There are few countries which illustrate the success of liberalism as clearly as Poland. In 1989, when communism was abolished, Poland introduced into governance philosophy of political and economical liberalism which made Poland way more rich and democratic country. Polish GDP grew from around 70 billion to over 1 trillion dollars, the quality of life improved significantly and Poland became one of the fastest developing countries in Europe. These are the effects of liberal thinking in Polish politics in practice.
Despite this, liberalism in Poland is losing its importance in favor of radical, extreme movements, especially on the right, which divide society, increase polarization, and whose views are based on hatred – towards social groups, other nationalities, state and European institutions, as well as towards specific politicians. They undermine all the liberal and democratic values that have led to Poland’s success in recent decades. This leads to a few questions – why are populist policies so successful in Poland? How can liberalism defend itself against this? And most importantly, can liberalism survive without becoming populist?
The economic and political transformation in the spirit of liberalism in 1989 was a success for Poland. This is a fact we have already established. But this beautiful story has one catch: economic development, even on such a large scale as in Poland, does not automatically translate into political gratitude from voters. Voters do not care about the billions of dollars in Polish GDP, they do not care about indicators measuring quality of life, and they do not care about abstract figures describing the funds Poland receives from the European Union. They care about how much they actually get out of it.
And, unfortunately, Poland’s economic success was not evenly distributed – everyone benefited, but not everyone benefited equally. Liberals did not understand this for a long time. But populists did. And that is how they won the 2015 elections – it was the year when PiS party came to power.
Immediately after coming to power, they began implementing social programs and a shift in the state’s philosophy. This led to positive changes in many household budgets. Above all, however, people who had felt neglected by the state for many years finally felt noticed. This change in their financial situation was coupled with something PiS politicians called a “revolution of dignity.” This contrasted with the then-opposition politicians, who warned that this was economically irresponsible and that there was no money for such expenditure. At the same time, PiS was dismantling the rule of law, attacking key public institutions such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court, and gradually eroding democratic standards – doing what you always might expect from far-right politicians. Despite this, they won the elections again in 2019.
Everything changed in 2023, and several factors contributed to this. First, PiS’s economic policies brought negative consequences, which included more than just a hidden budget deficit – high inflation and a real increase in the cost of living. As a result, the 2023 elections ended in a victory for the democratic opposition. The highest voter turnout in the history of the Third Polish Republic and the mobilization of many social groups (especially young people) gave power to a broad coalition – the liberal-democratic Civic Coalition, the Left, the center-right Polish People’s Party and the centrist Poland 2050. Donald Tusk became Prime Minister, and for the first few months, things were fine – polls showed quite high support for the parties forming the government, confidence polls also looked quite good, and the ruling parties achieved successes in local and European elections.
It will soon be three years since the 2023 elections, and the situation today is completely different – the right wing won the presidential elections last year, and may win the parliamentary elections next year. In short, the liberal side of the political scene is in a situation today that should be at least alarming. The democratic opposition succeeded in removing the PiS party from power in 2023, but failed to permanently reverse the political trends that initially brought the right to power. Today, they are returning, stronger than in 2023. PiS is becoming increasingly extreme, and with it comes the nationalist-conservative Confederation and the nationalist, monarchist, and very far-right party of Grzegorz Braun.
So why are populists so strong in Poland? The answer to this question lies primarily in a skill that populists have and liberals lack of them. Populists can create simple, understandable, and resonant narratives from true social frustrations. Liberals, on the other hand, have for many years either pretended that certain problems did not exist or, when they did recognize them, proposed sensible solutions but explained them in a highly complex and incomprehensible way. In Poland, the Civic Coalition, the only government party whose support is higher today than in 2023, has already partially (“partially” however is not enough) understood this.
So how can liberalism defend itself against populism? Of course, it does not have to become populist, and it does not have to copy the right. Above all, it must become better at communicating its program and values. This is something that Polish liberals have also partially understood (again, only “partially”). Until recently, migration and security issues were areas dominated by the right-wing agenda. Today, however, these are topics where the message of liberal parties in Poland is very noticeable. Liberalism can offer a simple, understandable message while also relying on pragmatic and responsible policies.
In conclusion, can liberalism survive without becoming populist? Yes, it can. Liberalism should not promise easy solutions to complex problems or create enemies simply to mobilize voters. Pragmatic liberalism does not have to be complicated, boring or unexciting. Instead, it should offer people something that populism cannot – a positive vision of freedom, prosperity and opportunity, combined with respect for democratic institutions and individual rights. The future of liberalism does not depend on whether we become copies of populists, but on whether we give people something better and more appealing.