The political processes of the past decades in Hungary have raised several questions about the role of populism, enemy formation, and political identity construction. Fidesz’s political strategy under Viktor Orbán is a prominent example of how populism, used as a power tool, can change democratic norms while stabilizing political power.
The article examines the Fidesz strategy, from enemy formation to the metamorphosis of the political system, and seeks to highlight the lasting social effects of populist politics.
Political Scapegoating and Identity Formation in Hungarian Political Discourse
Political enemy fabricating and identity formation are phenomena that are crucial to the functioning of modern political systems. In Hungary, these mechanisms have been particularly pronounced in recent decades, with the political strategy of Fidesz at the center. Attila Antal analyses this process in depth in his study “Political Enemy and Identity”, based on Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy.
According to Schmitt’s theses, the basic organizing principle of politics is the distinction between friend and enemy – an antagonistic relationship that defines political communities whose identity can only be illustrated in relation to the ‘other‘. In Hungarian political discourse, this logic has played a dominant role since the regime change, but its strong presence has been felt especially after 2010.
Antal points out that Fidesz has strategically built its identity around national values and contrasted this with the universalist, liberal ideals represented by the left. Schmitt’s ideas were particularly in line with Fidesz’s narrative: by defining the political enemy, the government was able to build a cohesive community. This enemy was often given not only a political dimension but also a moral one. The left as an ‘anti-national’ force was pitted against the values represented by the ‘national side‘.
The construction of the political enemy was based on two essential tools: personalization and criminalization. Personification focused on the personal characterization of political opponents, which aimed at character assassination. The political faults and weaknesses of opponents were discredited in moral terms, while criminalization placed the political actions of the opposition in a criminal framework. As a result of this strategy, the enemy was not only a political rival but also a threat to the moral and legal order of the community.
However, the success of these instruments was partly due to the left’s weak self-definition. The left’s inability to present a strong and coherent identity meant that right-wing narratives became deeply embedded in the community consciousness over the years.
Populism and National Identity
Antal’s study emphasizes the role of populism in the process of enemy formation. In the ideology of populism, society is divided into two antagonists: the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite“. Fidesz’s strategy is based on this very antagonism, confronting the Hungarian people with the European Union, global capital, or migration. Another essential element of populism is identity construction: defining the “people” is only possible by constructing the identity of the enemy. The enemy is not just a political opponent, but a morally subordinate external threat that embodies an attack on national interests.
Role of Populism in Fidesz Politics: Enemy Establishment and Identity Construction
Populism as a political logic plays a particularly dominant role in Fidesz’s politics, which is centered on the polarised dichotomy of the categories of ‘us’ and ‘them‘. Balázs Böcskei’s study, Governing Populism, provides a thorough analysis of Fidesz’s populist communication strategies, particularly the mechanisms of enemy formation and identity construction. Böcskei highlights that the concept of populism is multifaceted, and can be understood as an ideology, a political logic, and a mode of discourse. In particular, Fidesz’s populism bears the hallmarks of “exclusivist populism“, which defines a homogenous, national identity of “us” through the exclusion of groups belonging to the category of “them“.
Contrary to Ernesto Laclau’s conception of populism, which emphasizes inclusiveness and the integration of different social needs, Fidesz’s populism is based on polarization and the maintenance of antagonistic dichotomies.
Scapegoating and Role of Identity Formation
Böcskei points out that the central element of Fidesz populism is scapegoating and the role of identity formation, which is manifested in both symbolic and material dimensions. The group of “them” may include the left-wing opposition, liberal elites, the European Union, George Soros, members of the LGBTQ community, and NGOs that represent “anti-national” interests according to Fidesz’s narrative. The criminalization and moral discrediting of the enemy’s identity play a key role in strengthening the “us” category, while the categorical exclusion of “them” consolidates Fidesz’s political position.
The rhetorical elements of enemy construction often rely on symbolic insults such as the attack on the “national interest” and “Hungarian sovereignty“. The campaign against George Soros, reinforced by Fidesz’s anti-migration rhetoric, is a typical example of how populist discourse constructs the enemy as a threat to national values.
From Inclusive Populism To Exclusive Populism
Fidesz’s populism has not always been so exclusionary. According to Böcskei’s analysis, before 2010, Fidesz showed more traits of inclusive populism, reflecting on the economic and social challenges after the regime change. In the opposition period, Fidesz’s communication was based on a critique of neoliberal economic policies and the corruption scandals of the left-liberal coalition, which allowed it to integrate the needs of different social groups.
However, since 2015, in the wake of the migration crisis, Fidesz’s populism has taken on an exclusive character. This change has led to a continuous expansion of the category of “they“, which now includes not only opposition political actors, but also NGOs and international actors.
Political Consequences of Exclusionary Populism
The exclusivist nature of Fidesz populism is not only rhetorical but also structural and institutional. The unilateral restructuring of the electoral system, the restriction of the operation of NGOs critical of the government and the establishment of a pro-government media dominance have all contributed to a significant decline in pluralism in Hungary.
