![Who Will Win the Polish Presidential Election? with Adam Jasser [PODCAST]](https://4liberty.eu/phidroav/2025/05/Liberal-Europe-Podcast-2024-7-1024x1024.png "Who Will Win the Polish Presidential Election? with Adam Jasser [PODCAST]")
What does the forthcoming presidential election in Poland mean for Europe? What are the main issues and divisions between the candidates that occur in the ongoing campaign? And how will the election result influence the current government and its policy? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Adam Jasser, an economic and political analyst with 30 years of professional experience as a journalist, an editor, and a policymaker. He is currently the Deputy Director at TVP World, a leading English-language news channel in Central Eastern Europe, and the host of ‘On the Record’, a current affairs show.
Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): Who will be the next Polish president, after June 1? And why is it important in the European context?
Adam Jasser (AJ): Although I do not have my crystal ball with me, I can refer to what I see in opinion polls and estimates conducted by various pollsters. According to this data, it seems that Rafal Trzaskowski – the current Mayor of Warsaw, a sort of center-right or centrist candidate – is in the lead. How big that margin is and whether the dynamics changes before the second election round is not entirely clear, but it seems unlikely that he will lose the forthcoming presidential election.
LJ: What is this presidential election about? What are the main issues? And what are the key actors of the ongoing campaign?
AJ: Apart from Rafal Trzaskowski, who represents the pro-European mainstream parties and is appealing to pro-European mainstream voters, his main contender is Karol Nawrocki, who represents the conservative (or rightist, if you will), Eurosceptic Law and Justice party. This is the party that was in power in Poland for eight years before the current government took over at the beginning of 2024. It is precisely Karol Nawrocki who poses the challenge to the ruling majority, which is behind Rafal Trzaskowski.
Therefore, in a sense, this election could be interpreted as an early plebiscite or referendum on the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Rafal Trzaskowski, and the entire coalition that they represent. But this is just one dimension. The second dimension is that this is, again, a contest between political forces that see Poland at the heart of Europe being an active member of the community, while at the same time also try to assume a leadership role in that community. Of course, proportional to Poland’s GDP and an overall standing. Together with France, Germany, and possibly Italy, Poland wants to be at the top table. And we have seen some evidence of the fact that the current coalition and Rafal Trzaskowski will be able to perform this function in Europe.
Meanwhile, Karol Nawrocki and the Law and Justice party represent the Eurosceptic strain of European politics. During their eight years in power, they managed to basically alienate all European partners – with some minor exceptions, such as Viktor Orban. But even there, the differences over Ukraine meant that, in the end, Law and Justice and their government were pretty much isolated in Europe. In other words, they were unable to leverage Poland’s really strong economic, political, and defense position to push forward Polish interests.
Therefore, if Rafal Trzaskowski wins, then we can assume that Poland’s place at the heart of European politics will remain in place – and will even get a boost. If Karol Nawrocki wins, then obviously status is going to be challenged. Moreover, the lack of internal cohesion in Poland that is likely to result from him taking over the presidency is going to make Poland probably less effective on the European stage.
LJ: The Polish president is mostly responsible for foreign policy and defense, even though it is the government that really frames this policy. This being said, to what extent, in your opinion, has the election of Donald Trump for the president of the United States played a role in the Polish presidential election? And do the security issues related to the Ukrainian agenda matter in this campaign?
AJ: The Polish president is elected directly, so has a very strong popular mandate. However, at the same time, when it comes to policymaking, their role is really limited. Some commentators called that ‘negative power’. This means that the president can veto legislation, delay appointments, and in general make life harder for the parliamentary majority. Still, it is not the case that the president can really change the course of policy, unless they block things – which is also some form of changing of policy.
Therefore, unfortunately, the Polish constitutional order makes the president either a consensual, consensus-seeking role of trying to bring compromise and to stabilize the political situation, or the only other role for the president is to be that negative power – veto legislation and demand policy changes, which then very often the ruling majority in parliament will not necessarily obey. And you need three fifths of votes in the Polish parliament (which is very hard to get) to overturn the presidential veto.
