In 2016, Viktor Orbán made a risky move. The prime minister’s July endorsement of Donald Trump might have come as a surprise given the obvious ideological affinity between the two leaders, but Orbán was the first head of state to openly back the American president when Hillary Clinton was still considered as the favorite for the White House. We have come a long way since then, and it is worth taking a closer look at just how well this wager has paid off.
There seems to be a contradiction at the heart of this decision: Orbán has benefited from his image as a high-stakes player on the world stage, but a second Trump term does not quite seem to fulfil the promises on which the official narrative of the Hungarian government has rested so heavily. In this article, I will track the evolution of the relationship between these two figures of the new right, and whether Orbán’s gamble might ultimately come back to haunt him.
The MAGA-Fidesz Connection
The history of the relationship between Hungarian conservatives and the American right long predates Trump. As early as the 1990s, Fidesz began to develop institutional connections with Republican networks in the United States. The International Republican Institute played a key role in supporting the emergence of conservative parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and in facilitating political exchanges. These contacts grew into a network facilitating the transatlantic circulation of ideological narratives and political strategies.
American political consultants have played a particularly significant role in shaping the modern Fidesz political party. Following the party’s electoral defeat in 2002, Orbán began to work closely with U.S. strategists such as Sean Tonner and Rich Beeson. Most important, however, was his partnership with American consultants Arthur Finkelstein and George Birnbaum, known for their roles in various Republican and Israeli campaigns.
Their influence has contributed to the institutionalization of the confrontational political style that came to define Orbán’s illiberal system: mobilizing voters through narratives about foreign influence, bureaucratic elites, and national sovereignty. The anti-Soros and anti-migration campaigns that became part of the foundation of Orbán’s political narrative owe part of their origins to this transatlantic relationship.
This long history of ties laid the groundwork for the alliance with Trumpism. By the time Trump became the dominant force within the Republican Party, Orbán’s ideological project already overlapped significantly with many of the themes that would dominate the MAGA movement. For both political camps, the struggle has been framed as a civilizational conflict against the liberal world order.
As Trump rose to prominence, figures within the American conservative movement began to present Hungary as a model for the US. Bannon, for example, has called Orbán “Trump before Trump”. Similar comments were made by other American commentators, who celebrated Hungary’s migration policy, family benefits and cultural politics as a model for successful conservative governance.
Institutional ties also intensified. The state-backed Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) has emerged as a major site of transatlantic conservative networking. Supported by more than $1.7bn in state funds in 2021 alone, MCC organizes conferences, fellowships and exchange programs to bring together Hungarian policymakers with American conservative thinkers.
The Hungarian government has also started to host international events such as the CPAC Hungary conference, where American and European radical right leaders gather to reinforce each other’s political project. Links with institutions like the Heritage Foundation and the Danube Institute have also strengthened the ideological similarities between the Orbán regime and the MAGA movement.
At first sight, this seems like an extraordinary feat for Orbán. A politician from a modestly sized Central European country has established himself as an ideological touchstone for one of the globe’s most influential political currents. But the structural imbalance in the relationship has become more obvious.
Orbán’s Expectations of Trump
Orbán’s endorsement of Trump was not merely a matter of symbolism. It was also a form of strategic investment, driven by his reading of the deeper shifts in global politics. Orbán regularly claims that the liberal international order is in a state of decay, and that a multipolar world is taking its place. Trump’s election in 2016 seemed to vindicate this thesis. If even the United States was now turning against liberal globalism, then Orbán’s own illiberal project in Hungary had been justified.
Inside Hungary, the government’s communications reinforced these expectations. The pro-government media often depicted Trump as a problem-solver who would rapidly sort out international disputes and repair economic relationships. One particularly popular meme held that if Trump were re-elected, he would sort out the Ukraine war in just 24 hours, an argument that became a standard reference in the government’s political communication.
The purpose of such content was straightforward. By depicting Trump as an international ally who was about to transform the global environment, Orbán’s government could argue that its increasingly hostile posture towards the EU and the broader liberal west would one day prove a strength rather than a weakness.
Politicians from the Hungarian ruling party hinted that more concrete benefits might be on the horizon. Government propaganda suggested that a re-elected Trump presidency might bring favorable trade terms, exemptions from particular economic sanctions or even some kind of broader “financial shield” that would protect Hungary from international pressure. Thus, Orbán would be generously compensated for his loyalty by Washington.
