Will Robert Fico Be the Next Orbán? with Michal Vašečka [PODCAST]

ELF

Should we be afraid of Slovak nationalism? And why do Slovaks dislike the West? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Michal Vašečka, a Program Director of the Bratislava Policy Institute. Since 2012, he serves as a representative of Slovakia in the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe. He is a chairman of the Editorial Board of Denník N. He operated at the Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University in Brno in 2002-2017 and at the Comenius University in 2006-2009.

Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): What is the future of Slovak democracy looking like right now?

Michal Vasecka (MV): The picture is very gloomy at the moment, and it is connected to numerous factors. Currently, it is not only Prime Minister Robert Fico as an authoritarian leader who is strengthening his power in Slovakia day by day, but also public opinion and value orientations of Slovaks, who are very anti-Western (but not necessarily anti-EU), anti-liberal, pro-Russian, and pro-Putin.

Moreover, I am relatively skeptical also because of the reactions of Brussels and the way it is generally unable to deal with regimes such as that of Fico in Slovakia, Orban in Hungary, and – in the past – Kaczynski in Poland. Unfortunately, Brussels is simply caught in an unpleasant situation, when people like Orban and Fico are basically blackmailing Brussels, saying ‘We do not really care about Ukraine, nor about the war.’



By the way, Slovaks are not so pro-Russian as many people say, so we can support your Ukrainian consensus, but we have one condition: Do not criticize us and, most importantly, do not cut any EU structural or cohesion funds. If you are not harsh on us, we will be a happy European family again.

There is a striking difference between Viktor Orban and Robert Fico. The former, ten years ago, declared that he wanted to be in the avant-garde of future illiberal Europe. This is why he has very good contacts in Italy, France, Germany, and in many other countries. He supports the Brothers of Italy, AfD in Germany, and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France. He even established a think tank in Washington, DC, and he is trying to influence developments inside the Republican Party.

What we heard from Donald Trump during the last debate with Kamala Harris was that there is a fantastic leader in Europe with whom Trump has fantastic connections – and he clearly meant Viktor Orban. So, Viktor Orban is playing the game which is not really reflecting the fact that Hungary is a relatively small country. Meanwhile, Viktor Orban seems to be thinking that he is still representing the original big Hungary.

At the same time, Robert Fico is different. He does not care about foreign policy – and he never did. He never really wanted to be influential anywhere outside of Slovakia. Even when he had a chance to influence politics in the Czech Republic – because of the natural ties between Prague and Bratislava – he refused. Moreover, he does not understand many things about foreign policy, which is even worse. His goal is simply to strengthen his power in Slovakia – the smallest country of Central Europe.

Slovaks were the winners of the 20th century. From an unimportant, small, and almost non-existent nation, they became very successful. They survived the 20th century, including the World War II, but many Slovaks still remember it. We made it only thanks to the fact that we were trying to play on all sides, and we never really took a moral stance clearly supporting somebody – because when we did, it that was a mistake.

Since then, for the last three thirty years, Slovaks have been trying to play on all fronts and to have equally good relations with Berlin, Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and even Belgrade and Zagreb. Actually, although it may not be very moral, it is a good strategy for a small country.

The problem is that Slovakia is becoming an absolutely unreliable partner for the West. It is basically saying that it is not a part of the West in many aspects and brings not only questions on the side of our Western partners, but also very concrete results. Practically nobody is cooperating with Slovak intelligence service, nobody wants to be in touch with Slovak judiciary, etc. All this has very concrete repercussions.

LJ: Is there enough of people and institutions to resist the government in Slovakia? Or does so much depend on the states and the government that it is impossible for citizens to mobilize and for institutions to resist the current threat?

MV: Here, there are good and bad news. The bad news is that Slovaks as a small nation, a small country, went through several stages of experiences. Once you give up and focus on survival, sooner or later you will benefit from it.

This approach constitutes a striking difference in comparison to Poland. Some Poles may not pay attention to it. In 1938-39, Slovakia gave up. We were not fighting against Germans. In 1968, the same happened within Czechoslovakia, as we were not fighting and did not even declare that we disagree with the invasion of the Soviet Union. Slovaks learned their lesson – that it might be bad, but it is never tragic.

The same is happening now, with the legacy of so-called ‘normalization’. After 1968, communists wanted to normalize the situation, and so they basically freed the social dynamic of society for 20 years. In those 20 years, Czechoslovakia and Poland were very different countries in this respect. There was plenty of food, for instance. During that period, Czechoslovakia was a relatively prosperous part of the Eastern Bloc, but at the same time, it was not the happiest barrack of that concentration camp (with Hungary being often referred to as ‘the happiest barrack of the camp’).

