![Total Defense in Europe: What Is It and Why Do We Need It? with Helena Quis [PODCAST]](https://4liberty.eu/phidroav/2025/12/Helena-Quis1-1024x1024.jpg "Total Defense in Europe: What Is It and Why Do We Need It? with Helena Quis [PODCAST]")
When talking about total defense, for whom and against what is it? What should the European total defense look like? Why cannot everyone be like Finland? And is total defense even possible in polarized societies? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Helena Quis, who works in the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Europe Programme as an expert on European security and resilience, focusing on total defense and civil preparedness.
Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): What does the term ‘total defense’ actually mean? What did it signify historically? And why is it relevant for Europe’s security today?
Helena Quis (HQ): ‘Total defense’ can be a somewhat confusing concept, as the term has not been widely used since the Cold War, and few people are familiar with it today. This has changed, of course – most notably since 2022.
The key point is that total defense has no universally accepted definition, and there is no single model. It looks very different across European states – for example, it differs in Germany compared to Lithuania. So, perhaps the first ‘bad news’ to note is that there is no unified European total defense because of this diversity.
However, certain elements are common across all European total defense models. The main aim is to organize a coordinated effort between the nation’s armed forces – the military side – and civil society, mobilizing all available resources for national defense. This includes civil-military cooperation, which is essential to combine military and civilian efforts, as well as the ‘whole-of-society’ principle, engaging all segments of society in defense efforts, and the ‘whole-of-government’ principle.
The whole-of-government principle differs from traditional military defense, which is generally the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Total defense, in contrast, involves the entire government, not only at the national level, but also, potentially, at state and local levels, depending on the country.
As mentioned earlier, the concept originates from the Cold War and has been revitalized in recent years – first after 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and more prominently after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Compared to the Cold War period, total defense today is not outdated, but it is applied differently. It has become more complex and challenging due to elements of modern societies, such as privatization – where some resources are no longer in state hands – as well as digitalization and social media, which can spread disinformation and pose new threats.
Additionally, modern societies have new vulnerabilities and involve numerous actors, including private companies and civil society organizations, all of which must be integrated into a joint effort for effective defense.
LJ: Is total defense not simply another term for what already existed during the Second World War – namely, that total war necessitates total defense? Does the concept make sense for countries within alliances such as NATO – especially those without a direct border with Russia, like Germany? Is it not confusing to use the same term in very different contexts, as in comparing today’s situation with how Finland fought in 1940? Does total defense now imply conscription and the militarization of society? And, finally, is the term consistent over time, or is it essentially a different concept that happens to share the same name?
HQ: I would go further and say that total defense must be considered not only in terms of consistency over time, but also across geography. Trends in transport and communication, for example, extend beyond borders, and these changes must be taken into account.
I would never advocate simply copying approaches from the past – certainly not from as far back as 1940, when conditions were entirely different. Nor is it feasible to transplant solutions from one country to another. As you mentioned, many nations today admire Finland’s security system – Germany wants to emulate it, and Poland has expressed similar aspirations – but such direct replication will not work.
This inconsistency in the concept sometimes leads to amusing situations in international discussions, where representatives from different countries define total defense in entirely different ways, often without realizing they are talking about different things. Perhaps it is more useful to think of total defense as a strategy rather than a static concept – something to be adapted to a country’s specific challenges, resources, geography, and threats. In practice, it must be tailored to the circumstances of the time and place.
Currently, there is often an overemphasis on ‘copy-pasting’ approaches, whether in military planning or total defense. For example, some argue that all nations must prepare for a conflict like Ukraine, but this overlooks differences in national contexts, NATO membership, and other factors. Each country, in each era, requires concepts and strategies suited to its unique situation.
LJ: If you were, hypothetically, able to introduce everything required for a total-defense strategy in Germany, what would actually happen? With a ten-year perspective and a ‘magic-wand’ ability to reshape the country in line with your research and understanding of current and future challenges (including those that are unforeseeable) what would change? What would you implement, what would you abolish, and what would this optimal scenario look like?
HQ: For context, total defense in Germany is distributed across different governmental bodies at the national, state, and local levels. The civilian component, in particular, falls under the Ministry of the Interior, which may be surprising to some observers from other countries.
If I were to design total defense in Germany today, I would emphasize the need for a strategic approach, especially regarding the civilian side. The 2022 settlement, widely known across Europe, focused primarily on regaining military capabilities and expanding the defense industry. The civilian dimension, however, was largely neglected, with no substantial civil component included.
What is needed now is a clear threat assessment, followed by the development of a range of scenarios. This is essential because it allows for capability-based planning – a method known from the military context but not yet fully applied to the civilian side. Capability-based planning involves defining a threat scenario and then determining the specific capabilities required to address it effectively. This approach ensures that both military and civilian elements are appropriately prepared for potential challenges.
LJ: What is the most relevant threat scenario, in your view, that Germany should focus on over the next two to three years – one that this government ought to take seriously in its immediate planning?
HQ: Germany is in a very interesting location, in the middle of Europe, and, therefore, it is in a very specific situation. Of course, here we also plan for an Article 5 incident, so a territorial threat along the eastern flank. As we all know, Germany is very much engaged in Lithuania, so that is kind of the threat scenario. We always calculate that if something happens on the NATO eastern flank, the German armed forces will be moved there as fast as possible.