In other words, the president is the head of state. Yes, they are the commander in chief. However, in fact, defense policy and key decisions are made by the Defense Ministry. As such, a lot depends on personalities, on the understanding of what the role of the president is – in the spirit of the law rather than the letter of the law. So far, Poland was not very lucky with this. I think the only president who managed to be this consensus-building figure and trying to be relatively neutral towards all political parties was Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was a former communist, later social democrat president, who was in power for two consecutive terms between 1995 and 2005.
Kwasniewski managed to exude that kind of father figure for the nation and to serve as an arbiter. Although he did not hide his leftist sympathies, he could also see through other lenses and was seeking consensus on many issues. Later presidents, like Lech Kaczynski (the brother of the current Law and Justice leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski), were definitely partisan. Even though there was a brief four-year period when there was another president who was perhaps a little bit more compromise-seeking, he was, nevertheless, still clearly aligned with the then ruling party.
Then, for the last decade we had Andrzej Duda, who has been highly partisan. Basically, he was a hostage to Law and Justice and its policies. He is largely responsible for some of the constitutional problems and rule of law disputes in Poland over the past eight years.
Now, it is really important to understand that either Poland will be getting a president who will stick with the constitutional principles and try to overcome the existing divisions and polarizations (and I believe that Rafal Trzaskowski will seek to do that), or we will face the continuation of the current confrontational cohabitation (if Karol Nawrocki wins, or possibly someone even more to the right, because there is a third person in the race who still has a small chance of coming to the second round).
Cohabitation is the key word here. If you have a president, a prime minister, and the parliamentary majority from opposing camps, it is extremely difficult to push through legislation and a reform agenda that would ensure significant policy decisions.
When it comes to the influence of the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States and, broadly speaking, the MAGA movement on the Polish election, it seems that it is clear to the rightist or conservative voters in Poland that Karol Nawrocki is close to the MAGA ideology. However, at the same time, we have seen that endorsement from Donald Trump or his proxies, such as JD Vance or Elon Musk, does not necessarily help that much to increase the vote. Therefore, in a sense, it is like preaching to the convinced. And even though Karol Nawrocki got a photograph with Donald Trump in the Oval Office, it seems that this in itself did not make that much of a difference – because, in the end, it should not.
LJ: Is it possible that we may face any legal issues regarding this presidential election? After all, this is what happened recently in Romania. Do you think it might be the case? Or do we have nothing to worry about?
AJ: Overall, I am not too concerned about this because this is a popular vote, and no one questions the integrity of the election process as such. It will be hard for any actors to try to undermine the result on the basis of some question marks over the legality of the Constitutional Court, which needs to verify the result. It would be suicidal for these officials there to try to overturn the real election – unless, of course, there are solid grounds. But I do not think that the situation is comparable to Romania. Therefore, overall, the result of the election will be respected.
Of course, we can have a situation in which the result is so close, marginally close, in which case we can expect recounts and protests that may drag out. However, the important thing to remember is that even if, for some reason, there are legal doubts about this process, President Andrzej Duda has to leave office by August, regardless of what happens. His term expires. He cannot carry on as president, in which case the Speaker of the Parliament, who is a member of the ruling coalition, steps in and acts as an interim president with full powers. This means that whatever works in the system or attempts to to unsettle the system, the ruling coalition in such a situation, in my opinion, will be able to prevail and restore the constitutional order. In this light, because this is known to everybody, I do not expect any attempts at overturning the result.
LJ: What should we expect will happen after May 18 (the election day) and before June 1, as we are going to enter two weeks of very intensive campaigning between just two candidates (most likely Rafal Trzaskowski and Karol Nawrocki)? What do you think is going to happen then? How will they try to appeal to the voters who did not vote for them?
AJ: It is important to mention that Karol Nawrocki has recently become embroiled in a scandal that puts a spotlight on his character and his integrity. Namely, the media have discovered that he might have swindled an elderly person out of his flat, which he denied. He said he was acting in good faith. It is a rather complex story, and I do not think we need to go into the details of it. Nevertheless, what we have seen in the last few days is that his ratings have dropped. Currently, the gap between Karol Nawrocki and Rafal Trzaskowski has increased to between 8-10 percentage points – and that is a gap that is very hard for the former to overcome.
