I have noticed a change in myself recently – I open fewer news websites and read through multiple analyses of the same issue less often. If I want to know what the government has announced, I often visit one of Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s social media channels, where I can find not only the news but also its political interpretation straight away. In a matter of minutes, I can find out what decision has been taken, how the Prime Minister justifies it, and how he frames it within the narrative of the government’s performance. This is a quick and convenient way to stay informed, but it can easily give the impression that I already have enough information on the issue in question.
This personal experience does not in itself prove a general shift in news consumption, but it draws attention to an issue of democratic importance: what happens to the watchdog role of journalism when a section of the public begins to treat a political leader’s own channel as a fully-fledged news service?
In Hungary, this question is linked to the restructuring of the media system under the Orbán era, as the dismantling of political dependencies is taking place within a public sphere where, alongside traditional newsrooms, politicians, content creators and global technology companies also shape how information is accessed and interpreted. Restoring the independence of public service media therefore does not, in itself, resolve the relationship between political power and the provision of information.
The central paradox of the Hungarian situation is that the very same direct, platform-based communication that helped Péter Magyar circumvent a politically captive media system also enables him, as Prime Minister, to bypass the critical press. The democratic risk arises when citizens come to regard the authorities’ own communications as sufficient for assessing a decision, and independent scrutiny, further questioning or the consideration of alternative interpretations are pushed into the background.
The Legacy of Media Capture
In the Hungarian media system that emerged after 2010, political influence operated through several mutually reinforcing channels. The functioning of public service media, the concentration of ownership among government allies, and the allocation of state advertising all contributed to substantially unequal access to public visibility for political actors. Reporters Without Borders identifies these factors as major challenges to press freedom in Hungary. (Reporters Without Borders: Hungary)
In this context, the defining feature of media capture is the persistence of dependencies that constrain editorial autonomy. A media company may formally retain control over its content while its revenue, executive appointments, or regulatory operating conditions depend on political actors. Under such circumstances, accommodation can occur without direct instructions – a newsroom may, for example, anticipate the consequences of covering a politically inconvenient issue.
A report published on the Mérték Media Analysis Workshop website, examining the period from 2010 to 2025, outlines not only market and institutional influences but also the means used to obstruct independent journalism, including restrictions on access to information, smear campaigns and the use of legal pressure. It also highlights that democratic restoration must extend to the actual working conditions within newsrooms. (Mérték: The Repression of Independent Media in Hungary, 2010–2025)
This legacy does not disappear with an electoral defeat. Ownership structures, financial dependencies, professional practices and the public’s trust evolve more slowly than the composition of the government. Political transition can therefore easily run into the ‘winner-takes-all’ logic: the new leadership may deem it justified, citing past abuses, to exercise tight control over institutions undergoing transformation. However, this may perpetuate the very dependencies that the reform was originally intended to eliminate. One of the most important issues in the restoration process is therefore how to implement the necessary changes whilst at the same time limiting the scope for intervention by the new authorities.
The Dilemma of Dismantling and Rebuilding
In its July 2026 assessment, the Committee to Protect Journalists described the Hungarian government’s initial media policy measures as promising, while emphasizing that rapid changes in personnel and institutions do not yet guarantee lasting independence. The organization highlighted transparency in the reform process, professional participation, and safeguards against future government interference. This distinction matters because replacing an institution’s previous leadership can produce an immediate change, whereas establishing the conditions for autonomous operation requires a longer process of institution-building. (CPJ, 2026)
In the case of public service media, for example, the professional credibility of new executives is necessary but insufficient on its own. If their appointments, continued tenure, or budgets still depend on whether the government is satisfied with their work, a subsequent conflict may once again compel them to accommodate political expectations. Reform must therefore, also ensure that public service media can report on government failures, give space to opposition views, and investigate issues uncomfortable for those in power without fear of repercussions.
The European Media Freedom Act provides guidance in this regard. Article 5 requires transparent procedures for selecting the leadership of public service media, restrictions on early dismissal, and adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding. These safeguards are intended to ensure that editorial independence does not rest on the goodwill of the current political leadership. (Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Article 5)
The true test of democratic self-restraint is whether the rules now established are also binding on the government that created them. Reform can endure if it protects an institution’s autonomy even when its work no longer aligns with the government’s political interests.
