The 2024 EP and municipal elections in Hungary, held on the same day, provide a complex and illuminating study of how financial resources, legal frameworks, and media control shape electoral outcomes.
The Fidesz party’s overwhelming dominance in campaign spending, both directly and indirectly, highlights significant imbalances in the democratic process. This article aims to explore and circumnavigate the financial imbalances between Fidesz and opposition parties, examine the legal structures that exacerbate these imbalances, and consider the wider implications for democratic justice. Additionally, it delves into the remarkable rise of Péter Magyar, leader of the Tisza Party, and the innovative strategies that have enabled his success despite the odds.
Financial Disparities in Campaign Spending
Direct Campaign Expenditures
The Fidesz party’s direct spending on election campaigns is significantly higher than that of opposition parties. These expenditures cover traditional advertising avenues such as television, radio, print media, and online platforms. The precise figures are challenging to determine due to limited transparency, but available data indicate a substantial imbalance.
For instance, in the 2022 national elections, Fidesz reportedly spent around HUF 10 billion (EUR 25 million) on its campaign, dwarfing the combined spending of all opposition parties, which was estimated at approximately HUF 3 billion (EUR 7,6 million). These expenditures are made possible by a combination of state funding, private donations, and corporate contributions, all of which are more accessible to the ruling party due to its entrenched position in power. [1]
Indirect Campaign Support
Beyond direct expenditures, Fidesz benefits from significant indirect support through entities such as Megafon, the Civil Unity Forum (CÖF), and government-sponsored advertisements.
Megafon: This pro-government media organization plays a crucial role in disseminating Fidesz’s narratives and attacking opposition figures. It operates through social media, creating and amplifying content that supports the ruling party’s agenda.
CÖF: The Civil Unity Forum is a government-aligned civil organization that conducts extensive campaigns aligning closely with Fidesz’s political goals. Funded by state and private resources, CÖF’s activities often blur the lines between civil society initiatives and political campaigning.
One of the keys to Fidesz’s electoral success is a national network that mobilizes effectively at the local level. This network is largely run with public money, mainly through pseudo-civil society organizations supported by the Municipal Civil Fund, which is administered by the Bethlen Gábor Fund. In recent years, it has distributed hundreds of millions of public funds to NGOs, many of them with strong links to the governing parties. Campaign financing is done through legal loopholes, which allow public funds to be used for mobilization and candidate positioning before elections. [2]
Government Advertisements
Advertisements funded by the government ostensibly for public information purposes frequently carry political overtones that favor Fidesz. These ads are funded by taxpayer money, creating an inherent advantage for the ruling party.
The combined effect of these indirect supports amplifies Fidesz’s message far beyond what opposition parties can achieve with their limited resources. [3]
Legal Framework and Exploitation of Loopholes
Hungary’s legal framework governing election campaign financing is riddled with loopholes that Fidesz exploits to its advantage. The laws ostensibly aim to ensure fair competition but in practice, they disproportionately benefit the ruling party.
Campaign Finance Laws
Hungarian law sets limits on direct campaign spending to promote fair competition. However, these limits are undermined by several factors:
Lack of Enforcement: The enforcement of spending limits is lax, allowing parties to exceed legal limits without facing significant consequences.
Broad Categorization: The categorization of what constitutes campaign expenses is broad and often vague, enabling parties to classify spending in ways that avoid regulatory scrutiny.
Third-Party Spending: The use of third-party organizations to promote political messages without direct attribution to the Fidesz party exemplifies how the ruling party circumvents spending limits. These organizations, like Megafon and CÖF, spend extensively on behalf of Fidesz without it being counted towards the party’s official campaign expenditures and several media are moving with them, the KESMA newspapers (and other government-controlled media). [4]
Sovereignty Protection Law
The Sovereignty Protection Law, introduced ostensibly to protect Hungary from foreign influence, places severe restrictions on foreign funding for NGOs and civil organizations. Since many of these organizations are aligned with opposition parties or are critical of the government, the law effectively curtails their financial capabilities, limiting their ability to campaign effectively.
Foreign Funding Restrictions: The law requires NGOs receiving foreign funds to register as foreign-funded organizations and subjects them to stringent reporting requirements. This deters foreign donors and complicates the operational capacity of these organizations.