That means that the rest of Germany – everything aside from the armed forces, although some units would remain – needs to face several challenges on its own, including internal security, as well as organizing troop transport and logistics through Germany. This is also tied to the NATO principle of host nation support, meaning that if, for example, French armed forces have to move through Germany, Germany is responsible for hosting them – providing energy, logistics, and ensuring access to roads, etc.
Therefore, if the armed forces are tied up in conflict on the eastern flank, these tasks must be handled by civilian structures and personnel. That is kind of the baseline. On top of that, of course, we should not be naïve. It would probably go together with a series of hybrid attacks at the same time, targeting critical infrastructure and trying to prevent Germany from fulfilling the duties it has under a NATO Article 5 scenario.
LJ: To what extent does the concept of total defense address issues such as the rise of extremism and domestic terrorism? For example, the BND (the foreign intelligence agency of Germany) at one point issued warnings regarding the increasing polarization associated with the AfD. Should such developments be considered within the scope of total defense, given that societal collapse is a possible, albeit extreme, scenario? Or are these matters primarily political and internal, and, therefore, outside the purview of total defense?
HQ: Total defense is often not considered in an integrated way, but everything that concerns society should be addressed within total defense plans. This becomes more concrete when we consider real incidents, such as a terrorist attack, a natural hazard like a major flood, or a blackout, even if it does not stem from a hybrid attack.
Anything that undermines or threatens the functioning of vital societal functions poses a risk not only to civilian lives but also to the military, as the armed forces rely on the same structures for energy, logistics, healthcare, and other critical services. These civilian aspects of total defense are, therefore, crucial to ensuring both national and European defense and deterrence. This is also why a military alliance like NATO engages in this area, assisting allies in strengthening resilience – particularly of civilian structures.
LJ: To what extent does total defense rely on assumptions about societal cohesion, communication, and trust in government that may no longer hold true? How realistic is it to mobilize society along total defense lines in today’s political and media environment, given widespread mistrust and polarization? If political movements like the AfD gain significant power, could societal protests and conflicts undermine the effectiveness of total defense?
HQ: That is a very valid question. However, the concept itself should not be blamed. The issue lies in how it is understood and implemented. Since 2022, the majority of European countries – even those where one might not expect it – have adopted a comprehensive or total defense concept, at least on paper. In practice, however, this has often been implemented in a top-down manner, without integrating society or effectively communicating with the public.
This creates a vacuum that can be exploited by nationalist or right-wing forces. Such actors can shape the narrative around defense, deciding which threats to emphasize – for example, the AfD would likely not identify Russia as the main threat. This misalignment allows undemocratic forces to influence public discourse and steer defense efforts in the wrong direction.
So far, in Germany and in much of Western Europe, there have been few effective strategies for engaging modern society in total defense in a non-nationalistic manner. The emphasis should be on framing defense as protecting our way of life and freedom. This requires society to feel that there is something worth defending, which links defense closely to other policy areas.
Currently, defense discussions are often limited to military capabilities, industry, and technical issues. In reality, defense is also societal and emotional, especially in the context of total defense, where society is at the core. This requires a mindset shift – both among policymakers and within society itself. Government officials are primarily responsible for facilitating this shift – showing citizens how they can contribute and why their engagement is essential.
LJ: Do you think total defense could serve as a tool for societal integration, functioning both as a goal and a method to strengthen cohesion? If attempting to transplant the Nordic model top-down to 27 very different countries is not effective, is there an alternative approach that could work across Europe, taking into account national competencies and perspectives?
HQ: When considering the right approach for Europeans on total defense, it is important to differentiate between military defense and civil preparedness. I will not comment on military defense, as there are many of my colleagues already addressing that and numerous proposals exist. My focus has been primarily on the civilian side, which represents the newer elements. The Ministry report issued in October 2024 brought this aspect into the EU context, emphasizing that total defense is, indeed, not only about military readiness, but also about civil preparedness.
Following the Ministry report, the EU published a strategy at a relatively fast pace – in March of this year. The strategy is very broad, outlining 63 actions (some key, some not), spanning society, NATO-EU cooperation, EU foreign action, and more. In our policy brief, we argued that the strategy is overly broad, lacking a clear identity and strategic focus. Because of this, the EU has not yet carved out a clear niche.
For any new initiative to succeed, member states must be won over, particularly in the security and defense realm, which remains a national competence. Many member states are skeptical. Asking 27 states to implement a highly demanding, broad, and relatively new concept with limited resources, while also allowing EU oversight, is extremely challenging. Complexity generally increases when the EU is involved.
We argue that, rather than a top-down approach, the EU should start from the bottom, considering national and local realities. Understanding the 27 different models and approaches to total defense is essential to identify areas where European cooperation is necessary and where the EU can add real value. This does not require a one-size-fits-all approach, nor is it likely feasible within the limited time available, given Europe’s current gray-zone security challenges.
It is important to respect national realities and focus on forming smaller coalitions among member states facing similar challenges, depending on critical infrastructure, geography, and threat perceptions. From there, European cooperation can be developed strategically.
Finally, it is also necessary to respect NATO’s role. NATO already undertakes significant work, but its scope is limited. It is a military alliance involving only ministries of defense and foreign affairs, excluding other ministries and actors. Moreover, NATO does not have policymaking competence and limited regulatory or financial power. The EU, in contrast, can bring regulatory authority and funding – but it must first identify a clear niche in which it can provide credible added value.
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with Movimento Liberal Social and Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.