Now, regardless of the drop in popularity of Karol Nawrocki, the scenario A is that both of these candidates will pass to the second round of voting after May 18. So, what will happen in those crucial two weeks? On the one hand, yes, there will be an element of reset, all the other minor candidates will have dropped out. In this context, it is going to be as if the race will start again. However, at the beginning of that race, Karol Nawrocki will be trailing by up to 10 percentage points. Therefore, unless he finds a new narrative, unless there are events that change the course of this campaign, he will be racing against the odds to catch up with Rafal Trzaskowski.
Meanwhile, Rafal Trzaskowski’s challenge will be to become really convincing in his messaging about being a consensus-driven person, and someone who will try to bridge the gap and the chasm that has evolved in Poland over the past 10 years (or maybe even longer) between the far right, Eurosceptic electorate, and the more centrist and moderate electorate – which is a Polish paradox that these are the main opposing forces: broadly speaking, it is center right versus the right or hard right. As such, he will need to convince the undecided voters that he is the person that can unite Poland again. On top of that, he also faces the challenge of winning endorsements from other, minor candidates – particularly those on the left, who together seem to be now polling at around 10%, which is significant – and whether he manages to bring them into his big tent.
Finally, the last factor that will be important is how Confederation (Konfederacja, the far-right party) will behave. It is likely that they will, one way or the other, be more sympathetic towards Karol Nawrocki, because, ideologically, they are closer. However, we have seen in recent days that they have tried to put some distance between themselves and Karol Nawrocki because of the scandal. Moreover, in the long term, they seem to be keen on replacing Law and Justice as the main force on the right wing. As such, they are not necessarily looking forward to Karol Nawrocki winning the election, because this will, obviously, consolidate Law and Justice’s hold on the political scene in Poland. In this context, Rafal Trzaskowski needs to find a way of making it easy for Confederation to at least stay neutral in this race.
LJ: Do you think that the lack of a more progressive agenda (hence any issues focusing on young people or women) might cause trouble to Rafal Trzaskowski between the first and the second election round – especially, if his support in the first round is lower than expected?
AJ: The fact that Rafal Trzaskowski has tried not to appear too progressive might be problematic for him. However, at the end of the day, if more center-left or leftist voters are confronted with Karol Nawrocki (who is definitely not on their side) and Rafal Trzaskowski (who is 50 percent on their side), I think they will rationalize it, and they will make it a vote without enthusiasm, perhaps, but a calculated decision to back the latter. That is one issue.
The second issue is that, ultimately, some of these centrist and leftist parties are members of the ruling coalition. Thus, for them not to endorse Rafal Trzaskowski could jeopardize their position in the ruling coalition later on. Because one can imagine a scenario in which Trzaskowski wins anyway – even by a slim margin – in which case Prime Minister Tusk suddenly has much more leverage over the entire political spectrum. In such a case, it would be extremely risky for the left or for the Third Way (the other coalition party, which is sort of centrist, liberal, and sometimes hard to define). It would be very hard for them not to endorse Trzaskowski and not to call on their voters to support him.
So, yes, there will be some attrition among the voters of the candidates that will not pass to the second round. Still, Rafal Trzaskowski has decent potential to mobilize these voters.
LJ: In the most likely scenario in which Trzaskowski wins, Donald Tusk’s power will be further consolidated. How will this fact influence the Polish domestic agenda? What will be the impact on the future of the current government?
AJ: Donald Tusk needs to become bolder if Rafal Trzaskowski indeed secures the presidency – because, so far, the government has not delivered any substantial policy changes that Poland needs to boost growth, to consolidate public finance, and to deal with a number of other issues. Prime Minister Tusk has the right instincts, but there are internal divisions – and then there was the presidential veto.
There is a risk that the presidential veto used by President Duda in the past was a bit of an excuse not to do much. If Rafal Trzaskowski becomes the president, this excuse is gone, and the governing coalition should really get their act together.
