On July 22, 2020, Szabolcs Dull, Chief Editor of Index (Hungary’s most popular news portal at that time) was dismissed after a media outlet with close ties to the government had acquired the shares of the company publishing the portal. As a request by Index journalists to reinstate Mr Dull as Chief Editor was refused, the leaders and almost all members of the editorial office resigned, claiming that external intervention in the composition of the editorial team constituted undisguised pressure. These developments were headline news on both Index itself and in other independent media. Consequently, a crowd of several thousand people attended a demonstration for press freedom and in support of Index on 24 July.
Just a few months later, the resigning journalists established a news portal under the name of Telex, which also attracted lively media interest. The new site relied on donations by readers, and received a significant EUR 200,000 grant form the Czech media company Economia. Telex is now one of the most popular and most reliable independent news sites which has published numerous articles with major political impact in Hungary, such as the confession of a military officer who revealed problems in the army. And according to another Telex article, the government was aware of illegal pollution in a Samsung battery manufacturing plant at Göd.
Ultimately, the Orbán government intended to silence independent media but actually helped build a bastion of critical journalism. This is a great example for the resolve of Hungary’s independent media; despite a decade of disinformation, obstacles and a hostile media market, independent press has survived and exhibited credible journalism.
Orbán’s decade-long campaign against the press
Ever since the 2000s, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party had focused on the media; they considered control over the press as a major ingredient to success. Unlike the previous Socialist government who had had capital salvaged from the times of Hungary’s transition to democracy, Fidesz did not have their own press outlets. That is why Lajos Simicska, Orbán’s trusted businessman and effective cashier, was charged with building up the party’s media empire. It was based on Simicska’s directions that Fidesz started to aggressively increase their influence in Hungary’s press: entities close to the party acquired several TV channels and newspapers, and it was obvious already back then that these publications would be used for political purposes. As many as 95 lawsuits were filed against the daily Magyar Nemzet over a single year (most of which were lost by the newspaper).
Another media outlet taken over, HírTV, was the only channel that had broadcast the violent demonstrations in 2006 against Orbán’s predecessor and nemesis Ferenc Gyurcsány. After their election victory in 2010, Fidesz not only continued but in fact tightened their control of Hungary’s media. A new media law passed in 2010 elicited wide-spread international criticism and forced public media to engage in self-censorship. And the closure or take-over of independent portals continued.
The expansion of the Fidesz media empire did not stop until the infamous “G Day” (when Lajos Simicska publicly turned against Orbán and called him an obscene name starting with the letter G). This event turned out to be a milestone in Hungary’s media history. The government had unexpectedly changed the rules governing the taxation of advertisements, thus ruining the businesses of Simicska, who considered that move as an open attack. We still do not know why Orbán turned against the businessman who had built an empire of companies close to Fidesz. Simicska may simply have grown too powerful within the party, threatening Orbán’s all-encompassing personal power.
When the conflict broke out, the previously reclusive oligarch lambasted the leadership of Fidesz and Orbán himself in no uncertain terms. His media, which had previously been very pro-government, suddenly started to publish strongly critical content. However, the media war did not last long: Simicska felt threatened but could not find a suitable opposition party to support. So he finally capitulated and sold his businesses to Orbán’s new oligarch in exchange for the opportunity to retire peacefully.
Fidesz continued to forge ahead after Simicska’s departure, with all power now concentrated with Viktor Orbán only. The governing party grouped the media outlets close to them into the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) established in 2018. This resulted in media centralisation and concentration that was unique in Europe. KESMA included more than 500 media products, from printed newspapers such as county dailies to radio and TV channels, as well as web portals. The aggressive takeovers and closures continued, and Fidesz fundamentally altered the operation of the media market.
The state became the largest advertiser in the domestic market, and many advertisers shied away from the most-read websites for fear of retorsions. The distribution of financial support from the state marked a very clear line between pro-government and independent media; websites supporting Fidesz survived thanks to billions of funds in advertisements placed by state-owned entities, while the free press needed various grant schemes and support from readers to stay afloat.
Independent Press
As all players have had to adapt to the hostile environment, these developments have created typical patterns in the operation of Hungary’s independent press. These outlets received no support from the state at all during Orbán’s 16-year rule; consequently, most of the surviving newspapers are established publications with a long history. And community funding has become all but indispensable. A few media outlets were established during the Fidesz era, but the market environment was very hostile to all players who did not want to align with the governing party.
