![Scramble for Europe with Dimitar Bechev [PODCAST]](http://4liberty.eu/phidroav/2026/10/Liberal-Europe-Podcast-Format-1-2-1024x1024.jpg "Scramble for Europe with Dimitar Bechev [PODCAST]")
How is a waning liberal order shifting the ground beneath Europe’s feet? What does Russia’s aggressive revisionism mean for the future of European security? How is Turkey leveraging cooptation to play global powers against each other? Can Europe successfully navigate an increasingly intense strategic and economic rivalry with China? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Dimitar Bechev, the Director of the Dahrendorf Programme at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, as well as Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe. His latest book is “The Scramble for Europe: Russia, China, and Turkey Challenging Regional Order” (Oxford University Press, 2026).
Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): What specific challenges do Russia, China, and Turkey pose to Europe and its regional order?
Dimitar Bechev (DB): There are challenges in different ways. Before addressing the specific challenges, it is useful to briefly explain what is meant by ‘regional order’. The European regional order is a subset of what scholars describe as the ‘liberal international order’. It is based on American hegemony, open borders, democracy, and multilateral institutions.
However, two specifics distinguish Europe. First, the boundary between international politics and domestic politics in Europe is blurred because of ‘European integration’. What happens in Brussels has a knock-on effect domestically, and what happens in one member state spills over to another. Second, this order is expansionist. Once a country is a neighbor to the European Union, there is a magnetic effect. Neighbors have an interest in gaining access to institutional resources, and on the power side, they have an interest in having a say in how decisions on the economy, society, and politics are made.
All three players started off in the post-Cold War era as benign or cooptable into this order. Turkey is the best example because it was seeking membership and was serious about it in the 2000s when negotiations kicked off. Russia had a modus vivendi with the European order because its role was that of a partner on its own terms. It wanted to dictate the terms, but not as an adversary. China was benefiting from trade and from integration into the global economy, specifically with Europe.
Today, those three are pushing against various aspects of the order, or all aspects in the case of Russia. Russia wants to smash this system apart; it essentially wants the European Union, NATO, and the rest of the institutional setup to disappear. It might not have the capacity, but it has the will and the intention, and it will do what is within its power to achieve that. China wants to diminish Europe, co-opt it, and make it dependent economically and, to a lesser degree, politically. Turkey is very different. It no longer signs up to the European script in domestic politics, but externally, it wants to renegotiate the deal it has with Europe. It wants better access and to be treated as an equal, not unlike Russia in previous decades.
Europe used to believe that the world could be changed in its own image. However, over the last decade, it has found itself on the receiving end. It is defending and trying to sustain what it already has against multiple actors.
The United States represents another challenge because it is not an external actor; it is part of the internal structure. The American anchor was the structural condition that made the European Union and integration possible. The pushback against Europe coming from the United States administration belongs in the same bracket as centrifugal forces within Europe, such as the populist insurgency against integration, against Brussels, and against the liberal consensus. Therefore, the United States is part of the family structure rather than an external actor like Russia, China, or Turkey.
LJ: Do the outside powers you describe view Europe as a potential equal partner or adversary, or do they see it in a predatory way — seeking to exploit its weaknesses while never seriously considering it a true partner?
DB: I intentionally avoid speaking about Europe as a single actor, even in the normative sense, which is the case with many of those books. Using ‘regional order’ allows for fragmentation and more multiplicity because there are various stakeholders, and they are the member states, the European institutions. The United Kingdom is not a European Union country, but it is a stakeholder nonetheless, especially after the early stages of Brexit. Clearly, after Rishi Sunak came to office, you have the re-engagement. By the same token, the United States is a stakeholder too.
An order allows you to allow space for all kinds of different agents operating within the order under the same conditions, principles, and so on and so forth, and avoids the question of when will Europe finally get its act together and be a great power or integrate, which is not that helpful.
The question about Russia is really important because I do believe that Russia saw itself as a stakeholder in the European order, but in a very different one than the actual existing order. The Russian vision of Europe was sort of a flashback to the 19th century, where you have a couple of big guys, not just the United States, but also Germany and France and the United Kingdom, and you can do business with those and ignore the institutional overlay and definitely not pay attention to the smaller countries involved because they are secondary. They do not command political power.