One of the most important political consequences of exclusionary populism is the increase in polarization. The antagonistic juxtaposition of the ‘morally superior’ and ‘national interest’ right-wing and the ‘anti-national’ ‘them’ makes meaningful political dialogue difficult. Moreover, the constant narrowing of the category of ‘we’ contributes to deepening social divisions.
In light of the above, it can be said that the success of Fidesz’s populism lies not only in its rhetorical and communication strategies but also in the fact that its political logic and discourse are consistently applied at the institutional level. However, the path from inclusive populism to exclusive populism has not only reinforced Fidesz’s political hegemony but has also contributed significantly to the polarisation and loss of pluralism in the Hungarian political system.
However, the long-term consequences of exclusive populism may pose serious challenges to Fidesz’s policies. In a political environment fraught with polarisation, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain social cohesion, especially at times when economic or international crises bring new demands and problems to the surface… Therefore, the future of Orbán’s populist politics may depend on Fidesz’s ability to redefine the framework of populism or to stick to the current exclusive strategies, which may even become counterproductive over time.
Strategies of Populism and Emotion Generation in Viktor Orbán’s Politics
Rudolf Metz’s study “Popular hero or popular devil?” examines the emotion-driven mechanisms of populism and their political effects, with a special focus on Viktor Orbán’s leadership. The author analyses how the populist leader uses the manipulation of emotions to maintain his support base and how he becomes both a “popular hero” for his own followers and a “popular devil” in the eyes of his opponents.
Metz’s study shows that the essential element of populist politics is the generation of moral panic. This process portrays certain groups in society as deviants through the creation of an image of the enemy and amplifies fears of them. In parallel, there is a moral euphoria which focuses on the figure of the idealized leader. In the case of Viktor Orbán, these dynamics have emerged in the context of migration, the Child Protection Act, and international political conflicts. In the eyes of his supporters, Orbán not only defended the Hungarian nation but also expressed moral superiority.
Moral panic and euphoria are both characterized by a heightened emotional state that polarises society. The objects of moral panic become “popular devils” who appear as a threat to social order and values. In contrast, moral euphoria presents the leader as a ‘folk hero’ who becomes the embodiment and hope of the community.
Charismatic Leadership
This study considers the role of the charismatic leader in the emotion-driven dynamics of populist politics as particularly important. Charisma is not based on the objective qualities of the leader, but on how he or she is perceived by his or her followers. In the eyes of Viktor Orbán’s followers, he is the embodiment of the Hungarian nation, possessing outstanding abilities and moral integrity.
In contrast, for his opponents, Orbán has a “negative charisma” and is seen as a generator of moral crisis. This dichotomy gives rise to the specific dynamics of emotion generation in populist politics: the leader becomes an object of both love and hate, which further reinforces social polarization.
Moral Enterprise
Metz uses Howard S. Becker’s concept of moral enterprise to describe the activities of populist leaders to define the boundaries of social norms. In Orbán’s political narratives, this process is carried out through the demonization of migrants, the LGBTQ community, and global elites. These groups provoke emotional reactions, which the leader reinforces by acting as his own defender against them.
Role of Moral Panic Button in Hungarian Political Discourse
The study, written by Márton Gerő and Endre Sik, provides a thorough insight into the functioning of the moral panic button (MPB) and its role in the Hungarian political space, especially in the governance of Fidesz. The MPB is a power tool that serves to polarise voters and maintain political loyalty. Through this study, I will briefly describe how Fidesz has shaped and maintained its own voter base through this method.
How Moral Panic Button Works
The concept of MPB belongs to the specific toolbox of autocratic and populist regimes. Its essence is that it constantly maintains a sense of threat that defines the framework of political discourse. In the case of Fidesz, this threat is embodied in the form of migration, foreign influence (e.g. George Soros, the European Union, or “Brussels”), and the fight against liberal elites.
One of the keys of the MPB is that it does not generate one-off waves of moral panic, but builds up long-lasting, mutually reinforcing narratives. This not only helps to homogenize political discourse but also provides voters with a kind of “cognitive map” in which problems and their perpetrators are organised into a stable but flexibly expandable network. This stability ensures that voter loyalty to the governing party is maintained.
MPB’s Impact on Social Polarization
According to the study, the MPB has significantly increased the polarisation of Hungarian society. Citizens’ opinions are also determined by political sympathies on issues such as corruption, trust in political institutions and vision for the future. This polarisation makes it impossible for meaningful communication between social groups to take place, while at the same time reinforcing the gap between the Fidesz camp and the opposition.
The issues of migration and loss of national sovereignty are particularly illustrative of how the MPB operates. These issues provide “evergreen” threat narratives that are constantly on the agenda of government communication. At the same time, the use of MPB not only empowers pro-government voters but also alienates non-party voters from the opposition, as the general social impact of the sense of threat reinforces the Fidesz narrative.
