According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Bosev v. Bulgaria the inclusion of rules for judicial recusal and withdrawals in national legislation reflects the legislator’s care “to eliminate any legitimate doubt as to the impartiality of a judge or court and represents an attempt to ensure impartiality by removing the causes of concern in this area.”
In recent years, however, we have witnessed how the recusal, once a guarantee for a fair trial, can degenerate into a pressure tool against judges[1]. Cases of mass, unmotivated judicial withdrawals[2] have created a public perception that the random allocation of cases can be bypassed, access to justice restricted, and timeliness compromised.
Data
The number of judicial recusals and withdrawals offers valuable insight into the actual scale of the issue. The analysis “Judicial Independence or Institutional Fragility: Judicial Withdrawals in Bulgaria in 2024” examines both the quantitative aspects of the problem, its causes, the legal and social consequences of the excessive, and/or improper use of judicial withdrawals, and provides recommendations. The persistent growth of withdrawals is concerning. The number has exceeded 60,000 over the past three years.
Even if we disregard this large number, arguing that spread across approximately 2,200 judges it is not overwhelming, we cannot ignore two fundamental problems: their territorial concentration and the lack of justification for withdrawing from a case.
Territorial Concentration
In 2024 (as in previous years), judicial withdrawals are concentrated in specific courts. In absolute terms, the number is highest in Sofia City, which seems inevitable given the capital hosts many, often overloaded, courts. However, a closer look reveals that over 90% of all judicial withdrawals in Sofia City are concentrated in the Sofia City Court (SCC), with 8,450 of them (99%) being civil cases.
In the jurisdiction of the Burgas Court of Appeals, the highest number of withdrawals is seen in the Burgas Administrative Court (1,519, or over 67% of all in the region). In Varna, it is the District Court (DC) with 1,434 recusals (70% of the region’s total), of which 1,342 (94%) are civil cases. In Pleven, judicial withdrawals are more evenly spread. The highest number is registered in DC Pleven (946 or about 46%), but the Administrative Court (673) and the Regional Court (346) also have significant numbers. The District Court of Pleven also stands out for its almost equal distribution of recusals across civil (507) and criminal (432) cases, plus 5 in commercial matters.
An analysis of the relative share of withdrawals compared to the total number of pending cases reveals the highest frequency in the Burgas Administrative Court (48%), followed by the Pleven District Court (35–37%), Varna District Court (30%), and SCC (25%).
Lack of Motives/Reasoning
In many instances, including in high-profile cases, the motives for self-recusal are either missing or vague. Often, the only information provided is either the legal basis cited in the procedural law or simply the term “withdrawal”. There is an absence of specific case-related, objective facts and circumstances that would indicate possible bias or a conflict of interest. This could be due to omissions by judges or shortcomings in the design and operation of the Recusal Register, which hinders the completeness and transparency of the recorded information.
The large number of self-recusals, the lack of genuine reasons for many of them, and high-profile court cases that have attracted public attention create the impression that withdrawals have become a protective mechanism – a pre-emptive measure aimed at avoiding future criticism against judges, particularly in sensitive or high-profile cases. Also concerning is the lack of a consistent and effective institutional response. Equally concerning is the lack of a consistent and effective institutional response. Such responses are usually limited to individual bodies within the judiciary and rarely lead to meaningful change. Moreover, judicial withdrawals are also a sign of systemic weaknesses in judicial administration (judicial selection, evaluation, training).
Causes
Mass judicial withdrawals are sometimes prompted by so-called querulants – individuals who abuse procedural rights by filing numerous complaints or lawsuits against judges, frequently alleging judicial bias in another case which the judge is hearing. This is a chronic issue at the Sofia City Court, where a small number of plaintiffs are responsible for thousands of pending cases that remain inactive for years due to constant withdrawals. For these individuals, legal proceedings become a personal crusade, obsession, or form of compensatory action directed at an institution they view as a source of injustice, rather than a means to seek redress for a specific grievance.
When judges resort to withdrawals not due to real specific circumstances suggesting bias or conflict of interest, this may indicate:
- Lack of effective and consistent institutional support for judicial independence, including protection from groundless inspections or undue pressure from other bodies or branches of government. Despite the constitutional guarantee of independence, there have been cases where judges were subjected to special intelligence surveillance. Even when such checks end without sanctions, personal data is collected and can be abused (for instance, blackmail);
- Lack of personal resilience or professional maturity;
- Avoidance of excessive workload or complex, sensitive cases.
Consequences
It is unacceptable for parties in a court case to manipulate or for a judge to exploit the recusal mechanism for reasons other than ensuring a fair trial. When a judge cites impaired internal conviction without objective justification, it leads to many legally and socially unacceptable outcomes: worsened timeliness and quality of justice (revictimization and safety risks in criminal cases); undermining of random case allocation; conditions of uneven workloads among judges; increased costs; opportunities for forum shopping; restricted or denied access to justice; and erosion of trust in the judiciary.
What Can Be Done
Institutional measures taken thus far have shown little effectiveness, as judicial withdrawal numbers continue to rise yearly. Comprehensive and complex actions are needed, including:
- In-depth institutional analysis of the causes and effects of unmotivated withdrawals and easily granted recusals across the country. This analysis should include recommendations that do not threaten judicial independence or the judge’s right to form their internal conviction.
- Amendments to procedural laws to allow for collegial review of self-recusals. Such a mechanism would improve transparency and prevent abuse without compromising judicial independence. It is applied in other EU countries.
- Guaranteeing the physical safety and protection of judges under undue influence to recuse themselves as a way to manipulate cases’ outcomes.
Conclusion
The growing number of self-recusals and the prevalence of unmotivated ones undermine the random allocation of cases, access to timely justice, and public trust in the judiciary. The lack of effective institutional response to the persistently high levels of recusals jeopardizes key principles of the rule of law, including judicial independence and the right to a fair trial. When systemic deficiencies are treated as statistical (and nearly random) anomalies instead of symptoms of deeper problems, accountability becomes a formality. This not only erodes public trust in the judiciary but also weakens the internal legitimacy of judicial institutions.
For more information, refer to the full report.
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