The first time it became evident was in the Yugoslav Wars in 1994 when the Contact Group emerged around how to manage the siege of Sarajevo, and Russia got recognition as part of this Contact Group of great power, sort of a repetition of the ‘Concert of Europe’. That very much spoke to Russia’s quest for status in Europe, but a Europe of states or of regional powers.
Another case in point is energy, where Russia went bilateral with those deals and exploited fragmentation. Clearly, the German-Russian connection, but not only, was the key theme there. The point to me was that, again, Russians, all the way to Vladimir Putin’s return to power in 2012, could see themselves as a partner, as co-opted or co-optable, or could strike a deal with the Europeans.
The key European players had the same perspective on Russia. That was the essence of the deal in 2008 in Bucharest when Ukraine and Georgia were promised membership, but Germany and France essentially blocked the ‘Membership Action Plan’. That was the case when Nicolas Sarkozy went to negotiate a ceasefire in Georgia in 2008. That was even the case with the ‘Minsk agreements’, where Russia was acknowledged as a legitimate player and you could paper over the differences, start some sort of a diplomatic process. The Germans would invest also into Nord Stream 2, economic interdependence, where Russia could be co-opted into the European order, and there would be a mutual accommodation.
The problem with this approach on both sides is that, again, it ignored what a European regional order is about, and definitely ignored the pulling effect of Europe. Those negotiations could not cancel the willingness of other players to push for their own interests. When Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign the political association agreement, the next thing you saw was a domestic crisis in Ukraine because a sufficient number of people pushed back against it.
Ukraine had agency because a number of people, maybe not a majority, but a clear subsection of the Ukrainian society wanted to be integrated in Europe. Since Poland joined in 2004, Ukraine was much more closely integrated in the economic and the social sphere of this European regional order. Neither European policymakers at the top, but certainly not Vladimir Putin foresaw that there are those bottom-up dynamics that operate in a very different way than what was the case in the 19th century, that it was not a panel of great powers anymore, and this magnetic suction effect would apply.
Belatedly, I think the Russians came to realize that the European Union and ‘European integration’ matter, having been oblivious. They used to think Brussels does not play a role and that it is all about Berlin and Paris and London and so on and so forth. They discovered that it does play a role, and that is pretty much a key driver of what we see now with the tragedy in Ukraine, despite all the obsession about NATO involvement and some political statement, certainly the Russian narrative.
LJ: How would you describe the unique nature of the influence and the challenge that Turkey poses to Europe, particularly from a southeastern perspective, given its complex role in areas like the Western Balkans and its balancing act between Russia and Ukraine?
DB: I think this is the wrong way to approach the conversation, to ask ourselves, what is Turkey doing to disrupt our influence? The conversation has to start with Turkey itself and not with what Europe wants to do.
When you look from the domestic perspective of Turkish society, you can see the profound change. Historically, since the early 19th century, in the Ottoman times, Europe has been a model, a standard of civilization, if you will. Turkey had to conform with Europe to catch up, not unlike countries in Eastern Europe in many respects. Turkey is an Eastern European nation too.
This has changed now with the ‘AKP’ rule because there is a whole new discourse about civilizational uniqueness of Turkey being its own master, of having historical roots, of not having to be dictated in terms—very much the Russian conversation as well—and recovering its own cultural appeal and uniqueness. Some of that is obviously fake, but it is a different change of tone. It is a long conversation because even the pro-Western people or elites in the past had a bit of a love-hate relationship with Europe and the West, but now under Erdoğan, this is going in the other direction. Turkey sees itself as a leader of global Islam, a middle power, a potential hegemon in the Middle East, although this is not a given, but clearly not a country that desires recognition by Europe.
LJ: Do you see this civilizational and political shift as having been inspired internally from within Turkey, or was it more a reaction to a perceived rejection by the European Union?
DB: It has deeper roots in Turkey. It is both, to answer your question. It is the rejection, but also the rejection does not start in 2011 or 2009, when chapters were blocked. The rejection was felt from the 1960s, even before, that Turkey would never be accepted because of Islam, essentially.
