Parallel Realities in Hungarian Public Discourse

Marie Bashkirtseva: At a book // Public domain

For most of us, it becomes an increasingly frequent everyday experience that when a politically charged topic is discussed during a conversation it causes anxiety, tension, or simply a bad feeling. We can also say that this phenomenon has become an integral part of Hungarian reality. In most cases, this sentiment is triggered by the fact that we find it increasingly difficult to contrast our opinions or narratives with other points of view.

The place of the worldview formulated along the lines of opinion formation and arguments, which is suitable for integrating other aspects, and experiences different from our own, is gradually but seemingly unshakably taken over by an identity-based worldview. Identity-based worldview is a complicated issue because whoever adopts this practice makes the values of the opinion bubble that they represent an integral component not only of their way of thinking but also of their personality. This will lead to the fact that you will perceive any dissent as a personal insult.

In the case of collective opinion camps, this phenomenon takes on a kind of tribal, or more erroneously, sectarian character, which hermetically closes against any external stimuli that try to get between them. José Ortega, in his brilliant work, “The Revolt of the Masses, explicitly discusses the infinitely harmful nature of masses of people who are incapable of self-reflection and questioning the perfection of their own convictions, and of this spirit.

Advances in modernity, such as social media, allow every person to access whatever information they feel like doing at any given moment. Thus, it often arises that even within the same family, different opinion bubbles suck in the members, which in almost all cases makes it impossible to experience the time spent together in a quality way. In my view, this decline of discourse and debate culture will have harmful effects of immeasurable magnitude in the long run, which will inevitably erode society’s resilience as culture and other civilizational values weaken.

Examples of Declining Discourse in Hungarian Press

Articles, essays, and podcasts dealing with political and other public issues make up a significant part of the various surfaces of the Hungarian media. Recently, due to election campaigns, this has been the focus of public discourse. This chapter of the article attempts to bring examples of the above-mentioned problem from Hungarian public discourse along certain topics. For the sake of topicality, the topics presented in the article will be the Hungarian national team’s participation in the European Championships, the EP elections, and a topic that is constantly with us, the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Hungary’s National Football Team

In short, the Hungarian national team’s performance at the 2024 European Championship in Germany looked as follows, objectively speaking: in its first match against Switzerland, the national team was defeated with a final score of 3-1, and then in the key but difficult encounter between Germany and Hungary, although they showed a better level of play, they still ran into a 2-0 jacket. Finally, against Scotland, they managed to secure the three points with an astounding goal in the 103rd minute, keeping the hope of advancement alive.

However, the events of the other groups brought a negative outcome for the ‘Hungarian National Eleven’, the most surprising of which was the Portuguese defeat that Ronaldo’s side suffered against Georgia, one of the weakest teams in the entire tournament, so that instead of Hungary the Caucasian nation could finally qualify for the knockout stage.

In the Hungarian press, these events were presented in completely different ways. For example, Telex publishes an article highlighting four points of a professional nature and intends to explain the unsuccessful Hungarian performance through them. The article emphasizes and analyses such things as the tactics set up by the Swiss captain, the efficiency of the Swiss defense and midfield, and the unexpected but serious mistakes made by the Hungarian team.

The article also uses strong phrases such as “Hungarian performance way below expectations”, “underdogs” Hungary counterattacks at certain points of the match, and similar strong criticism phrases. Origo, representing the pro-government press, covered the match by saying “The Hungarian national team’s European Championship match brought record viewership”. In addition, in their article, they mention the result in a few lines and then describe without any further reflection on the events of the match and how popular the match was on Hungarian public television.

This is quite strange because, on the one hand, matches can only be followed officially on M4 Sport’s transmitter in Hungary. On the other hand, it is probably not an unusual phenomenon that the most watched matches of the tournament in a country are those in which the national team participates. In addition, an article was published about the match, which was titled “Swiss footballer enjoyed scoring for Hungarians even more than sex”. The article later reveals that the player did not say anything like that, just a reporter wanted to put those words in his mouth.

As several people did after the match, 24.hu also covered the referee’s performance in the Hungarian-German duel for several articles. For example, the forum contains an article in which the author of the article examines Gündoğan’s hit and its antecedents. The article gives the impression of a completely fair work, aiming to include pros and cons as well as expert opinions.

In connection with the same match, the “conservative” media also manifested itself. A graphic example of the toxic politicization of public life is the following article published by Mandiner: “German striker taunted Orbán after the Hungarian-German match (VIDEO)”. The Mandiner article strongly suggests from its title that the German player’s “orbáning” may be a comment concerning the Hungarian prime minister, because let’s face it, in nine out of ten “Orbán” cases, the “orbáning” fellow does not have the first name Willi, but Viktor in his head.

