In Hungary, FIDESZ-KDNP has been ruling the country with a two-thirds constitutional majority since 2010, now for 15 years. Under Orbán’s regime, there is a particular focus on the country’s media landscape and the crisis of its credibility. It is no exaggeration to state that the public media is effectively under political control and has lost its legitimacy.
In the year Orbán Viktor came to power, a new media law was passed, and in 2011, a comprehensive law came into effect that centralized everything in the hands of the regime and violated press freedom. This naturally caused a huge international outcry immediately, and there was also outrage over fears of the abolition of press freedom domestically as well.
The original criticisms and concerns predicted full and unapologetic censorship, as a media supervisory authority was established serving one party with the powers to impose fines and censorship. In reality, this has not fully happened. The EU, Strasbourg, Western countries, and international organizations all expressed their strong denunciation, and the European Commission even initiated a proposal to refine the law. Probably due to this, over the years, the government resorted to other methods instead of harsh legal tools. For example, the heads of the media regulatory authority are appointed for a period of nine years, making them irremovable for long periods, and so until 2028, the authority will be led by appointees of the two-thirds FIDESZ majority, with an effect on fines or radio frequency tenders.
As a result, no radio station in Hungary is independently owned. Moreover, over the last 15 years, many media outlets have been purchased by entrepreneurs connected to the government, exploiting their economic dominance and power. Several scandals have emerged around media outlets that once represented the independent press due to changes in chief editors, ownership, closures, or complete transformation.
The Hungarian law passed in 2010 stipulates that public service media must operate independently of the state and economic actors. Democratic control of its operation—meaning societal oversight—is also key for free public discourse and informed decision-making by voters. Additionally, the European Union submitted a media regulation proposal in 2022, which, after adoption, came into force this year as a regulation which is binding for member states. The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) emphasizes media pluralism, protection of media freedom, independence, and stable funding of public media, and transparency in media ownership and state advertising distribution. Important elements include journalist source protection and bans on spyware.
This regulation likely targets Hungary, where ongoing problems with press freedom persist. Hungary was the only country not to support the initiative, though it had no veto power. While the nation’s own laws and EU directives consider these conditions fundamental, public media less adequately meet these standards, which becomes an even more important issue for voters as the 2026 elections are approaching.
This year, Orbán’s government proposed another amendment to the media law, which again caused huge domestic and international outrage. Its enactment was postponed until autumn, but it is expected to return to the agenda. The proposal would classify media receiving foreign funding into a separate category—”organizations influencing public life with foreign support”—and list those threatening national sovereignty, potentially banning them. Many petitions and protests followed, as this would effectively wipe out independent media. The draft is titled “On transparency of public life,” but it regulates public life and media comprehensively and has been regarded by many as a Putin-style law.
The situation of the Hungarian independent press remains uncertain due to the 2010 media law and state media takeover, and continues to operate precariously, relying on foreign support and donations. It is clear that foreign funding, largely due to the rising popularity of podcasts and YouTube channels, plays some role in most online media, which is not equal to foreign control or influence. The bill was not enacted over the summer, citing clarification and consultation, but it is certain it will be on the table again soon. Protests and sharp EU criticisms likely had some effect, but government popularity is steadily declining according to polls, and elections are approaching fast. The campaign is just beginning, and Orbán will not yield easily.
Online media and various channels are becoming increasingly popular sources of information, which is not solely due to the media situation in Hungary. The importance of television and radio is decreasing, especially among youth. For younger generations, media consumption is shifting increasingly to digital platforms like podcasts, streaming, and social media, while older generations still seek active information but may be directed to online sites due to the unbalanced media empire mentioned.
The latest Eurobarometer Flash Youth Survey (October 2024) shows social media surpassing television as the main information source for youth (16-30), with growing awareness and sensitivity to disinformation. Digital platforms—especially social media—play a much stronger role in Hungary than the EU average. Young people are moving away from traditional media, with less TV and radio consumption and a stronger presence on digital and mobile devices. Unsurprisingly, trust in public media is lower in Hungary than the EU average; it is among the lowest, in fact.
The ever-fast-paced world and changing trends are opening new platforms for information, compounded by the distortion of the Hungarian media landscape, which has brought a clear change for youth. Traditional media such as TV, radio, or print have lost relevance, reinforced not only by technological advances but also by a lack of trust. The crisis of public media credibility has strengthened the political significance of Facebook, TikTok, and Instagram.
It is understandable how Viktor Orbán’s main opponent and challenger, Péter Magyar, became popular among youth. His conscious, well-organized use of social media—live streams, quickly spreading videos, personal messages—enables him to bypass traditional media channels and establish direct contact with voters. His communication style, authentic, direct, and even vulnerable, resonates with youth successfully so far. Based on polls, Péter Magyar’s party leads in popularity over FIDESZ.
However, this phenomenon and the use of social media are not unique to Hungary. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine-Russia war, Volodymyr Zelensky has addressed people directly with brief video messages that spread globally and rapidly. In France, Emmanuel Macron regularly uses TikTok and Instagram in his communication strategy. This trend is clear and unsurprising. Political communication and youth political engagement increasingly happen on online platforms, potentially boosting participation and political activity by involving future generations—a crucial issue that can reduce the distance between youth and politics. The question remains how well these platforms can convey substantive policy without shifting to shallow, quickly digestible messages where personality often outweighs content.
In Hungary, this has special significance with the 2026 elections approaching. One thing is certain: reaching voters, especially youth, today is unimaginable only through traditional media spaces.