![White Terror: A True Story of Murders, Bombings, and Germany’s Far Right with Jacob Kushner [PODCAST]](https://4liberty.eu/phidroav/2026/06/Liberal-Europe-Podcast-Format-1-1024x1024.jpg "White Terror: A True Story of Murders, Bombings, and Germany’s Far Right with Jacob Kushner [PODCAST]")
How dangerous is the far right in Germany? What should we know about the rise of neonazi terrorism? And what is the role of the secret services in Germany? Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Jacob Kushner, an international journalist who reports on migration, terrorism and violent extremism, science and global health in Africa, Germany, and the Caribbean. He is the author of “China’s Congo Plan” and “White Terror: A True Story of Murder, Bombings and Germany’s Far Right”. He teaches journalism at Columbia University in New York.
Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): What is the National Socialist Underground (NSU) movement in Germany, and what motivated your research into this underreported phenomenon?
Jacob Kushner (JK): As a foreign correspondent, I was based in East Africa when I first heard about the National Socialist Underground. I was covering attacks on LGBTQ refugees across East Africa. During the 2014, 2015, and 2016 wave of arrivals of asylum seekers to Europe, I started seeing news reports of attacks against asylum seekers in Germany. I began taking reporting trips to Germany to investigate those attacks in small towns and different regions where people had attempted to burn down shelters to prevent asylum seekers from being housed in their communities.
In the process of conducting that reporting, I heard about the National Socialist Underground. This was a terrorist group that formed and radicalized in the 1990s in the East German town of Jena, a few hours from Berlin. In the 2000s, they committed terrible attacks, murders, and bombings of immigrants and the children of immigrants across Germany. The crimes themselves were shocking, but the other element that shocked the German public when this came to light in 2013 was that these terrorists had evaded capture. For thirteen years, this terrorist group survived while living in hiding in Germany, committing these attacks over many years without being apprehended by the police. That element fascinated me as a journalist. One of our main responsibilities is to hold authorities to account, and I wanted to understand how they evaded capture and how German authorities had looked the other way for so long.
LJ: What is the background of the core members from Jena, and how did they transition from teenagers into radicalized and influential extremists?
JK: The National Socialist Underground was a network, but the three core members grew up as teenagers in the town of Jena during the 1990s. This was a period of high unemployment in Eastern Germany, marked by concerns following the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification, which included the closure of many factories. These were the grievances held by these three individuals. However, it is interesting to note that two of the three individuals never experienced these issues with unemployment themselves, nor did their families.
Uwe Mundlos was the son of a university computer science professor. He was highly proficient with computers and attended college; neither he nor his parents ever lacked employment. Similarly, Uwe Böhnhardt’s family maintained steady employment, although they held more working-class jobs. Beate Zschäpe’s situation was slightly more complicated. Her mother moved back and forth between Bucharest and Jena looking for work, having studied different subjects but never holding a job for an extended period. Her situation was more reflective of the difficulties people were experiencing in Eastern Germany at that time.
Their ideology began to form from being disgruntled with society and feeling that they did not have a rightful place within it. They believed that immigrants were in a better position than they were, which was not factually accurate. They possessed far more opportunities than immigrants did after the fall of the wall. Many guest workers in Eastern Germany lost their jobs entirely, faced visa complications, and had to leave the factories, dockyards, and dormitories where they lived to attempt to build lives on their own for the first time. Their anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic beliefs were not necessarily rooted in their personal financial experiences, though these were the convictions they came to hold.
Their offenses began as teenagers. They engaged in actions such as desecrating Jewish memorials and the graves of Jewish leaders. Eventually, they began experimenting with explosives, placing pipe bombs in stadiums and other locations, including potentially outside the home of an immigrant. They initially radicalized as provocative actors. In 1990s East Germany, there was no more potent way to be provocative or rebellious than by becoming a neo-Nazi. Eventually, they fully adopted a hardline neo-Nazi ideology. They did not develop in isolation; they grew up within a network of far-right extremists across the state of Thuringia, meaning they radicalized within a much larger group.