The Changing Role of Direct Communication
In Péter Magyar’s rise to prominence, social media provided an important opportunity to circumvent the inequalities of access that exist in traditional media. In its 2026 country report on Hungary, the Reuters Institute, when discussing Tisza’s communication strategy, emphasizes both the role of organic content on social media platforms and that of face-to-face meetings. His own channels enabled Magyar to present his views and mobilize his supporters independently of editorial coverage. (Szakács, 2026)
The bypassing of intermediaries is referred to in the literature as disintermediation. Research by Matt Walsh and Jane B. Singer on British election campaigns excellently illustrates how Facebook has become an increasingly deliberate tool for political actors to bypass the press, and what questions this raises in terms of fact-checking and political accountability. However, direct communication does not mean the disappearance of all intermediaries, as the platform’s operation also shapes the visibility of content. (Walsh and Singer, 2025)
It is undoubtedly an advantage for voters to be able to understand a politician’s position in its entirety, rather than being presented solely with details selected by an editorial team. The democratic value of direct communication should therefore be recognized, whilst a distinction must be made between the accessibility of a position and its verifiability. A live broadcast, for example, can show what a politician has said, but it does not in itself clarify how well-founded their claims are, or what important circumstances may have been omitted from their speech.
Assuming a role in government makes this distinction particularly significant. As an opposition leader, Magyar’s own channel amplified the voice of a figure with limited access; as Prime Minister, on the very same platform, he now discusses decisions in which he himself plays a decisive role. The decision, its announcement and its political interpretation are thus all linked to the same figure.
When the Prime Minister Runs His Own News Feed
The intensity of this communication is also quantified in an analysis published on Telex by Csaba Molnár, an analyst at Political Capital. According to data from the Meta Content Library, Péter Magyar’s Facebook page published 1,918 posts between September 2025 and August 2026, without missing a single day. None of the posts examined contained external links, and the sharing of other people’s content was also rare. This suggests that the page operates as a continuous source of information based predominantly on its own content. (Molnár, 2026)
It is not yet possible to determine from this data whether followers consume less journalistic content. To do so, one would need to examine the information-seeking habits of the same individuals and how these have changed over time. However, it is possible to analyze what kind of information-seeking opportunities such a continuously updated politician’s page offers.
Its appeal lies partly in the reduction of the time and attention spent on searching for information. By following a single platform, one can learn what the government considers important, how it explains its decisions, and how it responds to its critics. The figurehead links the various issues together, whilst a regular presence can create a sense of continuity and closeness. Followers may therefore have less need to piece together the narrative of events themselves from various sources.
The risk here is the conflation of source and interpretation. A politician’s statement is the primary source for what the government claims or intends to do, but it is not independent evidence that a decision is working, that its costs are justified, or that all its consequences have been taken into account. When we use such a channel as a comprehensive news service, we entrust the selection and interpretation of topics to the very person whose actions we wish to judge. This does not require the dissemination of falsehoods. The selective presentation of factual information, the emphasis on successes, or the omission of certain consequences can, in itself, shape the audience’s assessment. The added value of journalism may lie precisely in the fact that it cross-checks the report against other sources, gives a voice to those affected, and asks questions that the politician does not address in their own statement.
Person-centered communication may also influence perceptions of governmental accountability. If various policy issues are presented primarily as the Prime Minister’s personal stories, the decision-making and implementation responsibilities of ministers or individual institutions may become less apparent. This is a possible consequence, the actual extent of which would need to be explored in a separate study, but it in itself justifies an examination of the relationship between personal communication and institutional information provision.
Criticism and Power Asymmetry
As well as on his own platform, the Prime Minister actively participates in debates arising from news stories about him. 444 has compiled a selection of one hundred comments from the first hundred days of the government’s term, including numerous reactions to editorial posts. This collection illustrates this communication practice, but as an editorial selection it is not suitable for providing a representative account of his entire commenting activity. (Német, 2026)
The Prime Minister is, of course, entitled to respond to a journalist, to dispute the claims made in an article or to take issue with its tone. Editorial teams must also accept professional responsibility for their mistakes and justify their interpretations. However, any assessment of the situation must take into account the differing positions of power held by the parties involved: a head of government’s statement is accompanied by the authority of office and the ability to mobilize political support; consequently, personal criticism from them may exert greater pressure on the recipient than a comment from a private individual.
It is particularly important that the reaction addresses the original claim. If attention shifts from the subject of the report to the journalist’s style or presumed intentions, the substantive issue may remain unanswered, whilst the public is already assessing the conflict between the politician and the editorial team. From the perspective of democratic accountability, therefore, both the content of the response and the opportunity for further questioning are important.