Impact on Civil Society: By targeting NGOs that support democratic engagement and government accountability, the law stifles independent voices and reduces the opposition’s capacity to mount effective campaigns. [5]
EP Campaign of Fidesz
From the beginning, Fidesz has communicated that on the one hand, it is preparing for the toughest EP campaign ever, and on the other hand Máté Kocsis, the leader of Fidesz, said that their job is very simple, because they believe that the EP elections are about war or peace, and Fidesz has always been consistently pro-peace, while the opposition is pro-war.
Political Capital, the Mérték Media Analysis Workshop, and Lakmusz have been monitoring, analyzing, and checking political advertising on social media for six months. Political Capital’s analysis highlights that between December 31, 2023 and June 15, 2024, the Hungarian government spent significantly more than the opposition on political advertising on social media. The government and its proxies spent HUF 2.136 billion (EUR 5,4 million) on Facebook and Google ads, four times more than the opposition combined.
This extensive funding has allowed Fidesz to saturate multiple media platforms with its message and significantly outspend the opposition. Ads featured a high proportion of hostile narratives, 98% of which came from pro-government sources. Fidesz’s advertising spend was also notable at the EU level, as they were the largest political advertiser on Google in the EU as a whole during this period. [6]
During the campaign, Fidesz’s dominance was also evident in the billboard sector, with Fidesz’s messages appearing on the majority of billboards in public spaces, while opposition parties were much less prominent. Billboard campaigns also had a significant cost. Fidesz placed hundreds of billboards across the country, costing millions of euros. It is important to highlight that the largest Hungarian public advertising companies are owned by Fidesz, and this increases the gap between the opposition and Fidesz, especially in rural areas, where only the most expensive opposition poster campaigns reach, and even then only occasionally and not everywhere.
Types of Advertisements
The content of Fidesz’s advertisements was uniform, but at the same time infinitely simplistic: those who do not choose them, i.e. “peace“, choose war and death. The fearmongering reached its maximum level. In addition, the negative ads often portrayed the opposition as a threat to Hungary’s stability and security, using misinformation to discredit the opponents.
The target of another prominent enemy narrative was Péter Magyar, whose discrediting was a dominant element of the entire campaign. [7]
Comparative Expenditure and Impact
Compared to opposition and other European political campaigns, Fidesz’s spending was extremely high. The opposition, hampered by poorer access to funding and media, found it difficult to match the scale and scope of Fidesz’s campaign. This difference is not only significant within Hungary but is also salient in the wider European context. In many European countries, campaign spending is more regulated and balanced, providing a more level playing field.
In Germany and France, for example, strict campaign finance laws and spending caps help to prevent a single party from beating its competitors by purely financial means. In Hungary, the lack of such regulations allowed Fidesz to dominate the media space, which contributed significantly to their electoral success.
How Much Were Billions Spent on Political Advertising Worth in The End?
The key findings of the analysis, jointly carried out by Political Capital, Mérték Media Analysis Workshop, and Lakmusz, were as follows:
- Political ad spending
Between 31 December 2023 and 15 June 2024, a total of HUF 4 billion 151 million (EUR 10,6 million) was spent on political advertising on Facebook and Google in Hungary.
The governing parties and their proxies spent four times as much (HUF 2 billion 136 million = EUR 5,4 million) as all opposition parties combined (HUF 544 million = EUR 1,4 million). - Campaign spending limit
For the 2022 parliamentary elections, the campaign spending limit was HUF 1 billion 177 million (EUR 2,9 million), which the governing side has already significantly exceeded on social media ads alone. - International comparison
Fidesz became the largest advertiser on Google in the EU, and five of the eight largest advertised videos were funded by Fidesz. Quite the achievement considering the entire EU was in campaign mode for the EP elections, and Hungary isn’t the largest, most populous, or wealthiest EU country, in fact, normally Hungary is dead last in European statistics. - Adversarial narratives
Of every HUF spent on political content advertising, 47 cents was spent on the dissemination of enemy narratives, for a total of HUF 981 million 380 thousand (EUR 2,5 million).
