![Is European Sovereignty a Real Possibility? with Olaf Osica [PODCAST]](https://4liberty.eu/phidroav/2026/02/Liberal-Europe-Podcast-Format-1-3-1024x1024.jpg "Is European Sovereignty a Real Possibility? with Olaf Osica [PODCAST]")
What is the future, if any, of the transatlantic relationship? Where do we stand on European sovereignty versus President Donald Trump? What should we know about the ‘brave new world order’ proposed by Canadian PM Mark Carney? Should Europe try to keep the United States on board as long as possible or mobilize against it? And is Europe ready for a war on multiple fronts given its internal challenges and the current aspirations of Russia and China? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Olaf Osica, a graduate of the European University Institute in Florence, a former director of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), and a columnist for Tygodnik Powszechny.
Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): Do we see European sovereignty occurring vis-a-vis Donald Trump with regard to Greenland and the subsequent withdrawal following the reaction from Europe?
Olaf Osica (OO): So far, so good. I would like to be optimistic and believe that this ‘Greenland moment’ will continue. On the other hand, knowing the history of the transatlantic relationship and the number of crises we have experienced over the last seven years, we must remain realistic in the sense that Europe has always tended to be very emotional and reactive.
The United States started a policy which was not in line with European expectations and was, to some extent, against Europe. The last major example was the debate regarding the war in Iraq in 2003. At that time, we could observe a ‘European moment’, when people were marching on the streets, and there was a constitutional moment for European integration. Twenty years later, we are more or less in a similar situation where the United States openly conducts a policy which is against European interests.
What is new in this situation is that we have a quarrel inside of the family. We are not talking about a broad intervention like Iraq; we are talking about NATO members. We are talking about the founder of the NATO Alliance suggesting that it will do whatever it takes to acquire Greenland, which is part of the territory of another NATO member. This is what makes the situation unique.
It makes me somewhat positive that, this time, it will not only be emotional appeals or emotional politics on the side of the European public. It is much more structural in the sense that people are asking whether we can let the United States behave in this manner. However, it remains to be seen how long this ‘Greenland moment’ will last. Let us hope that this will eventually change the European approach to America.
LJ: What do you believe was the decisive factor in Donald Trump’s decision to perform a reversal on the Greenland issue, and do you consider this a pause or a strategic retreat? Furthermore, do you believe the decisive element was European solidarity and the support of major states for the European Commission regarding potential tariffs, or was it internal factors such as the U.S. military or the markets?
OO: That is a good question. Honestly, I do not know. The fact that the European response was so quick and firm clearly made Donald Trump and his advisors think twice about the potential cost of continuing this policy. On the other hand, there was also a recalculation on the American side regarding the end game and whether they wanted to send American troops to have a standoff with Europeans.
I do not want to diminish or undermine the European position, because it was firm. However, I doubt very much that this is the end of the story. We saw the NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, attempting to find common ground with the Americans. However, we do not actually know what was occurring behind the scenes.
Clearly, the Americans and Donald Trump himself underestimated the European response; he likely thought it would be easy to convince the Greenlanders or the Danish government to give him what he wanted. I do not know if the Trump administration was prepared to simply enforce its will upon the Danish government to acquire the territory. We are not talking about extending the treaty or maintaining military bases; we are talking about acquiring the entire territory.
It remains to be seen what will happen, and we require more information. First and foremost, we must wait until the story ends, because I do not have the impression that the story has concluded. This is a new development, especially when you consider that you have Donald Trump on the other side of the Atlantic fishing for opportunities to distract public opinion from domestic issues. I would say that, so far, it is going well. We won this part of the competition, but let us see what comes next.
LJ: Do you believe that Donald Trump has managed to substantially transform the transatlantic relationship into one that is purely transactional rather than based on American leadership? Also, do you agree with the assessment made in Davos that this represents a rupture?
OO: I believe it is a rupture, but if it is, then it is not only about Donald Trump; it is about the American policy. Of course, Donald Trump makes everything appear quite strange because of his style, his behavior, and the way he conducts policy. If it were only about him, we could say that we should simply wait until he is replaced by another United States president to return to normal.
However, I side with the view that this is a rupture. It is about how America is changing domestically. Even if you consider a future Democratic administration, there are shifts we can take for granted. While I cannot see any Democratic president threatening Denmark, we are discussing a ‘de-Americanization’ of global politics and the Atlantic Alliance. The United States is focusing so much on its internal agenda that it is withdrawing from global affairs. In this sense, it is a rupture.
Regarding what this means for the relationship, I believe we are observing the end of the old alliance. People tend to forget that the U.S.-European relationship was formed as an alliance after World War II; before that time, it was a simpler relationship between states. If this is the end of the alliance as we know it, then we are moving into a period of selective partnership. We can speak of trade, investment, and political or military cooperation, but it is no longer an alliance where we share values and interests on both sides of the planet.
Even if there were a change in America and we saw a more Democratic president, the interests of the United States and the European Union will be different. As was pointed out, in this new world, one must make deals and cooperate with everyone. It is no longer the case that the Atlantic alliance is unique on a global scale. We are observing a new fabric of economic and political cooperation globally. The United States will have its share, but it will be definitively different from what we have known in the past. We see China and India, and we see how trade relationships are developing between countries like Canada and the European Union.