Czechoslovakia was not very happy, but it was plentiful – and Slovaks remember it. Right now, we clearly see that when government is cleaning ministries dramatically, when people are fired from various positions in police and judiciary, many people give up and do not protest – and that is bad news, because there is a certain legacy.

And now, for the good news. Unlike in Hungary, when Orban came to power, and slowly but systematically, he was depriving civil society, media, and even businesses of various rights, Slovakia went through the same process already in the 1990s. Slovakia was a troublemaker during Vladimír Mečiar’s regime (1992 -1998) and Fico is now repeating many of the things that happened at that time.

Meanwhile, civil society, the media, and many other segments of society are ready to oppose Fico. We are experiencing a feeling of a déjà vu, so we are very sensitive about certain signals. We are reacting very swiftly. Secondly, especially the media and civil society are ready also in a technical sense.

In comparison, when Viktor Orban, in a very sophisticated way got rid of Népszabadság, a major daily newspaper in Hungary, he succeeded also because Népszabadság was not ready to fight back. They were not paying any attention to the fact that something had changed in Hungary, and that they could have become a target for the new power.

However, many of Slovak media outlets are already aware, where there is struggle going on. It is a fearful fight at the moment. In some private TV stations, the same is happening. And we do not know what the result will be. Nevertheless, a number of leading portals and dailies seem to be ready for brutal attacks.

In fact, what is problematic in Slovakia these days is that unlike in some other countries where disinformation media or alternative media might be powerful, they are still not dominant. Slovakia ended up in a conspiracy hell years ago, and some of this information and alternative media became even more important than some of the major mainstream media outlets.

Currently, Slovak democrats, the media, and civil society have to fight on two fronts. First of all, against Fico, and secondly, against the power of disinformation media, which are supported by Fico. And, suddenly, we see that, in fact, the power of disinformation media, very often supported by Russia, might be even more destructive than activities of Robert Fico himself.

LJ: What is the importance of the Slovak identity? How is it being used to strengthen Robert Fico’s regime?

MV: The Slovak identity has been important for all segments of the society in Slovakia. Since 1944, different segments of society have been playing dirty games with it. First of all, from the very beginning, Slovak fascists, members of the People’s Party, were labelling the Slovak National Uprising as a coup d’état against the Slovak Republic, against Slovakia, and against Slovaks – simply because it was conducted under Czechoslovak flags.

Already in 1944, the uprising declared that we want to recreate Czechoslovakia. And, of course, it was a fight against not only local collaborators, but also against Nazi Germany. On the other hand, everybody in Slovakia who is old enough remembers how communists were basically declaring that they were the most important part of the resistance (which is very similar to Poland, where communists after 1945 were claiming that they are at the forefront of the resistance against Germans, even going as far as calling it ‘communist resistance’). Even though people never really believed it, when this kind of propaganda is done for many decades, it affected the general perception of this process.

When, after 1989, Slovakia started speaking freely about the uprising, the society became very divided. For Slovak Democrats, the Slovak National Uprising is very important for a very simple reason: it was practically the only time when Slovakia fought for independent Slovakia. Slovaks were standing on the side of progress, on the right side of history.

In 1848, when Hungarians under Lajos Kossuth were fighting against Vienna, the most conservative and anti-democratic force in Central Europe, Slovaks joined Vienna against bourgeois revolution of Kossuth, because they believed that Vienna would give Slovaks something afterwards. (Which, of course, did not happen.) So, Slovaks were not standing on the right side of history, so to say. The same happened during the World War I.

Furthermore, in 1939, Slovakia declared the existence of the Slovak state, which was a puppet state of Nazi Germany. Moreover, Slovak’s fascist state invaded Poland in 1939 together with Nazi Germany. Basically, Slovakia (together with Germany) was among those who produced the World War II. It went to the Eastern Front to fight against the Soviet Union.

Summarizing, without the Slovak National Uprising, Slovakia would be defeated – just like Hungary, Germany, or Japan. However, thanks to the uprising, Slovaks declared that they are on the side of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, and – suddenly – Slovaks were victorious. Not to mention the fact that Slovak soldiers were even marching in a parade in London in 1945, what Polish soldiers were deprived of, by the way.

Therefore, the Slovak National Uprising constitutes the most important thing for Slovak democrats in the history of their pro-Western, pro-democratic stance. Democratic Slovaks practically do not have anything better. As a result, they are attacked on two fronts – on the one hand, by fascist movements and political parties, who say that this was a coup d’état against the nation, and on this other hand by former communists like Robert Fico, who are trying to steal the legacy of the Slovak National Uprising, and they are even utilizing it against the West.