Also, it has deep ideological roots in Turkish Islamism, but also Turkish nationalism more broadly. Like I said, there is a love-hate relationship because Europe is the standard you want to conform with, but also Europe has been the other that undermined the Ottoman Empire. The war of independence in the 1920s was fought against European powers. Turkey managed to basically revise the post-World War settlement, had to fend off the British and the French in the Middle East. There is this sort of underlay of thinking about the world outside as a source of threat, which feeds into the Islamist version of nationalism, which also brings cultural uniqueness and Turkey being unique and not having to follow the lessons and the precepts and not being a student of the West anymore.
In that sense, going back to your original question, Turkey is an alternative for it. It is not a revisionist, but certainly a rival or another center of power in thinking in their own self-conception.
Now, on the level of policy it becomes trickier because many policies are in line with European preference. It is not that investment in Kosovo or contributing troops to European Union peacekeeping missions in Bosnia is against European Union interests. It is in line with European Union interests. Even helping Ukraine, despite keeping options open and talking to the Russians, Turkey is trying to be helpful there as well.
That is why I am saying that the Turkish behavior or the Turkish position on the level of policy, not on the level of ideology, is to demand better conditions, to demand better treatment, to demand a better deal from Europe as opposed to subdue Europe or to destroy it altogether, because that is not really the policy. That is why the response by the European Union to Turkey is to try to co-opt it as much as possible. That might differ from member state to member state. If you speak to the Hungarians or the Poles or even Bulgarians, it is one view of Turkey, and if it is compared to how, say, Greeks feel about it, Turkey is not like that.
Overall, I believe that Turkey is still in the Eurosphere and not a revisionist in the full sense of the word as the Russians are, and not willing to take geopolitical risk because it is not in Turkey’s interest. But if the question is, can Turkey do the sort of changes and accept or recommit to the liberal democratic credo of the European Parliament and European ‘NGOs’, the answer is no. It follows its own way, and that will be the case going forward.
LJ: How do you evaluate the changing relationship between Europe and China, particularly regarding the tension between China’s technological and economic dominance and the possibility of Europe gaining digital sovereignty by charting a path independent of United States policy?
DB: There is a misconception in the European Union and here in China—whether held in good faith or otherwise—that whatever problems and frictions there are between Europe and China, it is down to American influence in Europe. Left to their own devices, those two would have a harmonious relationship. That could not be further removed from the truth.
First of all, China is supportive of Russia in the war of conquest of Ukraine. The economic lifeline has helped the Russians wage the war, and it impinges on key strategic interests of the European Union and Europeans more broadly. Second of all, there is the ‘China shock’t. China is undermining the viability of key sectors of the European economy because of unfair trading practices, and the trading surplus is just the indication that the issues are structural. Even the German car makers, that were amongst the top beneficiaries of the opening of China in the 1980s and onwards, are now bearing the brunt of their competition.
But it is also the case that some of what China is saying has an element of truth, because China is a stakeholder in an open multilateral order. We have an interest to cooperate with China, say on green technology, because if you want to build a zero-emission economy, Chinese technology, things like solar panels and batteries, are essential. We have to find a way to maximize the benefits of dealing with China and minimize the disruptive effect.
It is also important to understand that China has a global set of ambitions. It wants to be the next hegemon and to replace the Americans. It might not do it the way the Americans do it, projecting military power, but it is interested in deepening European dependency on technology and on trade, and in making sure that in case there is a global clash with the United States, Europe stays neutral and does not take a side. Any policy vis-à-vis China has to account for that as well.
It is not an easy policy to craft because there is mixed motivation, and there are 27 member states. But it is a major challenge, and it is not going away in any shape or form. The sheer weight of China in the global space, in the economy and technology, means that even people like me, who ten years ago would not pay that much attention now have to. That applies to any policymaker or think-tanker these days. The way we tended to always be mindful of America, its politics, institutions, and leadership, we have to pay attention to Beijing and to China because of its global weight and impact in Europe.
The conversation revolves around Dimitar Bechev’s book: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-scramble-for-europe-9780197781449
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movimento Liberal Social and the Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.