To give you one example, at the moment, there seems to be no real economic policymaking center of government. There are different ministers with important portfolios, but you cannot point to a person in the government that really coordinates economic policymaking. Some of it seems to be not really evidence driven, not really analysis driven, but more or less accidental.
I hope (but it is by no means certain) that PM Tusk better gets moving really quickly, so that, in the autumn, he can either reshuffle the government or re-energize the coalition, to come forward with a number of specific policy changes that are going to sustain Poland’s economy, make spending on defense sustainable, and finally end some of the blockages in the broadly understood law enforcement, justice, and human rights.
LJ: Do you think that the nationalization that PM Tusk spoke of at the European Forum of New Ideas a couple of weeks ago might become the new economic policy we might expect from the government? Or was it just a pure ‘campaign talk’?
AJ: No, I think when we see what is happening in the world, with the rise of protectionism, the industrial policy is back. I mean, it was back under President Joe Biden. It was back in Poland, actually, under the previous Tusk’s government. It was certainly in place during the Law and Justice government – even if some of it ended up being decisions which were arbitrary, very often contrary to business logic.
Nevertheless, the industrial policy is back. This kind of nationalist economic policy is there, not just in Poland. It is just a part of unwinding of globalization as we knew it. However, at the end of the day, there are simple measures of success. Is growth accelerating? Is investment going up? Is corporate governance becoming better? Are companies going to be better run, more productive, expansionist in terms of proper market-based expansion? These are tricky policies to implement, so it is easy to declare a kind of an industrial policy or a more nationalist approach to the economy.
Nonetheless, the devil is in the detail and in specific legislation and measures that are being taken. I trust that PM Tusk understands this, and some of the ministers he assembled are basically market-driven people. Therefore, it is more a question of finding a balance between strict industrial policies and support of the state and maintaining a market principles, competition, and neutrality of the state when it comes to competition in the market. And this is very often forgotten in these discussions.
It will be important for Prime Minister Tusk and for his coalition partners to ensure that the industrial policy does not skew competition and market forces. Whether they are up to that, it is not yet clear.
LJ: It seem that Poland may now need to face a difficult choice, given that it has always been the most transatlantic voice in Europe. On the one hand, Poland has become quite powerful and important in the European Union and in Europe in general. On the other hand, it is not clear whether it can count on the United States anymore. What are the choices regarding security, especially after the forthcoming presidential election?
AJ: If Rafal Trzaskowski wins and Prime Minister Tusk gets some breathing space when it comes to domestic and international policymaking, he is likely to continue his policy on the international stage, which I would describe as ‘hedging his bets’. He certainly wants to keep the Americans involved in Polish and European affairs. He is not too keen on saying, ‘Okay, well, let us give up on America, we can do it ourselves’. Poland will never do that – and in that, actually, Tusk and Law and Justice are very similar. They are going to be the last ones saying, ‘We need a divorce from America’.
PM Tusk is also hedging his bets, or Poland’s bets, because he is trying to boost ties with France, particularly. Moreover, it is also worth mentioning here that he seems to be a great enthusiast of a deeper cooperation with the Nordic countries – namely Sweden and Finland. These two countries have recently joined NATO, which constitute a change of paradigm in which Poland can operate with them. Before, this security dimension was missing, or could not be really complete. Now, these countries not only perceive the threat from Russia in a similar way, but both Sweden and Finland are also robust military forces.
There is a commonality of interest between the Nordics and Poland. Donald Tusk, in his first speech in parliament, mentioned that building that kind of regional cooperation within the EU (without giving up on the EU and, certainly, without giving up on NATO) was going to be his priority. Nevertheless, he realizes the importance of different formats in which he can advance Poland’s interests and its security.
Now, by contrast, it is not entirely clear, and PM Tusk has been avoiding this issue. If anything, he has been ridiculing any kind of European dimension of Poland’s security. In this light, he is betting on a single horse: the United States. This is the ultimate layer. This is what this presidential race is about when it comes to foreign policy and Poland’s place in Europe. It is going to determine to what extent Poland will be able to continue strengthening its position within building these regional alliances. On the other hand, it may not fully take advantage of this potential and instead focus on keeping the Americans involved in Polish security issues.
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with Movimento Liberal Social and Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.