We know that disinformation as a tool of war is conducted in the shadow of war in the sense that it is a continuous, systematic, and diversified process, used not only during wartime but also—perhaps primarily—during “peacetime.”
In modern armed conflict, disinformation is the strategic use of false or misleading information to influence perceptions of reality, behaviors, and military outcomes. This phenomenon has evolved over time and in the digital age it has become widespread due to the rapid dissemination of content on social media. It is a key element of hybrid warfare.
In this context, disinformation serves long-term strategic goals by, for example, manipulating public opinion, undermining trust in institutions, and destabilizing societies, posing a significant challenge for governments, military strategists, and civil society. We know that disinformation as a tool of war is conducted in the shadow of war in the sense that it is a continuous, systematic, and diversified process, used not only during wartime but also—perhaps primarily—during “peacetime.”
In the theory and practice of countering disinformation, distinguishing between two processes is crucial: the unintentional spread of false information (misinformation) and deliberate actions intended to deceive audiences (disinformation). Both phenomena can lead to changes in attitudes at both individual and group levels, resulting in deepened social divisions and escalations of violence. They can also be used to influence political processes. It is worth remembering that in today’s cognitive warfare, the focus is more on the devaluation of facts rather than the concealment of lies. Additionally, what makes detection and counteraction difficult is that it takes place within an interconnected system of media and non-media actors—newsrooms, individuals, bots, institutions, organizations, etc.
The ethical issues surrounding disinformation as a tool of cognitive warfare are also a source of controversy. Psychological operations (PsyOps) violate civil rights and contribute to the weakening of democratic norms. Manipulating emotions amplifies fear, anger, and distrust among individuals, making peace processes and social cohesion (re)building more difficult. Therefore, countering disinformation is crucial in countries where indicators suggest a high likelihood of armed conflict and in those beginning the arduous process of post-war reconstruction.
In the age of social media dominance, understanding the mechanisms of disinformation spread—such as the role of influencers, viral content that manipulates emotions, and the use of digital propaganda—is essential to limiting its negative impact. As seen in Ukraine and Poland, Russian information operations are a significant part of a doctrine in which war is not a continuation of politics but an integral part of it—war against NATO and EU countries. In this unprecedented strategy, hackers, trolls, algorithms, media, businessmen, leaks, disinformation, propaganda, and other asymmetric military means are all involved.
These operations intensified in 2014, and large-scale coordinated offensive information campaigns have been conducted in the information spheres of NATO and EU countries, including Poland. This raises the question: What do we know, and how are we responding?
Effectively combating disinformation requires a comprehensive approach that includes public education, legal regulations, and cooperation between the military and civilian sectors to strengthen societal resilience against false narratives. Foreign experts, researchers (the body of scientific studies on disinformation and countermeasures is one of the fastest-growing repositories), and non-governmental organizations have proposed such solutions.
For example, in 2022, a team of 40 experts prepared a report titled Counteracting Disinformation in Poland: Systemic Recommendations, which included over 60 recommendations in six areas (legal regulations, state institutions, national security, education, information space, and social attitudes and behaviors) to better protect society and the state from information threats [1].
Disinformation often relies on appealing yet misleading narratives that exploit existing fears and prejudices. For example, narratives that undermine trust in electoral processes or democratic institutions are commonly used during politically tense periods. We observed this in 2024 in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations deemed the Georgian elections the least democratic in recent Central and Eastern European history. Electoral violations were recorded in 246 out of 3,111 polling stations. Complaints included violations of ballot secrecy, voting on behalf of others, multiple voting, and the presence of aggressive groups pressuring voters (especially women).
At the same time, the information sphere became an arena for disinformation. Monitoring of Georgian media (both traditional and online) by EUvsDisinfo uncovered numerous false narratives, such as claims that Ukrainian snipers had arrived in Georgia to sow chaos during mass protests, that pro-EU Georgian politicians were Satanists, that the West wanted to start a war in Georgia, that President Salome Zurabishvili (a French-born opposition supporter) was a Western puppet trying to turn Georgia into a colony, and that the U.S., EU, pro-Western opposition, and the president were planning a coup. A “document” also surfaced, allegedly proving that Kyiv was preparing riots in Georgia.
Propaganda often uses messaging to provoke strong emotional reactions. Examples include fear- and anger-based campaigns—two emotions that play a major role in the effectiveness of disinformation. Deliberate emotional manipulation, such as fear campaigns about immigration or health crises, aims to incite panic and erode trust in government institutions. The psychological effects of these actions have led to information chaos in Poland in recent years, making rational decision-making difficult for both citizens and politicians.
In 2021, Belarus, in cooperation with Russia, carried out two major cognitive operations against Poland. The first was the so-called email scandal, an operation classified as malinformation—the release of real but stolen and potentially manipulated emails from politicians. The second involved the migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border, triggered by the Operation Sluice, which was part of a planned aggression against Ukraine. Both 2021 operations had similar objectives: to undermine Poland’s internal and international position by weakening trust in Polish authorities before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, deepening internal divisions, tarnishing Poland’s global image, and undermining its reputation among Belarusians—particularly within Belarus [2].
The border operation was unique in terms of Belarusian and Russian influence in Poland. It was conducted mainly from abroad, with little impact from pro-Russian groups inside Poland. Although pro-Russian activists commented on the border situation, their words had no significant influence on Polish media discourse. The border issue, manipulated in media content prepared beyond Poland’s eastern border (and in the absence of Polish media access), gained traction and was widely disseminated. This disinformation was also used to attack social activists and journalists reporting on migrant conditions. Public media and politicians played a negative role as well, actively contributing to the spread of false information.
Effective disinformation campaigns that exploit fears and anger, combined with a frequent lack of critical analysis of media content, tend to escalate during election campaigns. This makes it a crucial moment for individuals and society to reflect on the levels of fear and anger among Poles, the ability and willingness to critically analyze media content, and to question who is responsible for the high levels of these emotions and the low levels of competence in this area. In other words, who in Poland is constructing the echo chamber for messages that serve as an effective and deadly tool used in the shadow of war as we know it?
References
[1] Report on Countering Disinformation. Systemic Recommendations, Warsaw 2022, https://ffb.org.pl/2023/02/23/przeciwdzialanie-dezinformacji-w-polsce-raport/ [accessed: 10.02.2025].
[2] Commission for Investigating Russian and Belarusian Influence on Poland’s Internal Security and Interests (2004–2024), Disinformation Task Force Report.
The article was originally published in Polish at: https://liberte.pl/dezinformacja-skutecznie-w-cieniu-wojny/
Translated by Natalia Banaś