LJ: Can you describe the ambivalent relationship between the German secret services, the police, and the far-right National Socialist Underground movement, particularly regarding the use of informants?
JK: Readers of the book will become familiar with a character named Tino Brandt. Tino Brandt was probably the ideological leader of the far-right scene in that state. He worked for a far-right publishing house, putting out right-wing books. On his off time, he organized far-right rallies and convened the groups. He conducted legal training sessions for neo-Nazis on how to avoid apprehension when carrying weapons in their vehicles or how to interact with the police so that they could execute violent attacks. He functioned as a ringleader. Tino Brandt was also an informant for the state intelligence agency. This ringleader of the far-right scene was receiving German taxpayer money, which, by his own admission later, he invested directly back into the scene. It was German taxpayer money that helped fund the extremist network within which the National Socialist Underground terrorists radicalized.
Regarding the relationship between the police and the intelligence agencies, the police were at one point investigating Tino Brandt and his network for approximately thirty crimes, ranging from desecrating memorials to violence against left-wing activists. When the police approached prosecutors to secure charges against Brandt and his co-conspirators, Thuringia’s intelligence agency intervened to protect him because he was their informant. They admitted this intervention. Even though he was not supplying useful intelligence, they paid him simply to maintain a well-placed informant.
This conflict came to a head when the police finally obtained a warrant to search Tino Brandt’s home and computer. His intelligence handler learned of the impending search the night before and warned Brandt to hide his computer because the police were coming. The next morning, Tino Brandt was waiting at the door for the police and willingly handed over his computer; however, the hard drive had been removed because he had been forewarned. Germany’s state intelligence agency actively thwarted the police from performing their duties and assisted an accused criminal in evading justice. This demonstrates the environment of that period and why it was unlikely that the intelligence agency would take the network that became the National Socialist Underground seriously.
LJ: What allowed these individuals to function for thirteen years and commit numerous violent crimes against immigrants without being apprehended?
JK: The trio’s time in Jena concluded when the police obtained a warrant to search their garages, where they had been manufacturing bombs. The trio escaped because the police mismanaged the operation that day, and the three individuals were never seen together publicly again. They lived in hiding in various East German towns for years. Their ability to evade capture was facilitated by a vast network of friends who rented apartments for them and secured the camper vans utilized to rob fifteen banks to fund their operations. They received substantial assistance in procuring weapons and logistical support from this network.
The failure of the police to apprehend them occurred because the police were not looking for them. Each time an immigrant was murdered, the police arrived at the scene and immediately placed blame on the victim. Whether the victim was a Turkish man in his kebab shop or a hardware store, the police automatically attributed the crime to the Turkish mafia or conflicts involving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They treated the scenes exclusively as organized crime. The police spent their time interrogating family members—demanding that wives, daughters, sons, or fathers admit who executed the victim or what controversies existed—instead of identifying the actual culprits. The police were blinded by institutional racism to the extent that they could not fathom that white Germans were executing these attacks rather than immigrants. This perspective allowed the violence to continue for so long.
Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies maintained numerous informants like Tino Brandt within these far-right scenes. They either never received information regarding the National Socialist Underground, which some analysts consider unlikely, or they received information but failed to act upon it, mirroring their earlier conduct in Thuringia. The book follows an intelligence agent who spoke with me regarding his handling of a far-right informant who may have possessed ties to the National Socialist Underground network.
The evasion of justice resulted from a combination of institutional racism by the police and a refusal by the intelligence agencies to risk compromising their informants to protect immigrant populations. When an agency acts on intelligence from an informant, they often compromise that source and terminate their utility. This raises the question of why the intelligence agencies funneled taxpayer money to far-right extremists—who used those funds to perpetrate attacks—and then refused to utilize those sources to protect the public and immigrant communities.
