When the United States struggled with a recession in the early 1990s, James Carville, who was an adviser to Bill Clinton during the presidential campaign, coined a slogan that for decades became a hallmark of neoliberal thinking (or even a neoliberal worldview). The economy, stupid! was quoted in every language, tailored to the circumstances of a given country, company, or even private matters. A phrase as well-known as it is overused, it eventually inspired countless variations in which “the economy” was replaced with other weighty nouns, drawing attention to the needs, deficits, or outright crises of various fields and disciplines. We still use it—sometimes intuitively, sometimes in moments bordering on resignation—to highlight how close we are to a crisis, if we are not already in one.
When the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union adopts the slogan “Security, Europe!”, it is difficult not to see the parallel. Although the phrase is decidedly more subdued than its American predecessor, it offers a firm diagnosis of today’s Europe: highlighting deficits across multiple domains, the crisis of our broadly understood security (as reflected in the priorities adopted for the coming six months), and (whispered perhaps less theatrically these days) the crisis of leadership itself.
Without leadership, without the stability, rationality, and predictability it brings, security simply cannot be ensured. Crises are multiplying: upcoming elections in Germany, political instability in France, Austria’s inability to form a government without the far right, Slovakia rushing headlong toward Moscow, Hungary—despite faint hopes for a solid opposition—remaining “safely” in Putin’s embrace, Elon Musk’s political ambitions in Europe, hybrid warfare, disinformation, and a general sense of anxiety that further erodes already fragile social resilience. This is already a long list—and we have not even reached the heart of the problem yet. One might be tempted to say, “Europe is what it is—everyone can see it,” but it is difficult to apply this old maxim lightly to something as complex as our Union, an organism whose internal and external vitality is, to some extent, in Polish hands.
Europe Takes Stock
The EU is by no means unaware of these crises and challenges. Nor is this about patching up the multidimensionally poor—and nearly invisible—Hungarian presidency in the second half of last year. In a sense, this may have been for the best: Orbán did not manage to break anything, while the EU, beyond its day-to-day business, was immersed in preparations for a new administrative and institutional cycle kicked off first by the European elections and then by the formation of a new, expanded, future-oriented European Commission. A quiet strategy of containing the fallout while simply “getting on with work” allowed the EU to reach January 2025 in one piece.
Yet Europe did not sleepwalk through this period. Looking back at 2024, one might call it the year of reports—thorough analyses of our starting point and proposals for shaping a “better tomorrow.”
The first was commissioned by the European Council and authored by Enrico Letta, former Italian prime minister and president of the Jacques Delors Institute. His report on the past and future of the single market highlights the widening gap between Europe and the United States in economic performance. Letta notes that although in the “Delors era” (with Jacques Delors heading the European Commission from 1985 to 1995) member states rejected integration in energy, telecommunications, and financial markets, today, when Europe’s competitiveness suffers as a result, it is time to rethink this direction.
A broader capital and energy union could allow Europe to narrow the gap with the US (and perhaps eventually catch up), strengthening our competitiveness. A crucial element of Letta’s recommendations is extending the list of fundamental freedoms in the single market—currently the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital—to include the free movement of innovation. He is hard to disagree with.
Since “competitiveness” has already been mentioned, the second major report, which is arguably the most discussed last year, was authored by former ECB President Mario Draghi. It warned of the “slow agony” of the EU economy and urged Europeans to “look to the future”: toward competitiveness, but also toward a model of “sustainable prosperity.” The point is not simply that without long-term thinking we will trip over our own feet and forfeit any hope of becoming a global leader in innovation and economic resilience.
Draghi makes it clear that if Europe wants to avoid slow decline while maintaining priorities such as fairness, environmental sustainability, and job creation, it must be ready to bear significant costs. According to his estimates, restoring EU competitiveness would require around €800 billion in annual investment. Draghi needed roughly 400 pages—no more, no less—to analyze all sectors of the EU economy and to outline proposals for improving their performance.