The Asymmetry of the Alliance
However, the Orbán-Trump relationship is much more one-sided than what the Hungarian public is usually presented with. Hungary has worked hard to gain influence in American conservative circles. The Orbán government has been building a network of think-tanks, conferences, lobbying, and media partnerships to make his ideological project an integral part of the broader MAGA universe.
The US, on the other hand, has invested very little in Hungary as a strategic ally. During Trump’s first term, Orbán had to wait almost three years before he received an official invitation to the White House. Even during the second Trump administration, high-level attention has not been the case.
This is no surprise given the underlying geopolitical logic of the relationship. Hungary is a small country that is trying to get political benefits from symbolic closeness to the United States. For the Americans, however, Hungary is a second-order partner.
Trump’s language towards Orbán has often been generous. The US president has frequently described him as a strong and excellent leader, thereby corroborating the narrative of the Hungarian government that Orbán plays a key role in global conservative politics. In practice, however, this rhetorical backing has not secured many benefits outside the symbolic dimension of the relationship.
Economic and Geopolitical Costs
Trump’s economic policies offer a glimpse of the potential costs for Orbán of tying his fortunes so closely to the MAGA movement. US protectionist tariffs on European exports endanger Hungarian industries. While only 4.1 percent of Hungarian exports go directly to the US, some sectors (notably automotive) are heavily affected by a trade war.
More importantly, there are indirect effects on the Hungarian economy that stem from its deep integration into European supply chains (notably, German manufacturing). If Trump’s trade policies weaken European industry and reduce transatlantic trade in the long run, then Hungary will be among those who suffer.
The geopolitical benefits of the alliance have also turned out to be more mixed than Orbán might have hoped. He had hoped that a Trump victory would mean a quick end to the war in Ukraine and exemption from sanctions and high energy prices. Instead, the war is still on and one of the key political storylines of the Hungarian government had to be considerably readjusted.
At the same time, Trump’s confrontational approach to Europe risks provoking the disintegration of the transatlantic alliance. According to recent surveys, trust in the United States has fallen sharply in many European countries during the Trump era.
For Orbán, this presents a problem. If relations between these two power centres continue to worsen, Orbán’s policy of trying to find a balance between them will become increasingly difficult.
Trump’s Popularity and the Limits of Orbán’s Policy
The other risk factor for Orbán’s strong Trump connection is the president’s popularity. Trump remains a divisive and relatively unpopular figure in Europe. The American president’s popularity is extremely low in many Western European countries.
Hungary is among those countries where Trump has the highest popularity in Europe. According to some surveys, one-third of the Hungarian society views Trump positively. However, Hungarian society remains divided. Another poll shows that more than half of Hungarians believe that Trump is the source of global conflicts rather than international stability.
The split in public opinion reflects the political division in the country. Fidesz voters trust Trump nearly completely, while the majority of opposition voters reject him. This means that Orbán’s policy reinforces his connection to his own voters but seems not sufficient to gain new ones which he needs at the moment to win the next elections in April. Furthermore, his strategy risks further isolating Hungary in Europe.
Strategic Contradictions
The main problem for Orbán is the strategic contradiction between different elements of his foreign policy. In the past few years, the driving idea behind Hungarian foreign policy has been the so-called “connectivity,” the notion that the country should build practical relationships with all major global powers at the same time. This means keeping good relations with the European Union, the United States, China and Russia.
However, in an increasingly polarized international system, this balancing act becomes increasingly difficult. Trump’s trade policy against Europe, the increasing geopolitical tensions and the growing rivalry between the great powers mean that the “connectivity” concept is increasingly unrealistic.
The developments in the United States even created within divisions the European radical right. The increased American pressure on European sovereignty created resentment within some nationalist parties. This reveals a deeper contradiction within the emerging populist international.
For Orbán, this creates a tough situation. The Hungarian prime minister has spent years building his image as Trump’s closest European ally and as a key figure of the global conservative movement. However, the practical returns of this policy remain limited, and the risks are growing.
The strong connection to the American president binds Hungary to a highly divisive and unpredictable political figure. If Trump’s policies create deeper tensions within the transatlantic relationship or further destabilize the global economic system, in the end, the costs for Orbán’s regime may outgrow the symbolic benefits Orbán has received.