After watching the video mentioned in the article, however, it becomes clear to everyone that the German player obviously meant Willi Orbán in this case, as he happened to be pushed by Gündoğan in front of the goal, which is what Füllkrug referred to the reporter. An article has also been published on the platform of the previously mentioned medium called Origo. The article lists the events of the match, during which it allows a few words of praise for the Germans’ play, especially the performance of goalkeeper Neuer, who previously spoke positively about the Hungarian team. However, this article also provides the narrative of the “cheating referee”, whose “performance” was essential for the negative outcome of the match from the Hungarian point of view.

Questions Related to War

The most recent events in connection with the war in Ukraine, which particularly affected Hungary, were undoubtedly Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s visits to Kyiv on 2 July and Moscow on 5 July, in addition to the 75th anniversary NATO summit in Washington also held in the same month. Since the outbreak of war on February 22, 2022, the Hungarian prime minister has not visited either of the two belligerent countries so far. However, following his takeover of the rotating presidency of the Council of EU on 1 July, the Hungarian Prime Minister did not delay in stopping by both destinations quickly.

Of course, the press did not pass by these events without a word. The articles of Telex and 24.hu mostly focused on the aspect of both events and to what extent the sudden visits could be related to Hungary’s new position within the Council of the European Union. This was mainly mentioned in connection with the visit to the Ukrainian capital, as the meeting suddenly put on the agenda and organized in the greatest secrecy was accompanied and preceded by a more conciliatory tone from the side of the Hungarian government than usual, as we can read examples of this from HVG in this article.

Moreover, the media critical of the government repeatedly highlighted Charles Michel and Josep Borrell’s objections and distancing to Orbán’s “peace mission” in Moscow. In addition to Telex and 24.hu, other outlets do not explicitly represent the position of the Hungarian government. The Western Light media represents a decidedly anti-government narrative, which, in my view, has little to do with factuality and objectivity in the same way as the surfaces of the previously mentioned pro-government press. Thus, even in its narrative about war, Western Light stands in stark contrast to that of the government, going so far as not only to deny the pro-peace attitude of the country’s leadership but specifically to accuse it of profiteering from the war emergency in an article. It should be emphasized that in this article the author prefers the term “tribute” instead of tax.

The pro-government side, on the other hand, presents events in a completely different narrative. For example, the Origo article calls Orbán’s visit to Kyiv “historic” and refers to it as a peace mission, as well as the Moscow meeting a few days later. The term “historic peace mission” is also strange or almost romantic, because Orbán was one of the last EU government/heads of state to travel to Kyiv since the beginning of the war, so it would be difficult to call him a great pioneer of diplomacy in this regard.

In contrast to the press critical of the government, comments from foreign politicians such as Nicolas Sarkozy, who explicitly praised Orbán’s actions to bring peace to Europe, made headlines. The division of Hungarian media and the almost hermetic isolation of the communication space between the two sides can also be observed on television. To alleviate the problem, it is certainly an honorable endeavor to create discussion platforms such as those offered by ATV’s Csatt program to Hungarian media consumers.

In the broadcast of this program on June 11, 2024,  the topic of the European joint army and conscription in connection with the Ukraine-Russia war was discussed. At one point, interrupting the debate between parties who identify with the position of the Hungarian government and those who form opposing poles on the subject, the presenter began to list the sentences previously uttered by members of the Hungarian government, which clearly portrayed positively the idea of compulsory conscription and the idea of a common European army, which are now described as dangerous risks to sovereignty.

In response, the pro-government journalist immediately started talking about a previous NATO summit, without commenting on what had been said. The argument of the ministerial commissioner sitting next to this journalist was roughly that it was too dangerous to support these plans now because they have become too important now and could pose a risk in the future. So, you should not invest in a project because it is currently of great historical importance. The logic is questionable, to say the least.

Another very important event is the NATO summit held in July this year, immediately after Orbán’s trips to Kyiv and Moscow (and Beijing). At this event, stakeholders discussed issues that will strongly thematize the strategy and operation of the Western military alliance system in the near future. These included planning further course of military and financial support to Ukraine and the possible membership of the Ukrainian state in NATO.

It is important to mention that at the event all member states signed a declaration declaring that the members of the alliance, including Hungary, unanimously support the inclusion of Ukraine’s accession on the agenda. This is a particularly interesting turn of events from a communication point of view, as the Hungarian leadership, in its communication to voters, has continuously emphasized the significance of the dangers inherent in Ukraine’s accession and its intention to prevent this accession process. Let’s see how all this turned out in the Hungarian press!