LJ: Do double standards exist regarding domestic far-right terrorism compared to foreign-based or Islamist terrorism? If double standards exist, what factors explain this discrepancy?
JK: Double standards certainly exist. Before even comparing far-right terrorism to Islamist terrorism, one can observe how authorities treat left-wing terrorism. When speaking to authorities in Germany, they state that at the time these attacks occurred, they did not conceptualize right-wing violence as terrorism. Instead, their historical framework for terrorism was the Red Army Faction, which engaged in kidnapping bank executives, hijacking airplanes, and other left-wing militancy. This is the defense authorities offer for why they initially interpreted these murders as organized crime. Authorities maintain a bias because they are traditionally accustomed to investigating left-wing terrorism rather than right-wing terrorism.
As an American, I observe a vast bias in the United States regarding the treatment of far-right extremists versus Islamist ones, both before and after September 11. In the book The Terror Factory, journalist Trevor Aaronson demonstrates how the United States government fabricated numerous Islamist terrorist cases after September 11 through methods resembling entrapment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation would identify mentally unstable Muslim individuals, convince them to act on their anger, and involve them in plots to acquire weapons for an attack. The Federal Bureau of Investigation engineered these scenarios to secure convictions and demonstrate that the agency was taking Islamist terrorism seriously.
This discrepancy persists in modern terrorist attacks perpetrated by white individuals in the United States. Dylann Roof, the white extremist who massacred Black churchgoers in Charleston, released a manifesto explaining his motives; nevertheless, prosecutors did not charge him under terrorism statutes. This represents a failure to define terrorism accurately. Prosecutors may have believed they could not secure a terrorism conviction because an American jury might not conceptualize the act as terrorism, which illustrates the divergence in public perception.
The public frequently associates terrorism exclusively with Islamist extremism; however, since September 11, more Americans have been killed by far-right extremists than by Islamist ones. There have been three times as many far-right attacks as Islamist attacks in the United States, and Germany has similarly experienced more far-right attacks than Islamist ones.
The understanding of what constitutes terrorism requires reassessment. A few years ago, there was a coup attempt in Germany by the Reichsbürger group to overthrow the government. One of the ringleaders, Heinrich XIII Prince Reuss, resided in a castle near the Saale River. Upon his arrest, Der Spiegel described him as an aristocratic man wearing a tweed jacket, noting he did not resemble a typical terrorist. That journalistic assessment was incorrect. In countries where the population is predominantly white, such as Germany and the United States, the empirical data demonstrates that most terrorists are white, right-wing males, precisely like Prince Reuss. A persistent error remains among the public and journalists to associate terrorism primarily with Islamist groups, even though data indicates it is predominantly a far-right extremist phenomenon.
LJ: Has the revelation of the National Socialist Underground case and subsequent coup plots fundamentally altered the institutional culture surrounding far-right extremism in Germany, or is the threat still largely minimized amid the political rise of anti-immigrant movements like the Alternative for Germany?
JK: There is substantial research regarding the correlation between radical rhetoric and political violence. Following the exposure of the National Socialist Underground, a five-year trial of five involved members occurred, which is chronicled in the book. This exposure caused widespread shock across Germany. The Bundestag initiated three separate investigations into the National Socialist Underground to determine how the group evaded detection. Consequently, the heads of the federal intelligence agency and one or two state intelligence agencies were dismissed and replaced.
The current environment produces contradictory indicators, suggesting that Germany has implemented certain institutional reforms while facing persistent vulnerabilities. Public awareness has increased regarding far-right extremism within the German military and police forces. For instance, a group of police officers in Baden-Württemberg was discovered communicating about executing a terrorist attack and framing immigrants to incite a race war.
Similarly, a soldier named Franco Albrecht was apprehended planning a terrorist attack using weapons siphoned from the military with the intention of framing an immigrant to instigate a race war. While these cases demonstrate that the threat remains prevalent, their exposure indicates that authorities are actively investigating and uncovering these networks. It remains difficult to determine whether this reflects improved enforcement or if these cases represent merely a fraction of undetected extremist activity.
