2027 Presidential Election in France with Blanche Leridon [PODCAST]

What should we know ahead of the 2027 presidential election in France? What topics will likely dominate the political debate ahead of the election?  What has recently changed in terms of Marine Le Pen’s candidacy for the president? Where does the enormous support base for the Rassemblement National come from? And what is the legacy of President Emmanuel Macron? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Blanche Leridon, Director of French Studies at Institut Montaigne, specializing in democratic and institutional issues.

Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): Given the recent Court of Appeal ruling concerning the conviction of Marine Le Pen, what are the legal and strategic implications of this decision for her leadership of the National Rally and her official entry into the 2027 presidential campaign?

Blanche Leridon (BL): It was not a big surprise here in France, but at the same time, it was the real start of the presidential campaign for 2027. Regarding the court of appeals ruling, the court found her guilty of the same charges as the lower court, so she is still convicted of embezzlement. However, it reduced her sentence in light of the voters’ freedom of choice, shifting the responsibility back to her to decide whether or not to run for president.

She decided that she would run for the presidency. The key to this decision is that the court of appeal decided to reduce her ineligibility. Because her ineligibility has been reduced, she can run for the presidency. She announced her decision relatively quickly, on the very same day of the court’s decision. This was a surprise because there was a perception in French public debates that it was the end for Marine Le Pen, especially with her protégé, Jordan Bardella, holding the party presidency. But she has built a new narrative about her candidacy as a martyr candidate, like a phoenix rising from the ashes, returning stronger. This is visible in her slogan, Renaissance, and her campaign posters. The campaign has really started, and it is going to be highly interesting to follow.

LJ: What structural changes and societal shifts have occurred over the last five years to transform the National Rally from a political outcast into the current favorite to win the French presidency?

BL: The rise of national populist parties is not a French exception. It would be unfair to lay the blame solely on Emmanuel Macron. National populist ideas are gaining ground everywhere in Europe. This trend, especially in France, is fueled by deep citizen and societal anxieties, including economic worries, inflation, a sense of social decline, and the fear that our children will live worse lives than we did.

There is a growing feeling of global insecurity, including the risk of conflict due to international events. When people are afraid, they naturally turn to anti-system parties because they offer simple, ready-made answers. This is especially the case with the National Rally because they have not governed during the last twenty years. For a large part of public opinion in France, they are the last chance; people want to try them because all the others failed before them. This is a key way to explain their popularity.

There is also another factor. Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella now form a ticket. This is quite new in French politics because presidential campaigns are usually focused on a single individual and the idea of a meeting between a leader and the people. A part of the French population is tired of this dynamic after ten years of Emmanuel Macron’s governing style. Instead, there is a duo. They are highly complementary. Marine Le Pen appeals to social and middle-class voters. Jordan Bardella embodies a more economically liberal, pro-business approach, which is attractive in the economic environment. They form an appealing duo for a large part of the French population.

This explains why they remain the most popular political figures in the polls, even though Marine Le Pen has been convicted and Jordan Bardella is only thirty years old without experience running a ministry or assuming major public functions. Immediately after the court gave its conclusion, polls placed Marine Le Pen between thirty-six and thirty-nine percent. She has never been as high in the polls as after the sentence of the Court of Appeal, meaning the conviction has absolutely no negative effect at the moment. However, a presidential campaign is a marathon and everything can happen. French political history shows that events rarely happen exactly as anticipated, but at this precise moment, they have never been this high.

LJ: Given the highly crowded and fragmented field of potential candidates across the left, center, and right, who possesses the structural and strategic capability to emerge as the primary challenger to Marine Le Pen, and does this level of division directly work in her favor?

BL: The starting line is crowded—perhaps more crowded than at any point in recent memory—because across the political spectrum, there are between thirty and forty contenders positioning themselves. They are testing messages, holding rallies, and publishing books, making it a highly messy and crowded starting line at the moment.

