As the Members of the European Parliament’s ninth term closed their books, we tracked the views of incumbent MEPs on authoritarian regimes.
We used qualitative and quantitative methods to build an accurate picture of MEPs’ positions on authoritarian countries. We have analyzed 152 votes cast by MEPs between 2019 and December 2023 to determine the potential openness of these MEPs to authoritarian influence, particularly from Russia and China. We have categorized the votes into three groups: (1) Kremlin-critical, (2) China-critical, and (3) Counter-authoritarian.
Based on the individual votes, we have created the corresponding indices, namely the Kremlin-Critical Index (KCI), the China-Critical Index (CCI), and the Counter-Authoritarian Index (CAI). All indices have a value on a scale of 0-100, with a higher number representing a more critical voting pattern towards the Kremlin, China, or all other authoritarian regimes. The key conclusions for the work of Polish MEPs are the following:
Dividing Line between Polish Democrats and Law and Justice Party
The dividing line is between the Polish Democrats and the Law and Justice Party, but all parties perform well in all three indices. Polish MEPs score relatively high in all three indices. Their scores can be associated with their political family affiliation, notably with the lack of Polish representatives in the most radical groups. There have never been Polish members in the Left group, but in previous terms, a Polish voice on the radical right was well heard both in Brussels and in Warsaw.
The current composition of the Polish representation in the EP allows for distinguishing two clusters: PiS and the Democrats. The previous one denotes all Polish ECR MEPs and the latter is composed of all other MEPs, belonging to EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, and the Greens/EFA (parties associated with the incumbent Polish government).
The democrats do well in all three indices, demonstrating their skepticism towards Russia, China, and authoritarianism. PiS performed worse, but the differences are not striking if we look at the numbers. They are, however, if we look at rhetoric.
The two clusters crash specifically in their attitudes regarding democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – important components of the Counter-Authoritarian Index – which are the key topics in the domestic political debate. PiS has represented its ideological views (e.g. on sovereignty) and stance on current internal events on the European level, which is especially visible in discussions about the rule of law and minority rights. For the full picture, the lack of approval of S&D and the Greens/EFA MEPs for resolutions regarding left-wing regimes in Latin America should be noted.
Generally Kremlin-Critical Atmosphere
Differences in the Kremlin-Critical Index are overshadowed by the general anti-Kremlin sentiment present in Polish politics. It prevents any forms of open and intentional support for initiatives targeted at aiding Russian interests. The situation is different in the case of the China-Critical Index, as the position of Polish parties on China is not as intransigent as on Russia.
Regardless, relations with China are also subject to scrutiny as a consequence of widespread anti-communist and pro-American (and, by extension, pro-West) sentiments. That said, the approach to Beijing can also be more pragmatic. Polish parties reached high results on the China-Critical Index. Their scores vary between 89% and 100%, with the lowest being the PiS – although their 89% can also be considered as a very critical stance. Objections and abstentions in voting related to Russia and China should not be associated with support for these states and their agendas, at least not in Poland’s case.
Questions about Respect for Democracy
The voting patterns and statements of the Polish MEPs in the ECR group should raise concerns from the perspective of respect for democracy. MEPs who used to play and still want to play prominent roles in national politics use the most alarming language expressing their anti-democratic and anti-European views, which is very visible in the EP during discussions about the rule of law and minority rights.
Among all Polish MEPs, the behavior of Ryszard Czarnecki (PiS) appears to be the most disturbing (visibly low score in CCI and CAI) and should be observed closely in the future. Czarnecki not only achieved low scores in CCI and CAI but made a name for himself by complimenting regimes, for instance, the Azerbaijani one (after participating in an unauthorized mission in Baku and labeling elections there as “high standard”, “calm” and “without incidents”, he was banned from acting as election observers by the EP.)
Those who want to play a role at home are the loudest critics of democratic values. Among Polish MEPs who sit in the ECR group, almost all have shown some tendency towards authoritarianism. However, it is MEPs who likely seek to take up roles in domestic politics later are the most vocal in their criticism of – for instance – the LGBTQI+ community.
Polish political parties achieved very high scores in all indexes in general, and the social-liberal Spring (Wiosna; S&D) achieved a KCI score of 100%, although they were only represented in the EP for 25 out of the 47 possible Kremlin-related votes. Only the Republican Party (ECR) and the PiS had a KCI score under 90, and no Polish force had a score under 84%, which confirms that Poland is one of the most critical of Russia among the countries analyzed in this study. The trends are largely the same on the other indices as well.
Written by Miłosz Hodun.
The article is based on the report “MEPs from Central Europe: A Bulwark against Authoritarianism” (Budapest, 2024), conducted by the Political Capital Institute with the support of Projekt: Polska and five partner organizations. The full report can be found here.
