Rebuilding the Union on a Radically Parliamentarian Basis

The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.

Treaty of Lisbon, article 10

1. Crisis, a moment for improvement

The debate on the European Union has been increasingly difficult throughout the last twenty years. It is no surprise, since the debate has increasingly been opened up to society. Europe is no longer an affair of the elites: citizens, individually or organised in civic and political platforms (parties, NGO, media) have come to integrate it as a fundamental vector of their life and their daily discussions. That is the result, in part, of the growing set of subjects under European responsibility. That is also the result of some – minor – institutional reforms that have given some voice to citizens and civil society^[1]. But, most of all, this is the result of a financial crisis that has become an economic one and, in consequence, a major political crisis that has thrown off many governments and shaken the whole European Union, threatening its very existence.

In the limited space available here, I will not go in-depth, but I will go far. The ideas here set will be flawed, incomplete and, I am sure that many will say, slightly unrealistic. I would say that it is from the conjunction of many silly ideas that we can come up with good solutions. I will, consequently, enumerate the several problems that we see in the present institutional framework. I will then dismiss some of the solutions that have been proposed. And I will end with a proposal for a new institutional framework, grounded on the understanding that we should recognize the confederal nature of the European Union, but that we should at last integrate true democracy in it. This proposal will, as we shall see, rest upon a reinforcement of the representation of citizens on three ways: giving more powers to the parliament, making the Commission directly dependent on a true pan-European election and substituting national governments by national parliaments in the representation of national interests in legislative issues (though on broad policy, governments would maintain their executive powers in the European Union).

2. The fatal flaws of the European Union

§1 – The non-separation and, by all means, the absolute confusion of the executive and legislative powers, is one of the main flaws of the EU.

How historically curious is it that an institution that wants to uphold the heritage of centuries of democracy and political liberalism is not capable of integrating such heritage in itself? Both the American Founding Fathers, and our own, French (that is, European) Montesquieu, would probably move away in terror if they had the misfortunate of seeing the legislative process of the Union. In the EU, the parliamentary body, the EP, is not the main legislative body, and it is, by all means, the least relevant of the three main institutions (Parliament, Council and Commission). The European executive, the Commission, holds the power of legislative initiative, and the National executives, through the Council, hold crucial positions both in political decision-making and in law-making.

§2 – National governments and their diplomats do not represent the citizens, are unaccountable, and are destroying the EU.

Another issue is the role of governments. They are presented as the defenders of national interests. First of all, there is a problem regarding such definition of interests. Whereas there are interests of the states, it is highly doubtful that national interests are the same as the interests of each citizen. More often than not, the most damaging decisions of the EU[2] come, not directly from the Commission, but from the Council. The same governments that negotiate the most relevant (and shocking, such as we have seen with Cypriot banking crisis) decisions in Brussels, are the ones that accuse Brussels of being guilty of all unpopular measures back home.

§3 – The fact that the popular, representative, political institutions are the weakest link in the EU constitutes a major danger both for the survival of the EU and for the respect of individual and collective rights and freedoms.

Finally, we have the role of citizens. The citizen’s initiative had, as a goal, giving more power to Europeans. But it is too little, too hard, and too irrelevant. Direct or semi-direct democracy is hard enough in our countries – let alone in a giant of five hundred million individuals. Citizens can only rely on national parliaments – that normally have little power in European politics – and on the European Parliament to represent them and to defend their interests. Whereas the Commission and the Council represent the elitist (bureaucratic and diplomatic) and consequently shady political side of Europe, the proper legislative bodies are the only democratic ones.

3. The right problems, the wrong solutions

§4 – A democrat will not ask what to do, but how to do it.