Telex, for example, published a rather critical article about the lessons learned from the summit. In this text, the author refers to an analysis by Stratfor, a geopolitical analysis company, in connection with the NATO summit. This article explicitly supports the argument that the support provided to the Ukrainian state agreed upon at this meeting is not politically, financially, or militarily sufficient. The last chapter of Telex’s article ends specifically with a quote in which Stratfor expresses that assistance at this pace still tends to increase Russia’s chances of victory.

On the page of Western Light, the one-sided anti-government platform, instead of analyses and various arguments of a more professional nature, we come across articles specifically containing negative comments about the person of the Hungarian Prime Minister. For example, an article titled “No one expected this: Ultra-embarrassing video of Orban is circulating on the internet”, features a video where all politicians except the Hungarian prime minister talk cheerfully before an event at the NATO summit. Another image, also depicted in this article, shows Meloni showing a distinctly unfavorable grimace on her face towards Orbán. I would not call this a mastery of political discourse either.

The other side of the coin is also worth mentioning. “Emmanuel Macron didn’t make much of a splash at the NATO summit,” Mandiner writes.  The article of the pro-government news site analyses in detail the role of the French head of state at the Washington meeting. Macron “was not one of the stars of the summit”, criticizing the fact that the president did not represent the central role that France has played in NATO affairs.

The parallel is interesting if we compare it with the aforementioned article of Western Light, how differently pro-government and government-critical outlets perceive and present the events of the same event. Also on topics related to support for Ukraine, Mandiner highlights narratives such as those voiced by Peter Pellegrini at the NATO summit, according to which support for Ukrainian forces is not necessarily insufficient, as Stratfor claims, but if it continues to this extent, it will, among other things, be to the detriment of air defense in Eastern Europe.

Touching on war narratives, for example, strong sayings in the pro-government press suggest in some articles that Western Allies are to blame for the war. This is also a very strange and radical viewpoint because officially even the Hungarian government takes the mainstream position that this bloody conflict is happening because of Russian aggression. However, Origo has articles under the title “The West provoked the War”. Of course, this is borrowed from the mouth of retired US military officer Earl Rasmussen, but publishing the statement in the Hungarian press is a gesture in itself. According to the article, Rasmussen traces the beginning of the “provocation” to the accession of Eastern European states to NATO.

EP Elections

As before, another current event is the EP elections held at the beginning of June this year. I will close this chapter by dissecting this topic. It should be noted that the Hungarian governing parties were preparing for a “Brussels occupation” throughout Europe. This means that the main campaign narrative and the great hope of Viktor Orbán’s party was that the EP elections would bring about a “sovereigntist” right-wing turn in the European Union, which would change the EU’s political attitude towards problems such as war, economic opening to the East, and the issue of migration, in a direction favorable to Orbán’s. Although only right-wing factions were able to win more seats than they had, there are strong conflicts of interest and fractures between these factions.

In addition, it is also a fact that the three strongest political blocs formed in the EP after the elections, i.e. the People’s Party, S&D and Renew Europe, would like to continue the EU’s political intentions so far, which, to put it mildly, goes against the aspirations of the ECR and ID, which the Hungarian governing parties hoped to advance. The results of the Hungarian EU parliamentary elections show the victory of Fidesz-KDNP with 44.82% and 11 mandates (independent, since then Patriots for Europe), while the TISZA Party, formed only a few months ago, is in second place with 29.60% and 7 mandates (EPP).

Moreover, the social democratic Democratic Coalition (Demokratikus Koalíció) and the national radical Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom) also won mandates, but their number is negligible. The seemingly overwhelmingly successful performance of the governing parties needs to be nuanced at this point by the important fact that this nearly 45% reached well over 50 at the beginning of the year, this was Fidesz-KDNP’s weakest performance in the EP elections since Hungary’s EU membership, and the aforementioned TISZA Party was not yet part of public discourse at all.

However, nearly a month after the election, Orbán’s dream came closer to reality with the formation of a new Eurosceptic, national radical group called Patriots for Europe. As reported by Telex and Euronews, with 84 seats, this group has officially become the third-largest force in the EP.

Now we will take a look at how certain actors of the Hungarian pro-government and government-critical media formed their own perception of reality in this case. In the days after the election (June 9 in Hungary), 444.hu, considered one of the most critical independent or opposition media outlets, apparently presented the governing parties and the prime minister in a rather negative context in the titles of articles published on the site. Such articles include “Viktor Orbán talks about snail slime, secretions and George Soros instead of war”.