Leading independent publications include HVG and 24.hu; both have survived the past 16 years thanks to a readership base built up over a relatively long time period. These publications had been established before Orbán’s second government came to power in 2010; unlike other publications collecting donations from readers, HVG and 24.hu employ a classic subscription-based market model. HVG is also published as a printed weekly, but most of the revenues is generated by advertisements and subscription fees.
Established back in 1999 as a groundbreaking online media venture, Index.hu was the definitive news portal in the 2000s and 2010s, with an initially youthful and light profile which gradually became more serious. The website still boasts major reach, but the government’s political influence became increasingly obvious after the acquisition of index in 2020. In the 2026 election campaign, the governing parties based their narratives on fake leaks published there. Two news portals that have since become definitive players split off from index: 444.hu in 2012, and the above-mentioned telex.hu in 2020.
Telex continued in the style of index.hu, with often updated news and scarce opinion articles. They have always been funded primarily from readers’ donations; in 2025, a Telex foundation collected the most money in a traditional support scheme involving the possibility for Hungarians to donate one percent of their personal income tax to various causes of their choice. A minority of their revenue came from international application schemes. Telex is the only major independent news site where all articles can still be read free of charge, without a subscription paywall, which indicates a significant supporter base.
In contrast, 444.hu has carried on the earlier, lighter side of the old index.hu; their video section features a drunk interview in Parliament. But they have also uncovered that the former President of Hungary had pardoned the accomplice of a convicted pedophile, an issue that helped end the 16-year rule of Fidesz. Most of the revenue of 444.hu comes from readers’ subscriptions; almost all analytical articles are now available to subscribers only. In addition, they generate advertising revenues, and apply for various international funds.
As an outlier besides the above-mentioned media, the YouTube channel Partizán joined the most popular online political interfaces as a grassroots initiative in the 2020s. Led by Márton Gulyás, the channel has gained popularity with interviews, analyses and short movies over the past few years. That is also where the first interview with Prime Minister Péter Magyar was published.
Partizán is chiefly funded from tax and one-off donations by viewers. The channel demonstrates how Fidesz has been unable to gain a foothold in the new online environment; they have introduced several “counter-channels”, but none of those could approach the reach of Partizán.
The list of noteworthy independent media includes RTL, one of Hungary’s two largest commercial TV channels. Owned by the RTL Group of Luxembourg, the channel has long been competing with TV2. Since this latter channel was bought up by the Fidesz government’s KESMA holding in the early 2010s, RTL has been known as the largest government-critical TV channel. It should be noted that RTL, as a commercial channel, primarily focuses on entertainment, with independent news coverage as a secondary function. Despite their objective reporting, they are often criticised for cheap “tabloid” content.
Hungary’s Media after the Orbán Era
In view of the situation described above, it is understandable that the demise of Fidesz in 2026 has caused upheaval in Hungary’s media market. Shocking developments have unfolded in the former government’s media since the parliamentary election in April: the state-owned news channel M1 has suspended broadcasting until the establishment of a new editorial team, and showed a black screen with an apology for the lies aired over the past years.
Massive dismissals have been announced at all prominent Fidesz media, affecting journalists, TV news directors, and research institutions’ staff alike. This demonstrates how many information sources depended on clandestine financing by the former governing party. The dismissals have also shaken the remaining voter base of Fidesz, with several pleas to wealthy “national capitalists” to keep conservative media alive. (Which constitutes an admission that these outlets are unable to survive in the market.) However, the oligarchs parading with handbags worth hundred million forints seem unwilling to devote money to such purposes.
It is rather difficult to predict how the free press will be affected by the recent changes. Communication with the new government is in fact much smoother than before, but how the media market will evolve remains unclear. The future of advertising by state-owned entities is unknown, and so is the matter of application schemes. What we do know is that independent media is here to stay.
There is a demand for credible journalism, and investigative articles have made a significant impact on politics in Hungary. As mentioned above, it had been the independent media that started a presidential pardon scandal which ultimately led to the rise of the Tisza Party and the demise of Fidesz. No matter how much money an authoritarian government burns up to generate media noise and discredit critics, a war against truth is doomed to fail.