Three challenges stand out, each costly and not always pleasant to implement: closing the widening investment gap between the EU and the US/China, particularly in new technologies; designing decarbonization in a way that boosts EU competitiveness; and, finally—the theme we will return to repeatedly—security in its military, economic-geopolitical, and broader dimensions (all reflected in the priorities of the Polish presidency).
Security is also the central theme of the third major report published in 2024, authored by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö. In eighty recommendations for Europe’s security, he emphasizes that “together is safer.”
“Together” refers to the Union as a community that must strengthen its civilian and military capabilities, identify and analyze potential threats, respond early, enhance civil, social, and military resilience, develop crisis-response capacities, and improve cooperation between civilians and armed forces as crises intensify. Niinistö highlights the need to raise awareness of existing threats: from information manipulation to cyber and hybrid risks, sabotage, and overt aggression. The report calls for common standards of crisis preparedness to ensure decisions can be taken jointly, swiftly, and efficiently without weeks or months of dispute.
Today, we already know that shifting the EU’s focus toward defense and security is a priority. Beyond the reactions to the report itself, this is reflected in the new structure of the European Commission, which now includes a Commissioner for Defence (former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius), a stronger emphasis on NATO cooperation, and the political elevation of experience from countries bordering Russia—an immediate threat. The new Commissioner for Security is Finnish MEP Henna Virkkunen, while Estonia’s Kaja Kallas has become the Commission’s Vice-President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Defense and security now rank high on the EU’s priority list.
Opportunity or Lesson
Poland does not begin its presidency in a void. It is not our task to bring light into the bureaucratic maze, heal inefficiencies, or “take over leadership.” Leadership is not, after all, the formal role of the presidency, though effective management of EU processes can certainly move one in that direction. The presidency’s role is, in part, to administer ongoing processes, close files already on the table, introduce new topics requiring timely and effective responses, and open fresh areas for discussion. As the first presidency in the new institutional cycle, Poland has an opportunity to shape new modes of thinking. It must also manage a vast array of issues that fall under the broad umbrella of “security.”
When people hear “Security, Europe,” many respond: “Poland now has a great opportunity” and add, “We’re keeping our fingers crossed!” But finger-crossing or 20/20 hindsight has too often led us to inaction.
Meanwhile, the seven pillars of security outlined by the presidency—external security (relations with NATO, the US, and allies; development of military infrastructure; support for Ukraine), internal security (border protection, combating hybrid threats, terrorism, organized crime, and the sensitive issue of irregular migration), information security (still learning to detect disinformation and destabilization attempts), energy security (from reducing dependence on Russia to developing green energy and nuclear power), and security in food and health (strengthening the Common Agricultural Policy, ensuring high-quality food, bolstering pharmaceutical production within the EU, and addressing the mental-health crisis among children and youth)—are merely the beginning.
The deeper we go, the more challenges emerge: enlargement toward the Western Balkans and Moldova, the complicated path of Georgia, and the even more complex war-shaped future of Ukraine. There are further stages of transformation and the need for creative responses to the recommendations set out in the reports mentioned above. Each is a step toward the Union we seem to want despite our divisions.
The Union described by Donald Tusk when he says: “Let us do everything so that Europe becomes strong again.” And he is right that Europe must draw on the sources of its strength—rooted, since the days of the Founding Fathers, in shared values, in the solidarity we show one another, in the sovereignty we are unwilling to concede, in the freedom through which we protect our rights, and in the inner strength we must rediscover to rise above pettiness and narrow interests for the sake of something larger.
Presidency also means mediation: the ability to encourage cooperation, align positions, and reconcile interests. This skill will be indispensable at a time when, on the one hand, external threats are multiplying, and on the other, we must also manage and resolve the issues in our own backyard.
The article was originally published at https://liberte.pl/przekraczajac-unijne-status-quo/
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