MPB and Voter Behavior
The study shows that the thinking of the Fidesz camp has become increasingly homogenised as a result of the MPB. The political identity and behaviour of party supporters is primarily based on loyalty and identification with the leaders. This means that classical electoral sociological factors, such as sociodemographic background or labor market situation, play a secondary role in party affiliation.
Another important effect of the MPB is that it makes it impossible for voters to cross over between the governing party and the opposition. In the Fidesz camp, it homogenizes the thinking and opinions of voters to the extent that they exclude dissenting opinions in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. This communication bubble further deepens political polarisation.
Populism as Power Tool
Populism in Orbán’s politics is not only an ideology but also a power tool that polarises society and consolidates political power. The populist discourse is based on an antagonistic juxtaposition of “us” and “them“, where “us” stands for the nation and “them” for hostile foreign powers, Brussels bureaucrats, migrants, or liberal elites. This narrative not only serves to delegitimize political opponents but also strengthens social cohesion within the Fidesz camp.
Zoltán Ripp: Our Country, Orbanistan, points out that populist rhetoric lends a kind of “democratic empowerment” to authoritarian measures. In government communication, the narrative is dominated by the defense of national sovereignty and the fight against “Brussels dictates“, which obscures the real goals of power centralization.
Dismantling of Democratic Institutions
One of the most striking features of the Orbán regime is the continuous weakening of democratic institutions. The role of parliament has become essentially formalised, while the concentration of government power has increased dramatically. The Constitutional Court, the media and the civil society have also come under considerable pressure, allowing Fidesz to control public discourse.
The new constitutional order, known as the “System of National Cooperation” (NER), brought not only institutional but also ideological change. The principle of separation of powers within the system gradually disappeared and was replaced by a monolithic, centralised power structure.
Status of The Opposition
Ripp stresses that, in addition to the hegemony of Fidesz, the opposition is also responsible for the consolidation of the authoritarian regime. The fragmentation of the opposition parties, their strategic uncertainty and the lack of an effective alternative to populist rhetoric have all contributed to Fidesz’s dominance. The opposition has often been unable to respond adequately to government narratives, further reinforcing polarisation.
Economic and Social Impacts
The Orbán regime’s economic policies are based on both oligarchic structures and populist redistribution. The government concentrated economic resources in the hands of a narrow elite, while social transfers and family support schemes served to broaden the social base. This dichotomy allowed Fidesz to maintain its popularity while social inequalities deepened. The success of the Orbán regime is in part due to its ability to effectively combine populist rhetoric with the centralized exercise of power while maintaining social support through economic redistribution.
Summary and Outlook
One of the greatest strengths of Viktor Orbán’s political strategy lies in the successful use of populist rhetoric and enemy fashioning. Emotion-driven politics, maintaining social polarisation, and exclusive populism all contribute to Fidesz’s long-term stability in power. However, this strategy also carries several risks: the continued search for enemies, the deepening of social divisions, and the weakening of institutional pluralism could undermine the legitimacy of the regime in the longer term.
The question is whether Fidesz will be able to adapt its political strategy to today’s changing social and economic challenges, or whether exclusive populism will gradually run up against its own limitations. The durability of a political system depends not only on the current means of power but also on its ability to maintain social cohesion in an ever-changing world.
If the current political dynamics do not change, populist politics may even fall into its own trap in the long run, as the maintenance of a permanent enemy establishment may become increasingly difficult as internal and external factors change (see: the unparalleled popularity of the TISZA Party led by Péter Magyar in a short period, the complete international isolation of Viktor Orbán). Therefore, the key question for the future will be how long Fidesz can maintain this political logic and what impact this will have on the future of the Hungarian political system.
Bibliography
Attila, Antal: Politikai ellenség és identitás. In: Antal, Attila; Földes, György (szerk.) Holtpont: Társadalomkritikai tanulmányok Magyarország elmúlt 25 évéről Budapest, Magyarország: Napvilág Kiadó (2016) 326 p. pp. 130-152.
Balázs, Böcskei (2021) Kormányzó populizmus – A Fidesz ellenségés identitáskonstruáló populizmusa. Politikatudományi Szemle, 30 (4). pp. 61-79.
Márton, Gerő, Endre, Sik (2022) „Már nyomni sem kell” – a morális pánikgomb és a 2022. évi választás. In: Az állandóság változása. Parlamenti választás 2022. Gondolat Publishers; MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Politikatudományi Intézet, Budapest, pp. 65-86
Rudolf, Metz (2022) Népi hős vagy népi ördög? Érzelemgeneráló populista repertoár Orbán Viktor politikájában. Socio.Hu Társadalomtudományi Szemle, 12(2), pp. 41–65.
Zoltán, Ripp: Hazánk, Orbanisztán. In.: Mozgó Világ, 2013. 1. sz. pp. 6–16.