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Illusions That Come at a Price: On “New Cold Wars” by David Sanger

Illusions That Come at a Price: On “New Cold Wars” by David Sanger

There are books that read like a description of an illness that presents symptoms; some people even diagnose it correctly, but in the end, they refuse to accept it. New Cold Wars by David Sanger, a veteran New York Times journalist and longtime observer of American foreign policy, falls precisely into this category. It is a superbly documented, at times even painful journey through decades of Western illusions — about Russia, China, and our own ability to understand or shape the world.

Sanger takes us on this journey in several acts. He begins with what was supposed to be impossible. By December 2021, more than 60% of Russian ground forces were already stationed on the Ukrainian border, some in formations ready to attack. Medical units with blood supplies were there as well. And yet, for political, economic, and psychological reasons, European capitals refused to believe that a full-scale invasion would actually take place. This time, it was not an intelligence failure, but rather a failure to take into account that different “rationalities” exist. And this Russian rationality differs from our own, Western, rationality.

In fact, this was not a precedent. Every few years, Russia consistently attempts to bring another piece of its former empire under its control. Georgia in 2008, Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—this is not a series of random decisions, but a logical sequence. Sanger demonstrates that the pattern was clear to those who wanted to see it. The problem is that each time, the West found reasons to treat the next episode as an exception, an anomaly, or an act of frustration, rather than as part of a larger strategy. If, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, one could say that the United States did too little, then Europe did even less. As early as June 2015, while the world was debating how to punish Putin for the invasion of Crimea, Royal Dutch Shell, along with several other oil companies, announced a new agreement with Gazprom. The deal concerned the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, worth over USD 10 billion.

But Sanger digs much deeper and further back. He goes back to a time when the illusions were even deeper. The cruise taken by Bush and Putin on the Nava (where the cook was a certain Yevgeny Prigozhin, who later became the head of the Wagner Group). Many at the time believed that Russia might truly move toward rapprochement with the West. Among them was Condoleezza Rice, an expert on Russia, former Secretary of State, and National Security Advisor, who admits bluntly: “For a brief moment, the thought flashed through my head: The Cold War really is over.” This admission is interesting — not because Rice was wrong (and she was), but because she represented a view that was popular among Western elites at the time. A few years later, in February 2023, Anthony Blinken, Secretary of State in the Biden administration, summed up the reality stating that this is not the world we wanted or sought to shape after the end of the Cold War.

Sanger does not limit himself to Russia. He simultaneously traces a similar trajectory with regard to China — and here the picture is equally intriguing. In 1998, Bill Clinton told students in Beijing that the internet would soon undermine the position of the Chinese Communist Party. George W. Bush echoed him on the economic front: “I fully agree that trade leads to freedom, and when we add the internet to that…” Today, these words sound unbelievable, yet they were spoken just a quarter of a century ago. The great value of this book lies in its skillful chronicling of recent decades. Sanders has managed to track down fascinating quotes and persuade both former and current officials to offer their commentary.

Meanwhile, despite Clinton and Bush’s optimism, as early as 2007, Beijing conducted one of the most irresponsible anti-satellite weapon tests in history. This did not prompt a revision of the West’s strategy toward China. Nor did the Munich Security Conference that same year prompt any reflection, even though Putin delivered a speech there that, as it turns out today, clearly outlined the dictator’s plans for Ukraine and the region.

Sanger cites, among other things, the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign, when Mitt Romney identified Russia as the greatest geopolitical threat to the United States. Barack Obama mocked him during the debate with disarming confidence: “The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back because the Cold War has been over for 20 years.”

It is worth pausing here, however, to do justice to the complexity of what Sanger describes. Lawrence Freedman, in his latest book, *On Strategists and Strategy*, rightly reminds us that, to a certain extent, we should be understanding toward officials and decision-makers. They make decisions based on the knowledge they have at the time, under conditions of immense uncertainty and a constant flow of often contradictory information. From a historical perspective, everything seems simpler. Sanger — and this is one of his strengths — does not take on the role of a prosecutor. Instead, he documents a series of errors and omissions on the part of the West. He understands that this is not about pointing fingers at incompetence, but about something more serious: recognizing a pattern in which people and institutions still fail to learn from their mistakes.

And this is perhaps the book’s most important message: Western democracies have a structural difficulty in acknowledging that their openness, the internet (or rather, its unrestricted use), and their values are not automatically attractive to all actors. Autocracies do not want (and, as we can see, did not want) to be drawn into the democratic order.

New Cold Wars is a useful read not only for those professionally interested in international politics. It is a book for anyone who wants to better understand what has made the world what it is today and what this means for the West’s relations with Russia and China in the coming decades. Because, as Sanger methodically demonstrates, illusions come at a cost.


Written by Mateusz Mielczarek – Research Fellow at RAND Europe and research assistant in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is an analyst specializing in European security, defense, and Russian foreign policy. His work focuses on deterrence, hybrid threats, and the impact of new technologies on security. He has advised policymakers and prepared analyses for government agencies and international organizations. He is a member of the Stakeholder Council of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw.


The article was originally published in Polish at: https://liberte.pl/zludzenia-ktore-kosztuja-o-nowych-zimnych-wojnach-davida-sangera/