Nevertheless, Germany maintains a more rigorous approach to these threats than the United States. In the United States, far-right groups such as the Oath Keepers have actively recruited active-duty personnel and veterans into militias for years, yet political appetite to confront this institutional infiltration remains low. During the Obama administration, the Department of Homeland Security drafted a report illustrating how far-right groups targeted the United States military for recruitment. The subsequent public and political backlash against President Obama for releasing parts of this report was so intense that the administration officially retracted the document. This reaction illustrates the domestic resistance within the United States to acknowledging the scope of far-right violence.
In that specific context, Germany demonstrates greater institutional willingness to confront the issue, though the intelligence sector has experienced minimal structural change. Hans-Georg Maaßen, who served as the head of Germany’s federal domestic intelligence agency for several years, maintained well-documented far-right associations and was described by Die Zeit as the Steve Bannon of Germany. Furthermore, the Bundestag exercises limited parliamentary oversight over these intelligence agencies. The public lacks access to accountability regarding the number of active informants utilized by the state, and the Bundestag itself receives highly restricted information. Consequently, the extent of fundamental systemic change remains uncertain.
Societies face profound difficulty when acknowledging that domestic actors constitute their primary security threat. A significant illustration involves Gordian Meyer-Plath, a German intelligence handler who later became the head of a state-level intelligence agency. During a visit to the Oklahoma City National Memorial—the site of a domestic bombing by a white extremist that killed 168 people—he observed that the memorial bookstore featured extensive literature on global Islamist extremism, yet lacked books addressing the specific type of domestic terrorism that had occurred at that location. This observation highlights the persistent societal resistance, particularly within the United States, to accurately recognizing and addressing domestic terrorism for what it truly is.
LJ: Given that appeasement and shifting the political spectrum to the right have failed to disarm movements like the Alternative for Germany or reduce far-right extremism, what structural strategies should Europeans and Americans implement to counter this threat?
JK: You discussed this with a previous guest, and it is clear that centrist or center-right parties cannot appease individuals who hold anti-immigrant views. Xenophobic beliefs often do not correlate with rational or economic motivations. Moving further to the right does not work when voters have an alternative option, such as the Alternative for Germany or the Republican Party in the United States, that is explicitly opposed to immigration. Political party leaders must consider the existing research demonstrating that appeasement fails as a strategy.
In Europe, this presents a difficult balance. Liberals are frequently cautious regarding excessive state interference and expanding the authority of intelligence agencies. In Germany, these intelligence agencies have historically been managed by individuals who sometimes sympathized with these extremists, or who were at least unwilling to utilize their intelligence to protect immigrant populations.
The primary requirement in Germany and across Europe is to acknowledge the true nature of these threats by gathering and releasing comprehensive statistics. It was only relatively recently that Germany began releasing police data focused specifically on far-right violence alongside data on left-wing and Islamist violence. Addressing the problem begins with identifying where terrorism originates. Journalists also share this responsibility, as global coverage routinely favors Islamist attacks over far-right ones.
Political parties must stop acting under the assumption that xenophobia will disappear if they simply adjust their policies toward those voters. A healthy political environment requires distinct parties with clear, competing platforms so the public has a transparent choice. We see this struggle in the United States as well, where the Democratic Party faces difficulties articulating its position on these issues. President Barack Obama deported more individuals than any other president in modern United States history. Democratic leaders must decide whether they will attempt to emulate the immigration policies of Donald Trump or establish an independent, distinct platform. As a journalist, I see the need for a clear differentiation between political parties on the issue of immigration.
Jacob Kushner will be a guest during this year’s edition of the Freedom Games, a festival of ideas co-organized by the European Liberal Forum on October 23-25, 2026, in Lodz, Poland.
Find out more: https://igrzyskawolnosci.pl/event/igrzyska-wolnosci-2026
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movimento Liberal Social and the Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.