This is exactly what Fico did during the anniversary celebrations of the uprising in Banská Bystrica this year. He openly attacked the West, the European Union, NATO, and the United States by saying that Slovakia again has its own opinion, and, again, it is not accepted by superpowers – just like it had not been accepted in the past.

So, of course, the fight is going on, but what we experienced this year in Banská Bystrica was relatively unpleasant, also because it looked like the celebration was run from Moscow – even the aesthetics of it was highly problematic. It was the very first time we saw something like this in Slovakia.

It seems that there is still a lot of sentiment for the communist era. And we need to remember that Robert Fico was a member of the Communist Party in the past (although a low-ranking one).

LJ: How do people remember both the first Slovak Republic and the Communist times, when Slovakia was in an asymmetric relationship with the Czech part of Czechoslovakia? How did these experiences shape the Slovak national identity? And how has the political discourse evolved around those issues in the last 30 years?

MV: All this is very important. As I have already mentioned, Slovakia was developing slowly but systematically during the whole 20th century. During the World War II, thanks to the fact that the Slovak state had, at least on paper, some space for independent politics, the country was benefiting from the war as it was not directly involved in it.

Many people still remember it. Slovakia went from a very, very poor country in the past, to the times of relative prosperity during the war. Even when there was hunger in some parts of Europe during the war, Slovaks never experienced it – except for the last winter, in 1944 -1945, which they still remember.

Poles might find this very difficult to understand. When, in Slovakia, my grandfather was studying medicine at the university in the years 1939-1945, during those six years of the war for people in Poland (and other parts of Europe) it was almost incomprehensible how it would be event possible. However, in Slovakia it was. Although most of the Slovak people disagreed with the regime, they still remember some good things about that period.

The same is true for the communist times, especially in the 1970s and 1980s in Slovakia. While communism was already not functioning ‘properly’ in some countries (like Romania, Bulgaria, or Poland), the standard of living for Slovaks was going up quite dramatically. This is why Slovakia, as part of Czechoslovakia, was the least prepared for the changes of 1989 – as opposed to what was happening in Poland, Hungary, or in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia.

Generally speaking, Slovaks were relatively satisfied with the regime and the only thing they wanted to understand was why ‘these communists’ did not allow them to go to church and why the borders were closed. However, there was no desire to change the system, which was definitely the case in Poland and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia.

In a way, Slovakia is still benefiting from this poisoned fruit until these days. What is common for those who have positive memories related to both the fascist state and communist state is their perception of authoritarianism. All these people are simply reluctant to even think about democratic Slovakia. They are both anti-Western and to some extent pro-Russian. This is why Robert Fico was a genius (in a negative sense of the word), because he actually combined these two sentiments.

What Robert Fico did is that he combined the sentiment for Josef Tiso (a former president, a priest, and a statesman who fought for Slovak autonomy within the Czechoslovak nation) with the sentiment for Gustáv Husák (who was the president of Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s and a figure who normalized Czechoslovakia). And, suddenly, it mixed into a really problematic, toxic mixture of everything that is basically against the West. All this is very similar to what we are experiencing in Russia, what we saw in Ukraine during the transformation, and what is less visible in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is still there as well, but it is not as prominent.

LJ: There seems to be a certain feeling of victimhood when we look at the history of Slovakia. At the same time, there were moments of national awakening. Is it possible for Slovakia to experience modernization of mentality alongside the material modernization in Slovakia?

MV: That is a very good sociological question. The answer is: no. I do not believe that it will go hand in hand. We have had a lot of proof of that in the last 30 years. Indeed, Slovakia was gaining relatively quickly. Now, it is a country where people are driving BMWs and Mercedes (just like in Poland). However, in cultural terms, modernity is not coming.

What we see is a growing gap between the structural and the cultural dimensions of modernity. The only thing that could change that is if Slovakia were to go through a certain shock. It definitely will not be a shock related to the economic collapse, because Slovakia will go through economic hardship in the upcoming years, I am positive about it. However, even such a challenge will not change the current landscape.

What might change it are dramatic problems related to Slovakia’s position in the European Union, NATO. If our presence in these structures becomes endangered and people understand that they might lose solid ground, something might change eventually. Otherwise, I am relatively skeptical.

All in all, it will get worse before it gets better. But it is very important that we talk about it in the European context, so we do not leave Slovakia to go alongside Hungary in this position.


Michal Vašečka was a guest of the latest edition of Freedom Games, a festival of ideas held annually in Łódź, Poland. This year’s edition was held on October 18-20 in EC1 Łódź. The European Liberal Forum is the Co-Organizer of the festival.


This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with Movimento Liberal Social and Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.


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