In a period of transition following an illiberal era, this may be accompanied by further tension. The interests of a press critical of the former regime and political figures promising change may have converged in exposing abuses; however, this does not imply any subsequent obligation of loyalty. The new government’s decisions are just as much in need of scrutiny, even if criticism arises at a politically inopportune moment, or if figures from the previous regime exploit it for their own ends.
One test of the press’s independence is precisely whether supporters of change also regard this scrutiny as legitimate.
The Institutional and Everyday Conditions of Independence
Media capture and person-centered communication on platforms are distinct phenomena; therefore, there is no justification for automatically equating them. The former refers to long-standing dependencies that restrict editorial autonomy, whilst the latter can function even under democratic conditions. Their relationship becomes significant where direct access to the government reduces the need for independent journalistic reporting, whilst the institutional and economic autonomy of the press has not yet been firmly established.
Moreover, the online platform remains an intermediary for politicians as well. Although they can control the content of their own messages, their visibility is also shaped by the platform’s ranking system, its rules and users’ reactions. In addition to curbing political dependencies, it is therefore necessary to take into account the media’s dependence on these platforms. (Walsh and Singer, 2025)
From the perspective of the Hungarian reform, this gives rise to three interrelated requirements. The management and funding of public service media must be safeguarded by rules that ensure its independent operation even in the event of political conflict. The allocation of state advertising and other media revenue derived from public funds must be made subject to scrutiny, so that economic conditions do not encourage political accommodation. Furthermore, government communications must provide various editorial teams with regular opportunities to ask questions and access substantive information.
The latter is essential even alongside the Prime Minister’s personal communications. A Facebook post or a live broadcast cannot replace a situation in which a journalist can ask follow-up questions, request documents, and, at a later date, compare the promise with its implementation. Institutional access to information of public interest must function even when a political leader does not wish to discuss a matter through their own channels.
Renewal Must begin with a Changed Public Sphere
Over the past sixteen years, alongside the political and economic conditions of the Hungarian media system, the very nature of news consumption has undergone a significant transformation. Newsrooms operate in an environment in which politicians, content producers and digital platforms alike shape what information reaches the public. The role of the media as the fourth estate has been subject to new conditions in this environment: whilst holding those in power to account remains its fundamental task, it now shares the role of conveying political messages with many other actors.
Péter Magyar’s government must therefore review the 2010 media regulations as part of its comprehensive reform of public service media, taking this changed situation as its starting point. In addition to dismantling the former instruments of political influence, it must also address how the public service remit can be fulfilled on digital platforms, how the long-term accessibility of information in the public interest can be ensured, and how editorial independence can be safeguarded amidst new dependencies. The modernization of legislation must also link the restructuring of domestic institutions to the broader European media regulatory framework.
The success of the reform will be demonstrated by whether the new institutions are able to maintain their autonomy even vis-à-vis their founders, and whether the public has access to information independent of the political leader’s own interpretation. To this end, journalism must also demonstrate the value of its own work: how it verifies a report, what missing connections it uncovers, and how it tracks the consequences of decisions.
A politician’s channel can be an important source of information, but the quality of a democratic public sphere is determined by the extent to which our knowledge of them goes beyond what they themselves wish to say.
Written
References
Committee to Protect Journalists (2026): Hungary’s initial media reforms are promising but lasting safeguards still needed.
Európai Parlament és az Európai Unió Tanácsa (2024): Az (EU) 2024/1083 rendelet a belső piaci médiaszolgáltatások közös keretének létrehozásáról és a 2010/13/EU irányelv módosításáról. Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja. (European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2024): Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU. Official Journal of the European Union.)
Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely (2026): The Repression of Independent Media in Hungary, 2010–2025.
Molnár Csaba (2026): Napi öt poszt, nulla üresjárat, 2,77 milliárd megjelenés – egy év Magyar Péter Facebook-oldalán. Telex
Német Szilvi (2026): 100 nap, 100 topkomment Magyar Pétertől. 444
Reporters Without Borders: Hungary.
Szakács Judit (2026): Hungary. Digital News Report 2026. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford.
Walsh, Matt – Singer, Jane B. (2025): Platform speech: Journalists and political campaigners reflect on Facebook and disintermediation in three UK general elections. Journalism, 26(10), 2087–2104.