In today’s fragmented political landscape, there is one assumption increasingly shared across the political spectrum: the National Rally is expected to reach the second round of the presidential election. The strategic question for almost every other political actor is, therefore, no longer whether the National Rally will be present in the second round, but who will face it.

On the left, the challenge remains one of fragmentation. Jean-Luc Mélenchon continues to dominate the political space to the left and remains the only candidate with a clearly defined political machine and program behind him. He is polling between twelve and fifteen percent, benefiting from a level of organizational discipline that his competitors often lack. The rest of the left remains trapped in an endless debate over unity, with nearly a dozen potential candidates currently maneuvering for position. There is a growing impression of confusion on the left at a moment where clarity is desperately needed.

The center faces a similar dilemma because there are two contenders who are both former prime ministers under Emmanuel Macron: Gabriel Attal and Édouard Philippe. These men are products of the Macron years, yet neither wishes to campaign as Macron’s direct heir. Each is trying to strike a delicate balance, benefiting from the experience and credibility gained in government while distancing themselves from the weakness and fatigue associated with a decade of Macronism. Gabriel Attal presents himself as a candidate of generational renewal, while Édouard Philippe seeks to embody experience, stability, and presidential stature in an increasingly turbulent world.

It is very difficult at the moment to say who will be in the second round with Marine Le Pen, if it happens this way. What can be said at this stage of the campaign is that the multiplication of candidates reflects what might be called the Macron precedent. The belief that a determined outsider can still emerge, disrupt the established order, and capture the presidency—as Macron’s victory did in 2017—continues to shape the political imagination. It encourages ambitious figures across the spectrum because they all think they can do it themselves without a party or without being previously elected to certain positions, which explains why there are so many candidates.

This dynamic will not last the entire campaign. At one point it will become clearer, and there will not be thirty or forty candidates. At the moment, the programs that are the clearest and the candidates that are most backed by their teams are Jean-Luc Mélenchon with La France Insoumise and, on the other side, the National Rally. The National Rally embodies unity, whereas all other parties are struggling with the poison of division. The key word for the next few weeks is going to be union—union on the traditional left, union in the center, and union on the right to produce one defined candidate who will be able to win against Marine Le Pen in the second round. Once again, it is a presidential campaign, and everything can happen. Everything, even on the Le Pen side, can evolve in one way or another during the upcoming weeks and months.

LJ: Beyond immediate discussions surrounding environmental challenges like recent heat waves, what are the primary domestic and international issues that will define the 2027 presidential campaign, and how effectively can the National Rally position itself on these topics?

BL: Purchasing power will be a key topic for this election because it is both a domestic topic and one heavily linked with the geopolitical situation. The French people understand this well, so we cannot separate what is happening on the domestic side from what is happening on the international stage. People often say international affairs do not count in a presidential election and that the French people only care about what is happening directly inside the country. That is not going to be true for this election. The French people understand that what is happening internationally has an impact on their purchasing power, their capacity to go on vacation, and other things. Purchasing power, with this dual explanation on the national side and the international side, will be absolute key.

This presents a difficulty for the National Rally because, even if they are popular, they are weaker on questions of international affairs. The French public still remembers the proximity between Marine Le Pen and Vladimir Putin, as well as her proximity to Russia, which is not popular in French public opinion. She does not possess the international stature that other contenders can showcase, which is a weak point in her candidacy.

Regarding other topics, healthcare will be absolutely key—specifically how we finance our healthcare system and address new challenges like an aging population. Pension reform will also be a huge topic because it was a central issue during the two terms of Emmanuel Macron, but it has not been resolved. The French people know that the system is not financially sustainable and that we have to find a solution.

This is also a potential weak point for the National Rally because Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella have not been perfectly aligned on this question. Jordan Bardella stated in the press that he was in favor of a more flexible system regarding the retirement age, which is different from Marine Le Pen’s position, as she supports a departure age of sixty or sixty-two. There will be debates inside the National Rally on this topic, and they will have to resolve them quickly because pensions will be a central campaign issue.

