Social, political and economic regulations are a result of the fact that not all of us are equipped with natural predispositions to the satisfactory degree. We are not even equipped equally. Therefore, we must compensate this inadequacy with cultural factors – we talked with Janusz A. Majcherek, a philosopher, journalist, the head of the Department of Sociology at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Pedagogical University of Cracow, Poland, about how to form democracy from the matter we already have.

Professor Janusz A. Majcherek

Agnieszka Rozner: For the past few weeks parents of the disabled children conducted a sit-in protest in the Polish Parliament demanding raising the attendance benefits to the level of minimum wage. The protest have also raised caregivers of adult disabled people. The situation poses a question: why the social correction, which is present in liberal doctrine in the shape of Rawls’s Theory of justice – especially his difference principle – seems to be inapplicable in the Polish reality?

Janusz A. Majcherek: Your question is based upon an erroneous thesis. The principle is realized in Polish politics of the past few years. The attendance benefits for caregivers of disabled children as well as many other social benefits were raised more significantly than average incomes, especially in comparison to the highest incomes. A decade ago, the lowest wage was lower by half: in 2004 it was 820zł (1€≈4,2zł, translator’s note) on average, now it is 1680zł. It has almost doubled while average wage was raised, in the respective time period, more or less by half. According to a recent publication, an increase in managerial wages, the highest wages in Poland, stopped. Moreover, those wages actually drop. Furthermore, according to the report published few weeks ago, social stratification, measured in Poland by the Gini coefficient, drops in the past few years. Therefore, if we apply Rawls’s maximin principle to the Polish socio-economic policy, we will see that it is fulfilled.

The maximin principle allows, however, for a certain injustice of distribution when it is advantageous for the least privileged.

Exactly, and in Poland the situation of people the most badly-off, suffering various misfortunes, improves the fastest in comparison the the situation of the wealthy citizens. We may only speculate whether the Rawls’ criterion is the only one there is or simply the best one to measure the level of justice. If we, however, apply it, it will turn out that Poland is a just state in this respect.

Then maybe we should not be bothered by high managerial wages? Because if they got even higher – according to the maximin principle – the overall social situation would be further improved.

In case of any evolving situation we may always claim that it can be done faster and better. It is, however, doubtful. Taking into consideration the protesting caregivers of the disabled, they are all concerned about the fact that once their demands are fulfilled, soon there will be lots of other social groups which consider themselves to be impaired or treated unfairly, demanding similar or even more radical privileges, subsidies or benefits. Is this a model of state we want to accept? Do we allow for the income distribution in Poland to be made according to the principle formulated by the leader of “Solidarność” (Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity”, translator’s note) Piotr Duda, who claimed that it shall be “snatched from the government”? Is it an acceptable way of shaping social policy? If so, then – let’s make things clear – a state would be useless. In such a case democracy, elections as well as any kind of institutionalisation of social conflicts is useless. We may as well leave the mechanisms of struggle for privileges – which would definitely not make the weakest ones the winners – alone. As the acceptance of such mechanisms means acceptance of the fact that in the end, not the weakest but the strongest, the most aggressive and determined shall be the winners.

Then a classical initial situation would reoccur.

Exactly. We have to make it clear that Rawls’s principles also cause some doubts. Let me compare this issue to a mountain-climbing expedition or a sporting competition: the faster the run or a climb, the more the group of competitors is spread out. The faster we try to run, the more we have to reconcile to the fact that not everyone will catch up. It is similar with mountain-climbing. Although we know an example of conquering K2 in winter, we also know that the two of climbers made it to the top and got back to the base camp very quickly while the two weakest ones died because nobody waited for them. That is an extreme example which shall not be even taken into consideration. Leaving aside extreme situations, however, we have to reconcile with the fact that fast development causes that the group which cannot catch up becomes larger. In such situation this group wants us to slow down and wait for the weakest ones. It cannot be done in many everyday situations, including macrosocial situation. At a respectively high level of development arise theories or questions whether stopping of the development in general is even possible. This might be the rhetoric of Switzerland or Norway but not Poland. Suggesting that Poles shall stop at a certain level of development is simply unacceptable. If we want to have fast development, we have to run really fast. Definitely faster than the Western Europe, to get closer to its standards. And fast run always results in the runners spreading out throughout the group, there is no doubt about it.