The debate on the reform of the European Union is centred in a series of problems on which there is broad agreement. Some of them took some time to be recognized, such as the need to hear the citizens, but the soaring rates of euroscepticism are now paying off. Probably, the only wrong question that has been put is that of the centralisation versus devolution of powers. The question is not if we should integrate more or less. Both might be fine, depending on how we arrange our institutions. Unaccountable institutions should have few powers. Democratic institutions under the rule of law may have larger competences. The right question is not more or less Europe; it is: ‘What Europe?’

§5 – National governments and national parliaments.

A Europe where the states have more power to control the excesses in integration has been an argument to two possible solutions: enlarging the powers of governments; substituting the current European Parliament by an assembly of national members of parliament. The first, as we have seen, is precisely part of the problem. Most of the abusive legislation is produced by imposition of governments, pressured by national economic lobbies. The second is a bit more complicated. Whereas it is sure that giving a stronger role to national parliaments would be most welcome, and could help to deliver more sensible decisions, erasing the only European institution with direct popular legitimacy would be highly damaging for Europe.

§6 – A European constituency?

To give a direct legitimacy and bind the interests of national and European elites, many federalists have pointed out the need to have a European parliamentary constituency within the Parliament. It is true that such a constituency would finally allow a democratic and truly European debate, instead of the present negative sum of twenty-eight national populist discourses. But having a political body with elements with very distinct legitimacies (national and European) would not only be difficult to justify to citizens but, most importantly, will not be accepted by the prime stakeholders: the present MEP’s themselves^[3].

§6 – A presidentialist regime?

It has also been said that what would need is a directly elected President of the Union. It would have a European, democratic mandate, and would create a sense of unity. It is surprising that, in a continent where the overwhelming majority of the political regimes are of a parliamentary nature, so many defend such a blatantly presidentialist element. Since I personally prefer parliamentary solutions and distrust every concentration of powers – even more so when we speak of a complex structure with so many conflicting interests such as the EU – I do not favour a figure that would, as a result of its popular mandate, feel legitimated to call for more powers.

§7 – A more accountable Commission.

Finally, the least bad solution, and the least over-reaching also, that has been put forward is making the composition of the Commission dependent on the results of the EP elections. Whereas this copies a long established tradition in any parliamentary regime, the problem is that the present Commission also depends on the number of member-states and on the national governments. Contrary to the President, where a wide democratic legitimacy would be dangerous, here the problem is quite the reverse. It is the lack of popular mandate that damages the Commission, main legislative and executive body of the EU.

4. A revamped confederation

§8 – Avoid the monster!

The first temptation of autistic decision-makers is to give way to vanity and accumulate positions, titles and institutions, instead of sticking to what is effectively needed. Let me thus start my proposal by saying that none of the changes I defend here should result in enlarged expenditure in administrative and political processes. We should simply see the human, material and financial resources that compose the EU bodies and re-assign them in a new, healthy and productive way^[4].

§9 – Keep the Parliament as it is, change the representation of the national and European interests.

If some might disappear, others should remain such as they are – that is the case of the Parliament. Through its double character (a European institution elected in national constituencies) it may well be politically polymorphic enough to capture the complexity of European reality. What should certainly change are its resources and its powers: as it has been defended by an overwhelming number of personalities, it should have a single seat, eventually in Brussels; and it makes perfect sense for a parliament to have the power to propose new laws.

What should also change is where the problems are, and that means the bureaucratic element (the Commission) and the diplomatic one (the Council). The first is deemed to protect the Treatises, the acquis, the European interest. The second is deemed to protect the national interests. In truth, as both suffer from several architectural flaws, they do no such thing. And yet both interests are valid, and are needed, and should be defended. Most importantly, they are not opposed, if duly framed.

§10 – A smaller executive, closely controlled by a politically plural pan-European democratic body.