LJ: Before we move to talk more deeply about the speech by Canadian PM Mark Carney, I wanted to ask you about a recent piece you wrote. You stated that holding under pressure is one of the most important features of state sovereignty. What do you mean by that, and how can it be applied to middle powers or smaller states in a world where the old-fashioned liberal rules might not apply anymore?
OO: Let us take the debate we are having about the digital tax and the presence of ‘Big Tech’ in our society. I think sovereignty here means saying ‘no’ to your partner and being able to survive the consequences. We are talking about sovereignty not only in terms of providing security to your society and controlling your borders; sovereignty also means that you have influence over the information ecosystem in your country.
In this sense, I believe we in Europe – in Poland, France, and Germany – must be able to organize our infosphere the way we would like to have it, rather than being solely dependent on social media or big tech companies from America. Of course, there is a price to be paid for that. As Mark Carney mentioned in his speech, there is a political price, but if you are serious about being a sovereign liberal state, you must be able to pay that price.
We should state openly that we would like to cooperate with America on a number of issues. I think the worst thing that could happen is that we try to build European integration against America – that we do something simply because we would like to be unlike the United States.
We have to find a positive way to conduct business, saying, “We are going to develop our own infosphere, our own clouds, and our own artificial intelligence models.” This is how you build your sovereignty – you do not build it against your partner, but because you need some sort of insurance. You cannot rely exclusively on the technology or the regulations of your partner. That is how I understand the debate about what it takes to be a sovereign liberal state in Europe these days.
LJ: How does the speech by PM Mark Carney – specifically his metaphor regarding the illusion of the liberal world order – apply to European countries and international relations in general?
OO: First of all, when Mark Carney speaks about ‘middle powers’, the question is who qualifies as such. I do not think Europe is a middle power in that sense; however, Canada, Brazil, India, and South Africa certainly are. Perhaps it is also questionable whether Germany remains a middle power.
Nevertheless, many points he made do apply to middle-sized countries like those in Europe. The first lesson is not to defend the old order, because it is gone; rather, he suggests we start thinking about how to create a new world order. This applies to many European debates, including those in Poland. We understand that America, China, and the world have changed, and that the multilateral system is in crisis or no longer exists. Yet, we still behave as if we believe we can sustain that model. It is very important that we start discussing how we see the future, rather than how we can save the past.
The second takeaway concerns sovereignty. As I mentioned, sovereignty has its costs; you cannot pretend to be a sovereign state while failing to defend that sovereignty. This applies not only to our relationship with the United States regarding digital problems but also to China. We cannot protect our sovereignty regarding the digital divide or the influx of Chinese products that flood the European market and cost us many jobs.
The third point is a significant problem for many in Europe: we must stop thinking of the global order as circulating around Europe or the West, because the West as we knew it is no longer there. We must be open, look for opportunities, and reach out to different countries to identify our interests. Of course, this leads to a debate about our values, which Mark Carney did not mention. It is easy to say that the old order is gone and that we must be open to cooperation with everyone, but then the question arises: what becomes of our values?
What does it mean to be a European liberal in a world where democracy does not enjoy much support? When you look at the world, you see that the authoritarian momentum remains strong, even within Europe. The question is how we can be part of this new world order without resigning from our core values.
Mark Carney focused on how to survive big power rivalry without mentioning how to remain distinct from other countries. I still believe there is a European way of living and certain norms that are European or Western. How to confront this new world while sticking to those values is not an easy question to answer.
LJ: Do you believe the European Union can manage the simultaneous challenges of the Russian front in Ukraine, the economic challenge from China, and the emerging tensions with the United States? Furthermore, how can Europe address these external pressures while facing internal struggles with populist nationalists who oppose the European project?
OO: There is a certain paradox here. When you follow the debate regarding European strategic autonomy – the idea that we must create something of our own rather than relying solely on the United States – it is a very long story. Since the end of the Cold War, many in European institutions and capitals have argued for a world that is not dominated by a single power. Now we have reached that exact moment, yet we find ourselves unprepared. This is the moment of truth.
Secondly, I believe the source of European strength lies in the fact that we are not threatening anyone. Europe does not have imperial ambitions. While one could argue that our association agreements represent a form of ‘soft imperialism’, it does not mean we are threatening others. We no longer seek to export our system; instead, we believe we must consolidate and focus on our own problems. This is a significant difference when compared to American policy, which is imperial in a very old-fashioned way, or the actions of Russia and China. As a power in its own right, Europe remains very attractive to other countries. It is not by chance that agreements with India are moving forward – both sides feel that Europe can play fair.
Regarding your question about populism, the key problem with the liberal democratic order inside Europe is that we talk extensively about values while failing to deliver public services, such as housing, security, and economic growth. It is simple and difficult at the same time: the only way to consolidate Europe around liberal democratic values is to stop talking about those values and start delivering on them. As in Mark Carney’s way of looking at things, we should stop talking about who we are and simply do what we believe in, so that people can see the results.
In terms of European integration, the worst-case scenario would be to start another constitutional debate or a debate about changing treaties and introducing qualified majority voting in foreign policy. Some believe that if there is a problem with European democracy, we should talk about institutions. I believe we must focus on delivering everything that was promised to our citizens. It will not happen overnight, but less talk and more action will convince people that European integration has value.
Despite the problems, opinion polls show that people are overwhelmingly in favor of European integration because they see that it delivers. In Poland, the younger generation is better off than their parents’ generation. This is unique, as there are many Western countries, such as Spain and Germany, where the younger generation is worse off. We must focus on growth and delivering public services. I believe this is the only way forward.
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