In this article, in connection with the latest severe financial penalty imposed on Hungary by the European Court of Justice, the author highlights that after the elections Orbán suddenly returned from the narrative of war alarms to the “Soros-migrant” axis, when the freedom fighter rhetoric against the EU was on the agenda. On June 19, 444.hu starts its daily news feed with a headline titled “The rise of the Tisza Party and the decline of Fidesz-KDNP in the EP”, where among the first events of the news feed it presents statements and data that all aim to point out how much more effectively TISZA Party performed in the EP elections than the Hungarian governing parties.

It is worth looking at the articles published on the site of Western Light on this topic as well, the radical anti-government sentiment appears just as it does in connection with the war. One article on the platform states that “Orbán is dancing for joy after his all-time low EP performance”. This article also makes radically pejorative statements about Orbán such as “buddying with Putin” and being “in his pocket.” Also on this platform, in connection with the local elections held in Hungary on the same day as the European elections, one of the articles directly accuses a ruling party MP of political pedophilia.

In contrast, long before the formation of the Patriots faction, the pro-government press was buzzing about the overwhelming performance of the governing parties at the Hungarian level, and at the European level, they tried to emphasize the rise of parties dear to them. Examples of such articles are “TISZA is flooding, the opposition is turning upside down, but Fidesz’s two-thirds majority is eternal – at least for the time being” and “After the EP elections, migrants are worried all over Europe“. In the latter article, for example, the author writes about the enormous rise of sovereigntist-right-wing parties throughout the EU.

Since the recent formation of Patriots for Europe, the narrative on both sides has changed as follows. Here we can observe perhaps even sharper differences between outlets representing opposing views. For instance, according to an article published on Origo, a significantly larger part of Hungarian society can identify with the political messages of the Patriots than with those of the People’s Party. The article draws attention to values such as the protection of sovereignty and the importance of making the child protection law even stricter.

The portal also published an article based on statements such as those made by György Hölvényi, MEP of the Hungarian KDNP, such as “the faction of opportunities”, referring to the formation of the Patriots for Europe. On his social media platforms, the politician also hinted that as a member of the parliamentary group, he will work for a normal and citizen-friendly Europe based on the cooperation of nations. An article in Telex takes a very different tone about the same faction: “With Filip Turek, the Patriots also have a real neo-Nazi in the faction.” It is noticeable that the term “neo-Nazi” is not necessarily intended to emphasize “normal and citizen-friendly” values. Basically, it can be observed very well that Telex uses the term “far-right” in its articles in relation to political forces sympathetic to Viktor Orbán rather than “sovereigntist” or “nationalist”.

Lessons To Be Learned

Concluding these examples, as well as the whole phenomenon behind it, we can see that the symptoms of polarization of public discourse become more apparent. The most serious symptom is that the passage between the narratives of certain opposing groups is increasingly impossible. The problem lies in the fact that an extremely necessary condition for the development of society is the ability to communicate between individuals and groups that make up society.

Therefore, this communication can prevail as efficiently and civilly as possible, and at the same time, the capacity of society to eliminate perceived tensions and problems within it will also increase. The basic condition for effective communication is, among other things, the ability and readiness to review one’s own perception of reality, as well as the ability to observe events in themselves and understand them from multiple perspectives. In order to improve the quality of public discourse, the very existence of an intention to do so would suffice.

However, I regret to see that this intention can hardly be detected in Hungary. I consider ATV’s program named Csatt, mentioned several times in the article, to be a positive example, but I still do not feel that it can achieve the desired effect in relation to the show. Of course, if such programs were the rule rather than the exception, there would be every chance that the culture of public discourse in Hungary would be reorganized.

It is also painful to see that it is precisely in the case of media close to the government that one can observe the greatest lack of reflection on anything that does not serve their momentary political interests, since it would be appropriate for a responsible state government to take ownership of its responsibility from this aspect of public service, and not to steer media culture towards the depravity of public discourse. This idea did not come from me: last year, for example, Balázs Orbán, the Prime Minister’s political director, put it this way: “Whoever dominates the media of a given country dominates the thinking of that country and, through it, the country”.

The only question now is: who has the courage in 2024 to subordinate this position of power not to their own interests dictated by the moment, but to the development of public spirit and culture?


Continue exploring: 

What to Do Next with Public Media in Poland?

Pro-government Social Media in Hungary

Balint Fazekas
Republikon Institute