In what concerns the Commission, there are two choices: either it is severely reduced, or strongly democratised. Understanding that the challenges of integration demand an executive power; but also understanding that the Commission is more than an executive; what we should be doing is changing the Commission altogether. My proposal would be a small chamber of one hundred members elected by a single European constituency and formed only by the pan-European political parties. This would allow: recovering the idea of a European constituency; guaranteeing that the Commission would really be the guardian of the European interest, since parties would have to negotiate, internally, a minimal common denominator, and not more; and, most importantly, this would make it accountable towards citizens. From this chamber, a small Executive college should be formed (in an uneven number, eleven eventually), each Executive Commissioner being responsible of a ‘ministry’ (ending with the present schizophrenia of twenty-eight Directorate-Generals). This chamber would also elect, among its members, the President of the Union, which would preside over (without having any voting powers) both the Commission and the Council. It would be, as in any parliamentary republic, a symbolic figure, a moderator and a facilitator. The remaining ninety-nine members of the Commission would then be divided between the eleven new Directorate-Generals, the non-executive members allowed to be members of two sub-committees in charge of scrutinizing the work of each Executive Commissioner.

§11 – Power to the parliaments: changing the representation of national interests.

Regarding the defence of national interests, as I wrote previously, it is far from the truth that governments are willing and able to be its sole guarantors, and indeed what we should be doing is dividing the task between governments and national parliaments. Governments, represented in the Council, should continue having some power of oversight concerning broad political issues. But the legislative power within the co-decision procedure should be passed on to a Parliamentary Assembly, meaning, a parliament of parliaments, which would de facto become the upper chamber in this institutional framework. With the same distribution of voting rights per country that we presently have in the Council, gathering monthly in Strasbourg, with no power of legislative initiative but having broad veto powers, it would constitute a fundamental element in the whole system of checks and balances.

1. 5.      Final Remarks

I have, in this paper, not focused on the policy responsibilities of the EU. As I said in the beginning, I do not believe in a discussion based on what we should be doing, on having more Europe or less Europe; instead, I believe in a discussion on how we should do it. I consider myself to be pro-European, but I am, before that, a Liberal and a Democrat. This means that I neither like nor trust unaccountable institutions. This means that I do not recognize decisions that did not count with my consent. And this also means that I believe in a system of checks and balances that guarantees that no political actor – be it a state, a person, a party or an assembly, or a group of any of these actors – holds so much power that the commonwealth is no longer able to counter authoritarian tendencies and have a say on its future.

I believe the EU is a confederation, and I believe it should not be more than a confederation – at least for the decades to come. It should be democratic, and thus integrate the multiple ways under which we, the citizens, present ourselves. As Europeans (and, thus, having a democratic institution elected by all Europeans as such that is in charge of respecting the European interest – my Commission College). But also as nationals of our own countries (and thus the European Parliament should remain as it is, though with enlarged powers).

But I also believe that the national interests should be respected, for we are not a country, but a country of countries. I just do not believe that governments perform that task. The Council should continue to exist, as part, together with the Executive Commission, of the executive branch of power. But the legislative branch should be given to its proper owners, the national parliaments, where the diversity of opinions in each country could be represented in a proper senate, the Parliamentary Assembly.

I also think that my proposal, besides performing this crucial scission between executive and legislative, and duly recognizing the national and the European dimensions, also allows us to address a couple of other, less relevant but still symbolic, issues. The first one is the Presidency of the Union. It would have a democratic mandate, but indirect. It would be influent, without having hard power. We would finally end this sad story in which the Presidents of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament try to present themselves as the first figure of the Union. Also, we could finally end the regular – and expensive – Strasbourg sessions of the EP. Strasbourg should be the home of the Parliamentary Assembly, and Brussels that of the European Parliament.

I hope that the near future brings us much fruitful and constructive discussion on how to reform the European Union. Where we are, we cannot stay. With the institutions that we have, I can only say I would prefer to step back, because the present EU has too much power and too little control by the citizens. So, if we do want to move forward, we will have to open it. Whatever the final conclusion is, I only hope that it respects the will of the Europeans, and not the whims of the elites. The alternative to this can only be the end of the European Union – something, I am sure, most Europeans do not wish.