Let us go back to the Rawls’s text. He wrote in “A Theory of Justice”: “The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts”. Prof. Irena Lipowicz, the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, referred the case of caregivers of adult disabled people to the Constitutional Tribunal which ruled that they should receive attendance benefits which were taken away from them before. The Commissioner announced that a disciplinary actions against the clerks who neglected their duty shall be taken. Is this an appropriate solution?

It is a subject of constant negotiations and that is what politics is all about. Social, political and economic regulations are a result of the fact that not all of us are equipped with natural predispositions to the satisfactory degree. We are not even equipped equally. Therefore, we must compensate this inadequacy with cultural factors. This, however, offers certain possibilities that force us into thinking about the limits of their application. Once, social politics was the effect of the impossibility of modifying the natural equipment of an individual. Now, the situation has changed drastically. However, due to the increase in the scope of possibilities of compensating the lack of natural equipment, questions about to what extent do we want to use them arise. Nowadays, this dilemma may concern surgical modifications while in the future we might face the issue of genetic interferences.

In Polish media, the debate about the situation of the disabled deals mainly with fiscal issues. Would dealing with this case in a broader sense, as we are doing it now, be a chance for breaking the impasse?

Genetic engineering is a distant matter notwithstanding the fact that we may already observe some aspects of it nowadays. I think that we are being somewhat hypocritical with regard to this issue. On the one hand we expect that our disability or illness will be corrected by the means of public funds. On the other hand, at the same time we are less willing to pay for refunding such instances for others. Discussion about whether a lady taking care of a disabled person has the right to go on holidays on Adriatic Sea touches exactly upon this issue. The questions about who should we support – everyone or only the ones in the biggest need – are clearly stated in this debate. The ongoing discussion concerns therefore the question of what is the meaning of justice and whether “justly” means equally or depending on the context. And if the latter, then which context is essential.

There is therefore a clash of some standpoints arbitrary from the moral point of view. Are we still hopeless in this matter despite the honest trials to create a neutral theory of justice?

We cannot really hope for universal theories concerning moral matters as they usually fail. Let us consider Kant’s imperative. Just one look at the consequences of Kant’s standpoint which Benjamin Constant presented in a famous polemics concerned with the issue of truthfulness is enough. Kant claimed that we shall always tell the truth. Even when Constant gave an example of a torturer asking for the hiding place of his victim, Kant sustained his position as in his opinion any lie breaches the rule of public trust in general. As Leszek Kołakowski summarized, according to this standpoint one shall reveal the hiding place of Jews to Gestapo officers. The same situation applies to other universal rules. I oppose to the ethical rules which create theoretically objective and universal rules of moral conduct. I believe that morality is a matter of one’s conscience and feelings and not a matter of rational calculation. I am a supporter of situational ethics related to utilitarianism in the Popper’s spirit, thus negative utilitarianism. We shall not care about how to follow a certain rule but rather think how may we help a person in a particular situation.

The protest of the caregivers of the disabled overlaps interestingly with an ongoing for the past few months debate about Polish liberalism. Critical publications by Andrzej Walicki and Marcin Król were echoed in many polemics, either more or less successful ones. In the “Gazeta Wyborcza” Magazine from the end of March, Marcin Król, in response to the polemics, stated that we have to take the risk of change. He wrote: “The risk concerns the extension of private feelings on public feelings, private freedom on public freedom”. How should we take it? Does it mean a broader application of situational ethics which you have already mentioned?

Despite the fact that I am a supporter of emotivism in ethics, I am also aware that – and most philosophers always emphasised it – we shall not rely solely on feelings as they are transitory and unstable thus we shall rely on reason as it operates on fixed rules. Succumbing to emotions was usually perceived as a weakness, as being led astray, as being led into temptation.