Government-controlled actors paid 98% of the amount, while opposition parties paid only 2%. - Role of proxy organizations
A significant part of the government side’s advertising strategy was outsourced to proxy organizations, such as Megafon and CÖF, which often disseminated the same narratives in a more extreme style. - War narrative
The government side has made war the most important issue in the elections, campaigning with false messages that the elections were a choice between war and peace. - Targeting young voters
Fidesz paid special attention to targeting young voters, especially through social media ads (Facebook, Instagram). - Intensity of advertising activity
In the run-up to the campaign, advertising activity increased dramatically, especially in the week before the elections, when ad spending approached HUF 900 million (EUR 2,3 million).
These analyses highlight significant disparities in political advertising strategies and spending, as well as the narratives used in government communications. [8]
The Success of Péter Magyar
Looking ahead to the 2024 elections, we cannot ignore the emergence of a new player in the Hungarian political scene. Despite Fidesz’s financial and institutional advantages, the 2024 election cycle saw the surprising rise of Péter Magyar.
Péter Magyar is an up-and-coming Hungarian politician who quickly became known in the political scene, emerging as a public figure in his own right in early February, amid the presidential pardon scandal that implicated former President of the Republic Katalin Novák and former Justice Minister Judit Varga.
On March 15, he announced a flag-raising rally for his new political movement, Talpra, Magyarok! / Rise, Hungarians! He then ran in the June 9 EP elections for the Tisza Party. Péter Magyar’s campaign gained considerable traction in just a few months, attracting immense support. In the election they won the second largest number of MEP seats after Fidesz-KDNP: 7 seats with 29.53%. (Fidesz-KDNP won 11 seats with 41.17%). Their success shows that innovative strategies and grassroots mobilization can partly offset financial inequalities.
Grassroots Mobilization
Magyar’s campaign has focused on building a robust grassroots network, leveraging community engagement and volunteer-driven initiatives. This approach has enabled him to connect with voters on a personal level, fostering a sense of authenticity and commitment that large-scale advertising campaigns often lack. By engaging directly with voters, Magyar has been able to build a loyal supporter base that transcends traditional media influence.
Digital Campaigning
The digital realm has been a crucial battleground for Magyar. Utilizing social media platforms, and targeted online posts, he has been able to reach a broad audience with relatively low costs. This digital savviness has been instrumental in bypassing traditional media gatekeepers and directly engaging with the electorate. His use of data analytics and targeted messaging has allowed for efficient resource allocation and maximized voter engagement.
Implications for Democratic Justice
The consequences of Fidesz’s heavy spending are profound. The use of public resources and the overwhelming financial advantage led to concerns about the fairness of elections. The extensive use of public funds for campaign purposes can also be criticized as a misuse of taxpayers’ money that could otherwise be spent on basic public services.
In addition, Fidesz’s dominance in media advertising raises questions about the health of democracy in Hungary. The ability of the ruling party to control the narrative and limit the visibility of opposition messages undermines democratic principles and hinders genuine political competition. However, while Fidesz’s extensive resources give it a significant advantage, we cannot ignore the fact that Péter Magyar’s success shows that alternative strategies can still secure votes.
“Free But Not Fair” Elections
The term “free but not fair” aptly describes the current state of Hungarian elections. Voters are free to cast their ballots, but the overwhelming financial and institutional advantages enjoyed by Fidesz compromise the fairness of the electoral process. This imbalance raises questions about the true competitiveness of elections and the ability of opposition parties to present viable alternatives.
Future Prospects
Looking ahead, the 2026 elections may serve as a pivotal moment for Hungarian democracy. If opposition parties and independent candidates can harness innovative campaign strategies and mobilize grassroots support, they may begin to counterbalance the financial and institutional dominance of Fidesz. However, meaningful reforms in campaign finance laws and a commitment to fair electoral practices are essential to ensure a level playing field for all political actors.
Conclusion
Hungary’s 2024 election campaign highlights significant disparities in political advertising and campaign financing, underscoring the challenges to democratic fairness. The Fidesz party’s extensive use of direct and indirect spending, facilitated by legal loopholes and government support, creates a formidable advantage.
Nevertheless, the unexpected success of Péter Magyar offers a glimmer of hope, demonstrating that innovative campaigning and grassroots mobilization can still make an impact. For Hungary to achieve genuinely fair elections, comprehensive reforms and a renewed commitment to democratic principles are imperative.
Continue exploring:
Government Bonds: Additional Source of Income and Economic Catalyst