LJ: Given the current fragmentation of the French parliament, how likely is it that a potential Marine Le Pen administration could successfully implement its radical domestic and European agendas, and where do you foresee the most significant structural challenges to the status quo?

BL: In today’s fragmented political landscape, victory in the presidential election may settle only part of the question. The legislative elections that follow could prove just as consequential, determining whether the next president will actually have the means to govern. Since 2022, and worsened by the elections in 2024, we no longer have an absolute majority in the French Parliament. This is a novel situation under the Fifth Republic, where we almost always had an absolute majority for the president or the prime minister during periods of cohabitation. The year 2027 represents a critical moment.

Today, France is divided into three or four distinct political blocs: the sovereignist far-right bloc led by the National Rally and its allies, the left-wing coalition—which is currently deeply divided between a part of the moderate left and the radical left—and lastly, the center-right bloc. There is no reason to assume that the repetition of legislative elections in 2027 would totally change this distribution. The rupture between the traditional left and the radical left seems highly advanced, and it is unlikely the French people will give an absolute majority to any of these blocs in the legislative election.

Regarding the National Rally, even if they win the presidency and somehow achieve an absolute majority, many of the proposals in their program conflict with our European engagements and even our own constitution. Implementing them would require reforming the constitution. This is a difficult enterprise because you do not change the constitution easily. Adding a “national priority” clause to the constitution would require a modification by referendum, and it is absolutely not certain that the French people would adopt such a text.

There are many open questions. Will they behave similarly to leadership models seen in Italy, meaning being cooperative with Europe and trying to embrace a more conventional policy approach? Or will they radicalize if they obtain power or an absolute majority? It is very hard to answer at this time because the official program of the National Rally has not been published yet due to the prior uncertainty over whether Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella would be the candidate. It will be easier to analyze when the programs are published, allowing us to evaluate how difficult such a program will be to implement in the country.

LJ: How will the French public ultimately evaluate the long-term legacy of outgoing President Emmanuel Macron, particularly regarding his dismantling of the traditional political party system and his mixed record on systemic structural reforms?

BL: This question of the legacy is absolutely key, and the president is obsessed with this issue. There are two ways to address it. First, regarding the promise made of breaking traditional partisan divides, the situation ten years after that promise has changed, but not exactly how people expected. It certainly weakened the traditional left and the traditional right, which is visible in the polls today. To be fair, they were already declining, so Emmanuel Macron just accelerated a political realignment that we also see elsewhere in Europe. The real turning point was 2022 and then 2024, with the disappearance of the absolute majority in parliament and the major gridlock. Unfortunately for him, the snap election and the decision he made in 2024 will remain a major part of his legacy.

There is another way to answer the question, which is more in terms of political legacy. Emmanuel Macron is obsessed with two dimensions: innovation and European sovereignty, alongside his engagement on the international stage. France recently hosted a major international summit, which was an opportunity for him to recall his commitment to the major issues of strategic autonomy, European defense, and the need for greater continental resilience. This focus on European sovereignty and being highly present in international affairs is absolutely key for Emmanuel Macron, and it works for this part of his legacy.

There is the same desire to shape his legacy in another aspect, which is about the competitiveness and attractiveness of the country. A major pro-business showcase initiative, which was created by Emmanuel Macron during his first mandate to attract foreign investment and project an image of economic openness, encapsulates Macronism clearly. By that measure, the policy has delivered tangible results because France has become Europe’s leading destination for foreign direct investment. Even many of Emmanuel Macron’s critics acknowledge the success of this aspect of his record, as the president recently announced a record of ninety-three billion euros in investment commitments.

To conclude, his record on economic issues is much more mixed because unemployment is rising in France, and he has failed to reform the pension system. Most importantly, the public deficit and debt have reached record levels. Many other challenges remain for the future president, including an aging population, education, and access to healthcare. This is a mixed legacy, but he still has ten months remaining in office.

This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movimento Liberal Social and the Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.