Philippe Braud in “The Garden of Democratic Delights” notes that there is a lot of theoretizing a’la Rawls in the philosophy of politics, many trials of forming fixed rules of formalizing social and political life which shall improve its quality. Just like him I doubt it, and in this respect I am truly an emotivist related closer to feelings than rules. We have, however, the whole spectrum of various emotions: love and hate, admiration and envy, compassion and jealousy, enthusiasm and rage. This would therefore concern the positive emotions. Secondly, positive emotions shall not obscure reason. You cannot fall in love so deeply that you allow yourself to loose your mind. You cannot engage yourself in civic life so much that you loose clear vision. You cannot give away all your belongings out of compassion. I would welcome growth of importance of emotions in civic life if those emotions were positive. The elimination of negative emotions for the sake of positive ones cannot, however, go against the reason. Our generosity, compassion and sympathy cannot result in infantile and naïve behaviour. Emotions you feel seeing a child begging on the street are evoked falsely and they indicate a false action that follows. We shall not make grand gestures and help everyone who evokes in us compassion.

When it comes to liberalism, Andrzej Walicki wrote about it a few excellent essays in which he tries to give reasons to somewhat dubious thesis. He claims that the only true liberalism is the liberalism in the understanding of Mill, Rawls etc. Walicki tries to undermine neo-liberalism as usurpation. At the same time he also distorts liberalism relating it to the socio-liberalism. Similar standpoint presents also Marcin Król. Walicki tries to persuade us that neo-liberals have appropriated liberalism, usurping the right to represent liberalism as its rightful spokesmen. I may agree with this thesis. Walicki, however, presents a list of various liberal thinkers of the past few centuries in order to show that those are the only true liberals. It is also biased and selective understanding of liberalism which is, in fact, very broad intellectual trend which comprises many different standpoints. No variety of liberalism has the right to usurp the exclusivity or representativeness of liberalism. And neo-liberals as well as Andrzej Walicki tend to usurp this right. The search for the one, true liberalism is a contradiction to the same doctrine which is, in fact, an apologue of pluralism and diversity. Liberalism accepts various intellectual and political trends. We shall therefore get accustomed with this fact instead of claiming that others are fake liberals.

It is just like in case of true democracy.

Notions such as true liberalism, true conservatism or true democracy are usually suspicious. If someone is talking about true democracy then it usually means something different from liberal democracy. Democracy as such also occurs in many variations. What is worth consideration is whether some variations do not defraud democracy. By analogy, there are certainly also some liberal trends which defraud liberalism and such cases shall be exposed. We shall not, however, single out fake and true liberals among ourselves.

Then maybe it is time to abandon the antagonizing oppositions: individual vs community, private vs public emotions? Maybe we shall focus on political culture?

I am extremely critical about the statement that we will not have a better democracy unless we improve culture – either civic, public or finally personal. We must do democracy with the people we have. We have to do our best forming it from the matter we already have. I am really optimistic about it. Liberal democracy is no system for angels. This is exactly why we need democracy. Because people are mean, imperfect, they succumb to temptations, bad habits as well as false ideas. The obstacle for democracy lies not in the fact that people fall for absurd ideas, that they have their faults or imperfections. Democracy suffers when groups usurping the right to rule and organise civic life according to their norms and standards appear. We shall oppose to that and not to the stupidity, underdevelopment, primitiveness or poor culture. Well, that too but it is not a condition vital for the existence of democracy.

And we finally come to the old Churchill’s thesis.

Saying that “thanks to our virtues we create society, due to our faults we must create state” would be also adequate. The necessity to regulate political life is the result of out imperfections. As democracy does it with the highest regard for freedom, it is the lesser evil from this point of view. And here Churchill’s statement it absolutely correct. We must introduce certain regulations in order to prevent meanness, envy, egoism and other faults from making living impossible and so at the same time we would not change into slaves. According to Hobbes, human life would be short, mean and deprived of all joy without it. If we allow spontaneity in interpersonal relations, the consequences would be terrible. Therefore we try to regulate it somehow. On the other hand, institutions which shall regulate it cannot be too complex as, as we know from our experience, then they usually serve some form of oppression. Thus, liberal democracy in a limited state is the answer. With awareness that no perfect model can be achieved this way. It is all about preventing suffering of possibly the biggest number of people. In this respect I agree with Mill or rather with Popper. We shall therefore not ponder over how much happiness can be given to people but rather try to eliminate possibly the biggest amount of pain and suffering.

Janusz A. Majcherek – a philosopher, journalist, the head of the Department of Sociology at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Pedagogical University of Cracow, Poland.

 

Translation: Olga Łabendowicz